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General introduction
According to Varian (1982), applied demand analysis typically ad-
dresses three sorts of issues concerning the behavioral model. [Var-
ian (1984) suggests analogous issues in a production setting.] (i) Test
consistency with the behavioral model under study. Given consistency
with the behavioral model: (ii) recover consumer preferences (or the un-
derlying technical constraints in the production setting); (iii) forecast
behavior in other economic environments (e.g. other price configura-
tions).
The consistency issue is of course the crucial one, since we first need a
characterization of the behavioral model in order to be able to tackle
the other two issues. The objective in this work is this first methodolog-
ical step, in which we model collective rationality ; as such we develop
nonparametric tests for the collective model of multi-person household
consumption behavior (see Chiappori, 1988 and 1992, and Varian, 1982,
for seminal work). Given this approach, some may argue that we are
‘non-standard’ for two reasons. Firstly, we do not opt for the tradi-
tional unitary approach for modeling the household consumption be-
havior. This standard approach assumes that the household acts as if
it were a single-decision maker that is maximizing his/her preferences;
as such, this approach ignores the individual preferences of the house-
hold members and the intrahousehold decision process. Secondly, most
behavioral models are parametric in nature, meaning that they rely
on ‘ad-hoc’ (or ‘non-verifiable’) functional specifications of the pref-
erences and the decision process. Below we argue that both standard
approaches have serious deficiencies. We avoid these deficiencies by us-
ing a collective model and revealed preference axioms for testing the
consumption behavior of multi-person households.
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The collective model explicitly recognizes that a household is formed
by individuals with own, possibly different, rational preferences. These
individuals are assumed to engage in a bargaining process that re-
sults in a Pareto efficient intrahousehold allocation. So, instead of as-
suming a specific bargaining strategy, such as, e.g., the one underly-
ing Nash bargaining or Kalai-Smorodinsky, the collective model starts
from the sole assumption that the outcome should be Pareto efficient.
Although this starting point incorporates the ‘cooperative’ strategies
(since these typically result in Pareto efficient outcomes), it of course
excludes some noncooperative strategies (which sometimes lead to in-
efficient outcomes). Nevertheless, since Pareto efficiency implies that
there is ‘no money left on the table’, Chiappori argues that the Pareto
efficiency assumption naturally extends the traditional individual ra-
tionality requirement towards collective rationality ; by exhausting the
budget the members try to maximize their preferences (see Chapter
1 for an extended discussion; see also Chiappori, 1988, and Chiappori
and Ekeland, 2005).
In this work we mainly focus on the consumption behavior of house-
holds, but, straightforwardly, our results also hold for the decision pro-
cess of groups of individuals. Of course, only for those groups where
the Pareto efficiency assumption is justifiable or can at least be used
as a benchmark case (see Chiappori and Ekeland, 2005 and 2006, for
an extended discussion).
The fact that the collective approach takes individual preferences (and
not ‘household preferences’) as the starting point, makes it, contrary to
the unitary approach, particularly useful for addressing methodologi-
cal (welfare-related) questions that specifically relate to the within-
household distribution of the household means. A first step in address-
ing such questions (which is of course the ultimate goal of the theory)
is the characterization and testing of the household behavior. However,
to obtain concrete answers to such welfare-related questions, one also
needs to identify the structural model underlying the observed behav-
ior. In this work, we only focus on the first step, namely characterizing
and testing the collective model; but, of course, this characterization
opens the avenue for tackling recovery and forecasting questions in the
(near) future.
In his original work, Chiappori (1988) focuses on a restricted collective
model. He considers a labor supply setting that involves a number of
convenient simplifications for the empirical analyst, such as observabil-
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ity of the individuals’ labor supply (or leisure), egoistic agents and the
exclusion of public consumption within the household.1
Browning and Chiappori (1998) provide a characterization of a gen-
eral collective model that includes public consumption and preferences
which allow for altruism and other externalities. Moreover, they start
from the ‘minimalistic’ assumption that the empirical analyst cannot
determine which goods are privately and/or publicly consumed within
the household, and, that the quantities that are privately consumed
by the different household members cannot be observed. As such they
avoid the above mentioned simplifications and obtain a general collec-
tive model. Browning and Chiappori (1998) derive a necessity condition
for collectively rational household behavior, while Chiappori and Eke-
land (2006) address the associated sufficiency question. Contrary to
the unitary model, the collective model entails empirical restrictions
that seem more difficult to reject when tested on multi-person house-
hold data (see, e.g., Fortin and Lacroix, 1997, Browning and Chiappori,
1998, Vermeulen, 2005, and Cherchye and Vermeulen, 2007).
One inherent difficulty in the usual testing of behavioral models (as,
e.g., the ones mentioned above) is that they implicitly rely on non-
verifiable assumptions concerning the functional structure of prefer-
ences and, if needed, the intrahousehold bargaining process. Therefore,
such standard parametric tests do not only check a model’s theoreti-
cal implications, but also the ad-hoc functional specifications that are
assumed.
By definition, nonparametric tests do not assume any functional specifi-
cation regarding the household consumption process. They directly test
the adequacy of a theory on the raw quantity and price data by means
of revealed preference axioms. Building further on the seminal work of,
among others, Afriat (1967), Varian (1982) conceived a necessary and
sufficient condition for individual rationality, which is captured in the
well-known Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP). See,
e.g., Varian (2006), for an up-to-date overview of the revealed prefer-
ence methodology and Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2003, 2007)
for recent developments.
Nonparametric tests of the collective model have been very scarce up
to now. Along with parametric restrictions, Chiappori (1988) also de-
rived nonparametric implications of his collective labor supply model
1 To be precise, we have to note that Chiappori also considered a more general case
by dropping the assumption of egoistic agents.
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under study. Based on this work, Snyder (2000) and Cherchye and
Vermeulen (2007) developed nonparametric tests for this restrictive
collective model. Since this labor supply setting involves a number of
convenient simplifications, we want to develop and apply nonparamet-
ric tests of general collective models that do not rely on these restrictive
assumptions.
In the first chapter we introduce the two main features of this disserta-
tion. We start by discussing the collective approach for modeling house-
hold consumption behavior by comparing it to alternative approaches.
Secondly, we introduce GARP which forms the basis for nonparamet-
ric tests of individual rationality. As such, we present the necessary
background for understanding the results in Chapters 2 to 4. We end
Chapter 1 by showing how we can apply the insights of the collective
approach to analyze the cost efficiency of multi-output firms.
The core chapter of this dissertation is Chapter 2, in which we aim at
generalizing Chiappori’s work (1988,1992) by providing a nonparamet-
ric characterization of the collective consumption model of Browning
and Chiappori (1998), which includes both public consumption and
externalities. Besides this nonparametric characterization, we also de-
rive testable necessary and sufficient conditions for data consistency
with this general model. As we will explain, these latter conditions are
solely based on observable aggregate information. So, in this chapter
we obtain our nonparametric tests for the general collective model of
household consumption behavior.
In Chapter 3 we apply these nonparametric tests to data drawn from
the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey. The panel structure of this
data set allows us to apply the tests to each separate household; as such
we avoid the assumption of homogeneous preferences across households.
Although our sample covers time series of only eight observations, there
is, as we will show, enough relative price variation to meaningfully test
behavioral models. In this way, we obtain a first nonparametric test of
a general collective model, with public consumption and externalities,
that uses ‘real-life’ data.
Next, since the general collective model cannot be rejected by the data
at hand, we further propose in Chapter 3 a novel approach to model
restricted versions of the general collective model. Specifically, we con-
sider the possibility of including alternative positions regarding the
sharing rule that applies to each household. This central concept in
collective models captures the distribution of the household means over
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the household members. In fact, as we will demonstrate, this approach
also obtains the unitary model as a special case of the general model.
In our empirical application we nonparametrically test these plausible,
but more restrictive, alternatives of the general collective consump-
tion model, which imply alternative prior assumptions regarding the
structure of the sharing rule. Besides presenting the test results, we
also include a power analysis (like the one of Bronars, 1987) for the
different specifications of the collective model.
In Chapter 4 we present a second application of our nonparametric
tests of collective models, but now on the basis of experimental data.
Our empirical application mainly focuses on an ‘egoistic model’, i.e.
a collective model with egoistic individuals and no public consump-
tion. Of course, when this restrictive collective model is rejected, we
also consider the general model. In this chapter we want to investigate
the ‘appropriateness’ of the egoistic model, since empirical applications
of collective models mostly assume this restrictive model; the parsimo-
nious nature of the model allows for a more powerful empirical analysis.
For our laboratory test, we consider an unsophisticated consumption
setting, involving a very limited number of commodities and a low bud-
get. The underlying argument is that, if the egoistic model is to hold
in the more sophisticated settings, then it must certainly hold for this
unsophisticated setting.
The laboratory nature of experiments effectively avoids the usual pref-
erence heterogeneity and data problems. In fact, it has been argued
that the nonparametric testing tools are especially useful within an ex-
perimental context; a particularly convincing case is provided by Sippel
(1997), who focuses on individual rationality. Moreover, the experimen-
tal set-up allows us to obtain extra information on consumption quan-
tities for the individual group members. Up till now, ‘real-life’ data
sets mostly only contain aggregate household quantities and therefore
do not reveal the individual members’ consumption quantities. As we
will show, this additional information allows for more powerful tests of
the collective consumption model.
Our study complements the existing nonparametric-experimental lit-
erature that focuses on the appropriateness of the utility maximiza-
tion model for describing rational individual behavior; see, e.g., Sip-
pel (1997), Harbaugh, Krause and Berry (2001), Andreoni and Miller
(2002) and references therein.
XXII General introduction
In the first chapters we consider a bargaining context in which individ-
uals maximize their utility given the household budget. Browning and
Chiappori (1998) present a dual representation of this maximization
program by adapting the dual reformulations for individuals towards
households. More precisely, duality implies that rational individuals
minimize their expenditures given their utility level; analogously col-
lectively rational households minimize their expenditure given both the
‘household utility’ and the bargaining power (see, e.g., Browning and
Chiappori, 1998, for more details).
In the final Chapter 5, this reformulation of collective rationality forms
the basis for applying the collective approach to the cost efficiency of
multi-output firms. Indeed, firms are rational if they are expenditure
minimizing (or cost efficient). We exploit the insights of Chapter 2 to
provide a nonparametric characterization of cost efficient behavior of
multi-output production firms. We take as starting point that in the
cost minimization process such firms benefit from economies of scope,
which in turn originate from joint input use and input externalities.
Economies of scope can be loosely defined as situations where the aver-
age total cost of production decreases as a result of increasing the num-
ber of different goods produced (see, e.g., Baumol, Panzar and Willig,
1982). Our approach extends the (nonparametric) results for single-
output firms (see Varian, 1984) by exploiting the scope economies in
the multi-output production process.
We stress that we do not present a methodology for investigating the
extent to which economies of scope are actually present. Rather, we
present a method for analyzing cost efficient production behavior that
exploits a number of specific features related to scope economies. As we
will show, these tests are directly linked to the nonparametric efficiency
assessment literature known as Data Envelopment Analysis (see, e.g.,
Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes, 1978, and Cooper, Seiford and Tone,
2000, for an introduction).
We end this chapter by applying our methodology to assess the cost
efficiency of research programs in Economics and Business Manage-
ment Faculties of Dutch universities. This application shows that our
method results in a more powerful efficiency analysis, as compared to
standard methods, such as, e.g., the method of Cherchye and Vanden
Abeele (2005).
Finally, note that the different chapters of this thesis were first written
as separate papers (except for the preliminary Chapter 1). While we
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have tried to keep the repetition of the arguments to a strict minimum,
we also included some ‘functional’ overlap, in order to improve the
exposition of the ideas. Moreover, by repeating the crucial concepts in
alternative ways, we hope to better sketch the intuition behind them.

Chapter 1
The collective approach and revealed
preferences: setting the stage
Abstract
In this chapter we introduce the several concepts that we will use in this
dissertation. We start by discussing the collective approach and present
the general collective model of Browning and Chiappori (1998). Sec-
ondly, we introduce the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preferences
(GARP), which forms the basis for nonparametric demand analysis.
Finally, we explain the conceptual analogy between consumption of
multi-person households and multi-output production. As such we pro-
vide the necessary background for understanding the next chapters.
2 Chapter 1: Setting the stage
1.1 Introduction
The goal of this dissertation is to develop and apply nonparametric
tests of collective choice behavior for both consumption and produc-
tion settings. In this chapter we introduce and motivate the several
concepts that are related to this objective; as such we hope to provide
the necessary intuition to understand the results of the next chapters.
The main part of this thesis consists of analyzing household consump-
tion behavior for multi-person households given their restricted budget.
In the literature, we can broadly identify three different approaches to
model this behavior (see, e.g., Vermeulen, 2002, Donni, 2007, and Lund-
berg and Pollak, 2007, for general overviews).
Firstly, there is the standard unitary approach which assumes that the
(multi-person) household acts as if it were a single decision maker; it
maximizes a well-behaved (single) utility function subject to a house-
hold budget constraint. This approach therefore implies that the in-
dividual preferences of the members can be aggregated into a single
household utility function, which is of course a strong assumption.
A totally different approach, which acknowledges the individual prefer-
ences of the household members, are the models that start from strate-
gic behavior ; each individual tries to maximize his or her own util-
ity function given the strategy of the other individuals. Although this
approach explicitly recognizes the individual preferences, it is again
not completely satisfactory given the context of household behavior for
which we may expect that there is (some) cooperative behavior. Indeed,
strategic approaches may lead to Pareto inefficient outcomes, implying
that it is possible to make one member better off without making the
other members worse off.
The collective approach simultaneously deals with the above remarks
by explicitly recognizing that the individual household members have
own, possibly different, rational preferences and that these individu-
als enter into a bargaining process to divide the available budget. The
sole assumption on this bargaining process is that it results in a Pareto
efficient outcome. In Section 1.2 we discuss more formally the three dif-
ferent approaches and, as such, we motivate our choice for the collective
approach.
Most empirical studies of behavioral models, such as, e.g., the ones
introduced in Section 1.2, are typically parametric in nature; i.e. they
critically rely on a (non-verifiable) functional structure for representing
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the individual preferences and, if needed, the bargaining process. This
implies that standard parametric tests do not only check a model’s the-
oretical implications, but also the ad-hoc functional specifications that
are assumed. A rejection of a behavioral model may thus well be due to
misspecifications. In this dissertation, we follow a different approach, la-
beled the nonparametric approach, which analyzes household behavior
without imposing any parametric structure on e.g. preferences. Instead,
using revealed preference axioms, the nonparametric approach tests the
restrictions of the behavioral model directly on the ‘raw’ price-quantity
data. See, e.g., Afriat (1967), Varian (1982) and, more recently, Blun-
dell, Browning and Crawford (2003, 2007). As such, our tests are more
robust since they cannot be influenced by misspecifications of the func-
tional forms. In Section 1.3 we present this nonparametric methodology.
As already mentioned, we do not only consider consumption settings,
but we also apply the collective approach to a multi-output produc-
tion setting. In Section 1.4 we argue that the results of the collective
model can indeed be easily adapted towards this production setting.
Moreover, we show that the extra information, contained in the firms
observed outputs (as counterpart to the unobserved individual utilities
in the consumption context), enables us to develop powerful tests for
analyzing the efficiency of these multi-output firms.
1.2 Modeling consumption behavior of multi-person
households
In the following sections we consider alternative ways to characterize
the consumption behavior of multi-person households. Suppose we ob-
serve T choices of n-valued bundles. For each observation j the vector
qj ∈ Rn+ denotes the chosen quantities under the prices pj ∈ Rn++; and
S = {(pj ;qj), j = 1, ..., T} represents the set of all observations for the
household under study.
1.2.1 The unitary approach
The standard unitary model assumes that the household acts as a single
decision maker who tries to maximize its preferences. A necessary and
sufficient condition for the observed behavior to be consistent with
the utility maximization hypothesis is that there exists a (nonsatiated)
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utility function U that rationalizes the data, i.e. for all j = 1, . . . T the
value U(qj) equals
max
q∈Rn+
U(q) s.t. p′jq ≤ p′jqj . (1.1)
This maximization problem leads to demand functions which have the
well-known properties: (i) adding up, (ii) homogeneity, (iii) symmetry
and negative semi-definiteness of the Slutsky matrix. Although these
properties are very convenient in practice, they are, especially the sym-
metry condition, often rejected in empirical studies. See, e.g., Deaton
and Muellbauer (1980), Blundell (1988), Browning and Meghir (1991),
Fortin and Lacroix (1997), Browning and Chiappori (1998), Vermeulen
(2005) and Cherchye and Vermeulen (2007).
While the above empirical evidence focuses on rejection of the proper-
ties of the demand functions, there is another implication of the unitary
model that is clearly rejected by the data. The straitjacket of the uni-
tary model also implies the income pooling hypothesis, which means
that the source of the household income should not have any effect on
the intrahousehold allocation. Not surprisingly, this restriction is also
clearly rejected by the data. See, e.g., Thomas (1990), Bourguignon et
al. (1993), Browning et al. (1994), Lundberg et al. (1997) and Fortin
and Lacroix (1997).
Besides this overwhelming empirical evidence, the unitary approach
is mainly criticized on methodological grounds. By assuming that the
household acts as a single agent, or equivalently by assuming ‘household
preferences’, the unitary model ignores the principle of methodological
individualism which states that social theories should run in terms of
individuals, rather than in terms of groups of individuals (see, e.g.,
Blaug, 1980). As such the unitary model does not take into account
that the individuals in the group have different preferences, and that
among them an intrahousehold decision process takes place. Of course,
the distinction between household and individual preferences becomes
irrelevant if all members have the same preferences (and therefore there
is no decision process needed) or if the household preferences coincide
with the individual preferences of one member (which then acts as a
‘paternalistic dictator’). In all other scenarios, the household prefer-
ences can be seen as the aggregate of the individual preferences. This
is a strong assumption, given that since the well-known impossibility
theorem of Arrow (see, e.g., Arrow, 1963), we know that we need extra
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(restrictive) conditions to aggregate individual preferences (see, e.g.,
Pollak, 2007 for discussion) . A notable example are the Gorman ag-
gregation conditions, from which one can derive that, because of the
quasi-homothetic preferences, the Engel curves are linear in terms of the
total expenditures (see, e.g., Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980 for an ex-
tensive discussion). Clearly this last implication is not what we observe
in the data (see, e.g., Vermeulen, 2002, Donni, 2007, and Lundberg and
Pollak, 2007, for discussion).
As we will show in Section 1.2.3 the collective approach conveniently
deals with the above drawbacks of the unitary model. Starting from in-
dividual preferences, it will derive testable properties of demand func-
tions and avoid the income pooling hypothesis. In general, any model
that acknowledges the individual preferences of the household members
(such as, e.g., the collective model), allows for addressing (normative)
welfare related questions concerning the intrahousehold allocation.
A first type of such questions fits within the ‘targeting view’ of Blun-
dell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005), which states that the effectiveness
of a specific benefit or tax also depends on the particular household
member to whom it has been targeted. These authors argue that the
collective model is well equipped to investigate such statements, while
the unitary model, since it implies income pooling, can of course not
deal with such considerations.
Related to this is the recovery of the so-called ‘sharing rule’ that divides
the aggregate household means over the individual household members
(see Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel, 2006, for a discussion of this
sharing rule concept in a parametric treatment of the collective con-
sumption model). Recovering this sharing rule, and subsequently ex-
plaining its variation in terms of household (member) characteristics,
can yield useful insights into the distribution of the within-household
bargaining power across the individual household members (see, e.g.,
Browning et al., 1994; Browning and Chiappori, 1998; Chiappori and
Ekeland, 2006). This issue is irrelevant in the unitary approach, given
that it does not model the intrahousehold decision process.
Another type of questions follows from the fact that models starting
from individual preferences allow for analyzing welfare at the individ-
ual household member level rather than at the aggregate household
level. For instance, Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2006) suggest a
collective approach for comparing the cost of living of individuals living
alone with that of the same individuals living in a multi-member house-
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hold. Again, the unitary model can not tackle such questions, since it
ignores the individual preferences.
1.2.2 The strategic approach
The strategic approach deals with the criticism that the unitary model
does not start from individual preferences; it assumes that household
members maximize their individual utility, given the optimal strategy
of the other members. See, e.g., Ulph (1988), Browning (2000), Chen
and Woolley (2001), Lechene and Preston (2005, 2007) for applications.
Of course, this Nash equilibrium setting implies other restrictions on
the household behavior than the unitary approach. Moreover these re-
strictions often result in rather weak tests of the behavioral model,
certainly in comparison to the unitary model.
The main implication is of course that noncooperative models may re-
sult in Pareto inefficient intrahousehold allocations, implying that in
such cases, individuals can be made better off without making other
members worse off. Although there are many settings that indeed
lead to Pareto inefficient outcomes, there are some intuitive arguments
which support that household consumption behavior is not an example
of such a setting. Firstly, assuming Pareto efficient outcomes imply that
no member can be made better off without making another member
worse off. So the members use all opportunities for Pareto improve-
ments, which is also referred to as there is ‘no money left on the table’.
As such, Pareto efficiency seems the natural generalization of individual
rationality towards our multi-person settings. Indeed, assuming Pareto
efficiency means that the household is collectively rational since the
household members exhaust the budget to maximize their utility (see,
e.g., Chiappori, 1988).
In order to present more ‘game theoretic’ arguments, we start by noting
that household consumption behavior is a nice example of a repeated
game. Indeed, the households have to take, on a regular basis, the
same consumption decisions (e.g. the expenditures on nondurables).
This repetitive character justifies, at least to some extent, to assume
that all members in the household know the preferences of the other
members or, more generally, that there is symmetric information. In
such a setting, bargaining (and cooperative) models typically lead to
Pareto efficient outcomes. In our opinion, these cooperative techniques
form the natural starting point for modeling multi-person household
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consumption behavior. At least if we assume that the members volun-
tarily form a household and can therefore use the threat to leave the
household.
Secondly, also in the noncooperative framework we may expect Pareto
efficient outcomes. It is well known that in repeated games with sym-
metric information, cooperation often emerges as the long run equilib-
rium. Certainly if one considers an infinite time horizon, which is again
tenable in our setting.
A final game theoretic argument is the fact that, in our opinion, it
seems too restrictive to assume that there is no communication in the
‘noncooperative games’ used to model household behavior. Note that
communication also includes the possibility to sign contracts in order to
force commitment or to make threats (such as e.g. leaving the house-
hold) credible. Again, games with communication make it easier to
support Pareto efficient outcomes. See, e.g., Aumann and Hart (1994)
and Myerson (1997) for more formal discussions concerning these ‘game
theoretic’ arguments.
We believe that the above, only intuitive, arguments show that it is
plausible to assume that the members in the household find mecha-
nisms to support Pareto efficient outcomes. If not, we can at least use
the collective approach to verify this statement: if the data rejects the
restrictions of the collective approach, one may interpret this as rejec-
tion of the Pareto efficiency assumption. In this respect, we also refer
to the formal discussion of Pareto efficiency in Lechene and Preston
(2007). Using a ‘household Nash equilibrium model’, they show that
their strategic model leads to different restrictions on the household
demand than the collective models (see also our discussion at the end
of Section 1.2.3). We can therefore use the collective model as a bench-
mark, namely what the members could have obtained if they reached
a Pareto efficient outcome.
Finally, to end this plea, most studies seem to suggest that the collective
model better fits the data. See, e.g., Fortin and Lacroix (1997), Brown-
ing and Chiappori (1998) Vermeulen (2005), Cherchye and Vermeulen
(2007) and our applications in Chapter 3 and 4. One exception is the
study of Udry (1996) on African agricultural data; see also Akresh
(2005), for a recent discussion, which challenges Udry’s conclusions.
Nevertheless, we believe that it is certainly interesting to investigate
the restrictions one may derive from assuming Pareto efficient behavior.
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1.2.3 The collective approach
As argued in the previous sections, in order to model multi-person
household consumption behavior we need a model which acknowledges
the individual preferences of the members and leads to Pareto efficient
outcomes. An obvious starting point for such models is the axiomatic
bargaining theory; using specific bargaining rules, one specifies how he
household members divide the gains of living together. See for instance
Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney (1981) and McElroy
(1990) for results concerning the Kalai-Smorodinsky and Nash bargain-
ing solution.
However, an important drawback of choosing an explicit bargaining
model is that, if the empirical restrictions are rejected, then it could
be difficult to determine which specific bargaining rule (such as for
instance Pareto efficiency) causes this rejection. Therefore, Chiappori
(1988, 1992) introduces the collective approach in which he takes a
common property of the bargaining strategies as starting point, i.e.
the intrahousehold decision process results in a Pareto efficient out-
come. In contrast to bargaining models, which result in a specific point
on the Pareto frontier, Chiappori does not specify in which point on
the Pareto frontier the household will end up. Now, given that most
bargaining models assume Pareto efficient outcomes, all these mod-
els certainly have to satisfy the empirical restrictions of the collective
model. Or equivalently, rejection of the collective model raises serious
doubts about the bargaining (or cooperative) approach and henceforth
the Pareto efficiency assumption.
The collective model introduced in Chiappori (1988,1992) restricts at-
tention to a labor supply setting, which involves a number of convenient
simplifications for the empirical analyst (e.g., observability of house-
hold members’ leisure/labour supply and no public consumption). In
this dissertation we focus on the more general collective model intro-
duced by Browning and Chiappori (1998), implying that we include
public consumption and preferences that allow for externalities (in-
cluding altruism). Moreover, Browning and Chiappori also start from
the (minimal) assumption that the empirical analyst only observes
aggregate demands and prices (i.e. (s)he only observes the data set
S = {(pj ;qj), j = 1, ..., T}).
To introduce the model of Browning and Chiappori (1998), we fo-
cus on two-member households. The generalization towards M -person
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households is straightforward. Since the general collective consumption
model allows for both externalities and public consumption inside the
household, it is of course not the aggregate consumption bundle q that
generates utility for the individuals, but the disaggregated intrahouse-
hold allocation of this bundle:
q = q1 + q2 + qh,
with q1,q2 ∈ Rn+ the (unobserved) private consumption quantities of
members 1 and 2, and qh ∈ Rn+ the (unobserved) public consumption
quantities. In principle, a consumption commodity can be used for pri-
vate consumption as well as public consumption (or combinations of
both). For example, a car can be partly used by member 1 to drive to
his/her work (i.e. private consumption), and also partly used by the
household to go on a family trip (i.e. public consumption).
Each individual has preferences, defined over these intrahousehold al-
locations, which are represented by the utility functions Um(q1,q2,qh)
(m = 1, 2). Thus, both members’ utilities depend on q1 and q2, which
captures the possibility of consumption externalities, as well as on qh,
which captures public consumption.
Using this, we follow Chiappori (1988) to define a necessary and suf-
ficient condition for collective rationality (see also Browning and Chi-
appori, 1998, for a parametric counterpart). A pair of (monotonically
increasing) utility functions U1 and U2 collectively rationalize the set
S if and only if there exists for each observation j = 1, . . . T : (i) disag-
gregated quantities (q1j ,q
2
j ,q
h
j ) and (ii) a weight µj ∈ R++, such that
the value U1(q1j ,q
2
j ,q
h
j ) + µjU
2(q1j ,q
2
j ,q
h
j ) equals
max
q1,q2,qh∈Rn+
U1(q1,q2,qh) + µjU2(q1,q2,qh)
s.t. p′j(q
1 + q2 + qh) ≤ p′jqj . (1.2)
In words, the collective consumption model (1.2) generalizes the stan-
dard (individual) utility maximization model (1.1) by describing house-
hold behavior as maximizing a weighted sum of the individual member
utilities. The weighting of the utilities exactly reflects the Pareto effi-
ciency characterization of optimal intrahousehold allocations.
Following Browning and Chiappori (1998), we interpret the Pareto
weights µj as representing the relative ‘bargaining power’ (vis-a`-vis
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member 1) of member 2. Since µj is observation dependent, this bar-
gaining power may vary according to the specific observation/situation
j at hand. A greater bargaining power implies, ceteris paribus, a higher
utility level for the corresponding individual. This higher utility level is
not necessarily due to a more favorable own private consumption bun-
dle; it may also follow from the other members private consumption
(through externalities) or from publicly consumed quantities.
In general, these bargaining weights may depend on the observed prices,
total expenditures and the so-called distribution factors This implies
that in the collective setting the individual utility of a member also de-
pends on the prices.1 This price dependence is crucial, since Browning,
Chiappori and Lechene (2006) argue that it is necessary to distinguish
the unitary from the collective model. As we will argue below, it forms
the basis of the test of Browning and Chiappori (1998).
Distribution factors are variables that influence the bargaining weight,
but do not directly influence the preferences. Examples are sex ratio,
age difference between partners and income shares (see, e.g., Bour-
guignon, Browning and Chiappori, 2006, for a recent discussion). Im-
portantly, Bourguignon et al. (1993) show that for two member house-
holds, all distribution should be collinear (or proportional), which is
again a testable implication (see Browning and Chiappori, 1998, for an
application).
Starting from this definition of collective rationality, Browning and Chi-
appori (1998) also derive restrictions on the demand functions and they
introduce the pseudo-Slutsky matrix. Their core result for two-person
households is that, under collective rational household behavior, the
pseudo-Slutsky matrix can be written as the sum of a symmetric nega-
tive semi-definite matrix P and a rank one matrix R. The first part P is
the traditional Slutsky matrix, which captures the changes in demand
induced by the variation in prices (holding U1, U2 and µ constant);
while the second part R reflects the changes in demand induced by
the variation in the bargaining weights (holding U1, U2 constant). So,
if there are no changes in the bargaining power, then R is not needed
and they obtain the standard unitary results. Indeed, if there are no
changes in the intrahousehold decision process, then we can aggregate
(using a constant weight µ = µj) the preferences of the members in
a (single) household utility function. On the other hand, if there are
1 The collective model need not be the only way to model price dependent prefer-
ences. See, e.g., Pollak, 1977 for an alternative approach.
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changes in the bargaining weight, there will be a deviation of the tradi-
tional Slutsky matrix (and so the unitary model will be rejected). This
deviation can be captured by a rank one matrix, since the changes,
induced by the variation in the bargaining weights, have to take place
along the one-dimensional Pareto frontier. Browning and Chiappori
(1998) show the necessity of this condition; Chiappori and Ekeland
(2006) address the associated sufficiency question.
Clearly, this pseudo-Slutsky matrix allows for adapting the existing
procedures for the unitary model towards the collective setting. More
precisely, the result of Browning and Chiappori gives a possibility to
test the adequacy of the collective model (and as such of the Pareto
efficiency assumption). Indeed, we merely have to verify the rank of R:
if it has rank zero, we can, based on this test, not reject the unitary
model and the collective model; if it is has rank one, we reject the
unitary model but not the collective model for two members; if it has a
rank higher than one, then we reject both the unitary and the collective
model for two members.2 So, Browning and Chiappori (1998) indeed
obtained the test of the Pareto efficiency assumption that we were
looking for. Moreover, the results of Lechene and Preston (2007) for
their ‘household Nash equilibrium model’ use this same pseudo-Slutsky
matrix. They show that if the outcome of the decision process is not
Pareto efficient, then the rank of R is higher than one (depending on
the number of public goods). We refer to Lechene and Preston (2007)
for more details.
To end this section, we want to stress that all models discussed in this
work are static in nature, implying that we ignore dynamic effects such
as for example habits formation and intertemporal decision making.
See, e.g., Browning, 1989, and Crawford, 2007 for nonparametric results
in an unitary setting, Mazzocco, 2007 for parametric results for the
collective model and Spinnewyn, 1981, for a formal link between habits
formation and intertemporal decision making. Combining these insights
with our results will be an important line of future research.
1.3 Nonparametric methodology
The tests introduced in the previous section are all examples of para-
metric tests. Indeed, to perform them we have to specify demand func-
2 Note that this implies that we, like in Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2006),
claim that the unitary model is rejected as soon as Slutsky symmetry is rejected.
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tions (reflecting the specific preferences), estimate the needed parame-
ters by use of the data and verify the properties of the (pseudo-)Slutsky
matrix. Of course, these results are satisfactory only if the parametric
form, of for instance the preferences, is indeed the one that underlies
the observed data. For instance, if one rejects the symmetry of the Slut-
sky matrix, this could be due to rejection of the unitary approach, but
also due to a misspecification of the parametric form. In order to obtain
more robust results, we want to avoid such specifications of functional
forms.
By definition, nonparametric tests require no ‘ad-hoc’ functional speci-
fications of demand functions. Using the concept of revealed preferences
they test the adequacy of the behavioral model, i.e. preference maxi-
mization, on the raw price-quantity data. See, e.g., Varian (2006) for an
up-to-date overview of the revealed preference methodology and Blun-
dell, Browning and Crawford (2003, 2007) for recent developments. In
this section we introduce the nonparametric characterization for indi-
vidual rationality; in Chapter 2 we establish analogous results for the
general collective model of Browning and Chiappori (1998). Note that,
since the unitary approach assumes that the household acts as a sin-
gle agent, it results in the same nonparametric tests as the ones for
individual rationality.
Samuelson (1938, 1948) provided the first nonparametric tests for in-
dividual rationality by describing, what is now known as, the Weak
Axiom of Revealed Preferences (WARP) for situations with 2 goods.
Houthakker (1950) generalized these tests toward settings with n goods
by introducing, what is now called, the Strong Axiom of Revealed Pref-
erences (SARP). Finally, based on the seminal work of Afriat (1967),
Varian (1982) demonstrated that a data rationalizing utility function
as in (1.1) exists if and only if the observed set S is consistent with
the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP). For the sake
of clarity, we will only focus on GARP and not on the alternative ax-
ioms such as WARP, SARP and strong SARP (see, e.g., Varian, 2006,
and Chiappori and Rochet, 1987, for a formal discussion of the several
concepts).
As we will show, GARP exploits the idea that a bundle qj is utility
maximizing subject to its budget constraint if and only if it is expen-
diture minimizing over its ‘better than’ set. While the expenditures
are directly observed (i.e. p′jqj), the same does not hold for the ‘bet-
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ter than’ set. Therefore Varian approximates this latter set by using
revealed preference relations.
Definition 1.1. For a set of observations S = {(pj ;qj); j = 1, ..., T}:
if p′iqi ≥ p′iqj then qiR0qj; and if qiR0qk, qkR0ql,. . . , qzR0qj for
some (possibly empty) sequence (k, l, . . . , z) then qiRqj .
The relation R0 is commonly referred to as the direct revealed prefer-
ence relation, while its transitive closure R is known as the revealed
preference relation. In words, this definition states that we can infer
from the data that a bundle qi is directly revealed preferred over a
bundle qj (i.e. qiR0qj), if under the prices of observation i (i.e. pi)
the latter bundle was attainable (i.e. p′iqi ≥ p′iqj) but was not chosen.
Subsequently, the revealed preference concept exploits that preferences
are transitive: if one prefers qi over qk (i.e. qiR0qk) and qk over qj
(i.e. qkR0qj), then transitivity implies that one also prefers qi over qj
(i.e. qiRqj).
Example 1.2 illustrates these relations for a situation with two goods.
Fig. 1.1. Revealed preferences
Good 1
q1
q2
Good 2
q3
Example 1.2. Figure 1.1 shows three observations of bundles of two
commodities. For each observation i the straight line (or budget line)
through the bundle qi represents the budget spent in observation i. This
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implies that all bundles on or below this line were feasible in observation
i (with respect to the budget p′iqi and the prices pi of the commodities
in the given observation i).
Given that bundle q2 lies below the budget line through q1, this implies
that under the prices p1, q1 is more expensive than q2 (i.e. p′1q1 ≥
p′1q2). So we observe that in observation 1 bundle q2 was attainable
(and cheaper), but nevertheless the individual chooses q1. Therefore we
conclude that (s)he prefers q1 over q2 or q1R0q2. Analogously we find
that q2R0q3.
Since q1 is preferred over q2 and q2 over q3, transitivity then implies
that q1 should also be preferred over q3 or q1Rq3. Note that q3 does not
belong to the budget set of observation 1, i.e. we do not have q1R0q3
Using Definition 1.1, we can now define the Generalized Axiom of Re-
vealed Preference (GARP).
Definition 1.3. A set of observations S = {(pj ;qj); j = 1, ..., T} sat-
isfies GARP if p′jqj ≤ p′jqi whenever qiRqj.
In words this definition states that S satisfies GARP if and only if each
observation j is expenditure minimizing over all the revealed preferred
bundles qi. As such, the GARP indeed provides the basis for a test
of individual rationality by expressing the idea that the bundle qj is
utility maximizing subject to its budget constraint if and only if it is
expenditure minimizing over its ‘better than’ set. The corresponding
test proceeds in two steps: one first recovers the relations R0 and R,
which define the (in casu revealed) ‘better than’ set for each qj (i.e. the
bundles qi such that qiRqj); subsequently, one checks if qj is effectively
cost minimizing over that set, which requires p′jqj ≤ p′jqi for qiRqj .
Finally, note that there exist efficient algorithms for applying this test;
a notable example is Warshall’s algorithm based on Boolean matrices
(see Warshall, 1962, and Varian, 1982).
Example 1.4 illustrates GARP (again for a situation with two goods).
Example 1.4. Figure 1.2 shows a rejection of GARP. Indeed, from
the figure we conclude that q1 is preferred over q2 (i.e. q1R0q2) and
we also observe that q2 is not cost minimizing since p2q2 > p2q1.
Note that this example shows that it suffices to have two observations
and two commodities to rejectGARP (and thus also to reject individual
rationality). We can easily show that this is also a necessary condition:
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Fig. 1.2. Rejection of GARP
Good 1
q1
q2
Good 2
(i) if there is only one observation we cannot specify a ‘better than’ set,
so a fortiori we cannot reject GARP ; (ii) if there is only one commod-
ity, then all multiplications in Definition 1.3 are scalar multiplications.
This implies that qiR0qj if and only if qi ≥ qj and thus also that qiRqj
if and only if qi ≥ qj . Under this condition, a quantity bundle is of
course always cost minimizing over its ‘better than’ set (and so, again,
we cannot reject GARP.
So for one member we need 2 (= 1+1) observations and 2 commodities
to nonparametrically reject individual rationality. In Chapter 2 we ex-
tend this result towards households with M members who are engaged
in a bargaining process. Specifically, we show that we needM+1 obser-
vations and M + 1 commodities to nonparametrically reject collective
rationality for households with M members (with M ≥ 1).
Next, we present the reformulation of Afriat’s theorem, which is also
due to Varian (1982).
Theorem 1.5. Let S = {(pj ;qj); j = 1, . . . , T} be a set of observa-
tions. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) there exists a nonsatiated utility function that rationalizes the data;
(ii) the data satisfies GARP;
(iii) there exists numbers Uj , λj > 0, j = 1, . . . , T , such that
∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , T} : Ui − Uj ≤ λj(pj)′(qi − qj);
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(iv) there exists a concave, continuous, nonsatiated and monotonic util-
ity function that rationalizes the data.
The numbers Uj , λj in part (iii) of Theorem 1.5 can be interpreted
as measures of the utility and marginal utility of income at the ob-
served demands (see Varian, 1982, for more details). By the use of these
numbers, Afriat’s approach offers an explicit algorithm for calculating
utility functions that are consistent with the observed data.
Some remarks are in order with respect to this result. Firstly, it states
that as soon as some nonsatiated utility function rationalizes the data,
then there also exists a well-behaved utility function that captures the
preferences of the individuals. [Note that the nonsatiation assumption
avoids trivial rationalizations such as for example U(q) = 0 for all
q.] This strong result does not carry over to our results for collective
rationality in Chapter 2; in that chapter we need to start from concave
utility functions.3 Therefore, we only obtain analogous results for the
last three statements. Relaxing the concavity assumption is work for
future research.
In view of the results in the next chapters, it is also important to note
that there exists several extensions of the above theorem by integrating
extra assumptions concerning the preferences. A notable example is
latent separability, which includes weak separability as a special case
(see, e.g. Varian, 1983, Blundell and Robin, 2000, and Crawford, 2006,
for inspiring results and discussion).4 Latent separability implies that
the observed commodities can be divided in groups such that (i) the
preferences for each group can be represented by a well-behaved utility
function and (ii) these separate utility functions can be aggregated into
another well-behaved utility function. If commodities can only belong
to just one group (i.e. if they are exclusive goods), then we obtain the
special case of weak separability.
Clearly, this set-up is closely related to the collective approach, since we
can interpret the different groups as the different household members.
However, there is an important difference since for the collective mod-
els, the second condition does not hold. Indeed, the discussion of the
3 More precisely, we need concavity in order to characterize Pareto efficiency in
terms of convex utility possibility sets, which obtains the maximization program
in (1.2)
4 Another intriguing example are the characteristics models, see Browning, Blow
and Crawford, 2007 for nonparametric results for an unitary model.
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pseudo-Slutsky matrix in the previous section, shows that the prefer-
ences of the individual household members can no longer be aggregated.
As such, the data can only satisfy the restrictions of latent separability
if it also satisfy the restrictions of individual rationality. In our non-
parametric setting, this implies that GARP always has to be satisfied
in order to satisfy latent separability, which certainly no longer holds
for our results for the collective model (see Chapter 2 for more details).
Although nonparametric techniques clearly allow for more robust re-
sults (i.e. rejection is due to the basic model and not to some unverifi-
able functional specification that is imposed on the model), one could
end up with weak results. To measure the strength of our results, one
could use power measures; see, e.g., Bronars (1987), who introduced
power assessment tools for the nonparametric unitary (GARP) con-
dition, Andreoni and Harbaugh (2006) for a recent survey and our
power measures in Chapters 3 and 4 for applications. If a model has
high power, then there is a high probability that the restrictions of the
model will be rejected by data that are generated by an alternative
nonnested model. For example if household consumption behavior is
not generated by collective rationality, then high power implies that
the restrictions of the collective model are likely to be rejected. As a
consequence high power models will also result in precise recovery and
forecasting results. See, e.g., Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2003,
2007) for nonparametric applications and discussion in an unitary set-
ting.
We end with two concluding remarks, concerning the power issues of
the models that we present in the next chapters. Firstly, the power of
our general models is rather low. So, a further line of research will be
to increase the power of our tests. This could be done by restricting the
general model (see, e.g. Chapters 3 and 4 for examples) or by adapt-
ing existing results for the unitary model (see, e.g., Blundell, Browning
and Crawford 2003 and 2007). Secondly, a fruitful approach could also
be to combine parametric and nonparametric results. That is, in a
first stage, using nonparametric techniques, one derives restrictions on
the functional forms that can be used; in a second stage one subse-
quently applies more powerful parametric techniques that satisfy these
restrictions. For example, using our results in a first stage one could
derive restrictions on the individual utility functions and/or bargaining
weights. In a second stage, one can then incorporate these restrictions
in a parametric collective model.
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1.4 Conceptual analogy with production
We end this chapter by showing that the collective approach for mod-
eling multi-person household consumption behavior can also be used
to analyze the cost efficiency of multi-output production firms. In our
cost efficiency analysis, we start from the basic idea that firms produc-
ing multiple outputs are benefiting from economies of scope; i.e. their
average total cost of production decreases as a result of increasing the
number of different goods produced (see, e.g., Baumol, Panzar and
Willig, 1982). In our interpretation, these economies of scope originate
from joint input use (e.g. the same secretary is used) and production
externalities (e.g. experiences in the production of product i benefits
the production of product j). Given this, we can easily introduce the
conceptual analogy between the multi-person household consumption
behavior and multi-output production firms.
Indeed, we can ‘artificially’ rephrase our general collective model for
multi-person household consumption behavior as follows: the house-
hold uses inputs q to ‘produce’ utility Um(q1,q2,qh) for each indi-
vidual m in the household. In this ‘production process’, the household
benefits from public consumption (or joint input use) and externali-
ties. The household is collectively rational if and only if it minimizes
expenditures given the ‘household utility’ and the bargaining weights,
i.e. given U1, U2 and µ. See also Browning and Chiappori, 1998, for
more details.
If we now replace household by firm and interpret Um(q1,q2,qh) as
a produced output, then we indeed obtain a multi-output production
model that benefits from joint input use and externalities (and thus
from economies of scope). Moreover, collective rationality then boils
down to cost efficiency: if the firm is ‘collectively rational’ it minimizes
its expenditures.
Formally, let xj ∈ Rn+ be the observed inputs; pj ∈ Rn++ the observed
prices and yj ∈ Rs+ the observed outputs. Then we obtain the following
program for the firm: each observation j is cost efficient if and only if
(pj)′xj equals
min
x∈Rn
(pj)′x s.t. f(x) ≥ yj , (1.3)
with f the production function of the firm which, as in the consump-
tion context, depends on the weights µj (see Chapter 5 for a formal
discussion).
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The above introduced conceptual analogy between the two settings will
allow us to adapt our insights of Chapter 2 to the production context.
As such, by explicitly modeling the cost saving effects stemming from
economies of scope, we extend the work of Varian (1984) for single out-
put firms towards multi-output firms. Note that the bargaining weights
µ also have an intuitive interpretation in the production context. They
can now be interpreted as ‘priority weights’ which may depend on the
observation at hand.
However, given the observed output information in the production con-
text, there is an important difference between the nonparametric tests
in both settings. In the consumption setting, we need the revealed pref-
erence concept to approximate the ‘better than’ sets, since we do not
observe the utility levels of the individuals. As is clear from the mini-
mization program described in (1.3), this is no longer the case in the
production context, since now we do observe the outputs of the firm;
the firm prefers individual output k of observation i (let us denote this
by < yi >k) over the same output of observation j (i.e. < yj >k) if and
only if < yi >k ≥ < yj >k. So, this extra (ordering) information allows
us to easily reconstruct the ‘better than’ sets, which in turn leads to a
powerful analysis of the cost efficiency of the firm under study.
1.5 Summary and concluding remarks
In this preliminary chapter, we introduced and discussed the main in-
gredients for the following chapters. We motivated our choice for the
collective approach for modeling multi-person household consumption
behavior, by showing that it nicely deals with the criticisms on the
unitary and strategic approach. Clearly, it respects the individual pref-
erences of the household members and the Pareto efficiency assumption.
But also the income pooling hypothesis is avoided, since the source of
the household income may influence the bargaining weights µj (see,
e.g, Browning and Chiappori, 1998).
Our discussion of the pseudo-Slutsky matrix clearly shows that the
unitary model is a special case of the collective model. So, in order to
be able to reject the restrictions of the collective model, one first has to
reject the restrictions of the unitary model. We want to stress that this
conclusion only holds in the absence of exclusive goods or assignable
information; i.e. if we only observe the aggregate quantities and have no
information concerning the intrahousehold allocation. If one has such
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assignable information, then the unitary and collective model are no
longer nested. See, e.g., Chiappori (1988), who reaches this conclusion
by the use of the observed leisure of the two members; or Cherchye, De
Rock and Vermeulen (2007d).
Next, we introduced GARP, which is the nonparametric tool to test in-
dividual rationality (or the unitary approach). We prefer this nonpara-
metric approach since it results in tests that do not rely on functional
specifications of the individual preferences and the intrahousehold deci-
sion process. These specifications are in general not verifiable and more-
over they may highly influence the outcome of the tests. Therefore, the
main objective in this work will be the development of nonparametric
tests of the general collective model of Browning and Chiappori (1998);
as such, we generalize the nonparametric results of Varian (1982) and
Chiappori (1988).
We ended the chapter by explaining the conceptual analogy between
multi-member household consumption behavior and multi-output pro-
duction firms. This analogy allows us to adapt the insights of the con-
sumption setting towards the production setting. We will exploit this
in Chapter 5 to obtain powerful cost efficiency tests.
Chapter 2
Collective approach to household consumption:
a nonparametric characterization
Abstract
We provide a nonparametric characterization of a general collective
model for M -member household consumption, which includes exter-
nalities and public consumption. Next, we establish testable necessary
and sufficient conditions for data consistency with collective rational-
ity that only include observed price and quantity information. These
conditions have a structure similar to the GARP for individual ratio-
nality, which is convenient from a testing point of view. In addition,
we derive the minimum number of goods and observations that enable
the rejection of collectively rational household behavior.1
1 This chapter is adapted from Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007a). We are
grateful to a Co-Editor, three anonymous referees, Denis Beninger, Geert Dhaene
and Olivier Donni for helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank seminar
participants in Leuven, Mannheim, Paris, Tilburg, Turin and at the Econometric
Society World Congress 2005 in London for useful discussions. Finally, we want to
thank Martin Browning for inspiring conversations, which formed an important
motivation for this study.
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2.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1 we discussed the general collective consumption model
of Browning and Chiappori (1998) and argued that it models house-
hold consumption better than the unitary model. However, the tests of
Browning and Chiappori are parametric in nature and therefore rely
on ‘ad-hoc’ functional specifications on the individual preferences and
the bargaining process. Chapter 1 shows that nonparametric (or re-
vealed preferences) tests avoid these specifications. This nonparamet-
ric approach was first adapted to the collective model by Chiappori
(1988), who restricted attention to a labor supply setting that involves
a number of convenient simplifications for the empirical analyst (e.g.
observability of household members’ leisure/labour supply and no pub-
lic consumption).
In this chapter we generalize Chiappori’s work (1988) by providing a
nonparametric characterization of the collective consumption model of
Browning and Chiappori (1998), which includes both public consump-
tion and (in casu positive) externalities. This characterization allows
for analyzing demand behavior without relying on (non-verifiable) func-
tional structure that is imposed on the household decision process (i.e.
the household members’ preferences and the intrahousehold bargaining
process). Focusing on this general model implies, however, that we can
no longer use the convenient simplifications of the labor supply setting
that Chiappori considered.
Section 2.2 contains this characterization, i.e. we derive necessary and
sufficient nonparametric conditions for data consistency with this gen-
eral model. As we will discuss, these conditions imply unobservable
(household member-specific) quantity and price information. In Sec-
tions 2.3 and 2.4, we subsequently establish necessary and sufficient
conditions that only require observed prices and aggregate household
quantities. Interestingly, this implies nonparametric tests for collective
rationality that are finite in nature, and that do not require finding a
solution to a system of (nonlinear) inequalities.2 As a by-product, we
derive that the minimum number of goods and observations is at least
2 We see at least two important differences between our approach and that of
Snyder (2000), who addresses a similar research question for Chiappori’s (1988)
original labor supply model. First, Snyder focuses on a more restricted model that
includes egoistic agents and observable leisure. Second, we do not make use of
semi-algebraic theory for quantifier elimination. A well-known limitation of these
latter techniques is that they become computationally cumbersome for large data
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3 in order to enable a rejection of collective rationality.
Section 2.5 considers the general case withM decision makers. The last
section contains some concluding remarks and the Appendix presents
the proofs of our results.
2.2 A characterization of collective rationality for
two-member households
As explained above, we first consider two-member (1 and 2) households.
The household purchases the (non-zero) n-vector of quantities q ∈
Rn+ with corresponding prices p ∈ Rn++. All goods can be consumed
privately, publicly or both. Generally, we have q = q1 + q2 + qh for q
the (observed) aggregate quantities, q1 and q2 the (unobserved) private
quantities of each household member, and qh the (unobserved) public
quantities.
Following Browning and Chiappori (1998), we consider general pref-
erences for the household members that may depend not only on the
own private and public quantities, but also (positively) on the other
individual’s private quantities; this allows for altruism and/or exter-
nalities.3 Formally, this means that the preferences of each household
member m (m = 1, 2) can be represented by a utility function of the
form Um(q1,q2,qh) that is non-decreasing in its arguments q1, q2 and
qh. Throughout, we focus on non-satiated utility functions.
Suppose T observations of the household. For each observation j we use
pj and qj to denote the (observed) aggregate prices and quantities,
respectively; while S = {(pj ;qj), j = 1, . . . , T} represents the set of
sets. For example, Snyder restricts to settings of only two observations, while we
consider the general case of T observations.
3 This setting generalizes Chiappori’s (1988) altruistic model in two ways: it does
not assume the observability of private and/or public consumption of any good;
and it allows for public consumption. Admittedly, the assumption of positive
externalities, which is not needed in a parametric setting (see Browning and
Chiappori, 1998), may be restrictive in some instances. However, its restrictive
nature should not be overestimated. Even though a negative externality may be
associated with e.g. tobacco consumption, the non-smoker’s positive valuation
of the smoker’s utility generated by smoking might well outweigh that negative
externality. In addition, within-household mechanisms may be instituted that
decrease or even eliminate the negative externalities; see, e.g., the widespread
practice of smoking outside in households consisting of smokers as well as non-
smokers.
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observations. For observed aggregate quantities qj , we define feasible
personalized quantities q̂j as
q̂j = (q1j , q
2
j , q
h
j ) with q
1
j , q
2
j , q
h
j ∈ Rn+ and q1j + q2j + qhj = qj . (2.1)
Each q̂j captures a feasible decomposition of the aggregate quantities
qj into private quantities (q1j and q
2
j ) and public quantities (q
h
j ). One
possible specification of these personalized quantities q1j , q
2
j and q
h
j are
the true quantities q1j , q
2
j and q
h
j , but -of course- these latter quantities
are not observed. Using this concept, we can now define the condition
for a collective rationalization of a set of observations S.
Definition 2.1. Let S = {(pj ;qj); j = 1, . . . , T} be a set of observa-
tions. A pair of utility functions U1 and U2 provides a collective ratio-
nalization of S if for each observation j there exist feasible personalized
quantities q̂j = (q1j , q
2
j , q
h
j ) and µj ∈ R++ such that
U1(q̂j) + µjU2(q̂j) ≥ U1(ẑ) + µjU2(ẑ)
for all ẑ = (z1, z2, zh) with z1, z2, zh ∈ Rn+ and p′j(z1 + z2 + zh) ≤ p′jqj .
Thus, a collective rationalization of S requires that there exists, for
each observation j, feasible personalized quantities q̂j that maximize a
weighted sum of household member utilities U1 and U2 for the given
household budget p′jqj . This optimality condition reflects the Pareto
efficiency assumption regarding observed household consumption in the
collective model. Each weight µj represents the ‘bargaining power’ of
the household members for observation j; see Browning and Chiappori
(1998) for a detailed discussion.4
In view of our further exposition, it is interesting to compare the col-
lective rationality condition in Definition 2.1 with the standard unitary
rationality condition. According to Varian’s (1982; p. 946) definition, a
unitary rationalization of the observed set S requires a collective ratio-
nalization with µj = 0 and q1j = qj (or, equivalently, q
2
j = q
h
j = 0) for
each observation j.5 In that presentation, unitary rationalization boils
down to collective rationalization with one household member (in casu
4 Given the discussion in Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2006), we implicitly
assume that the µj depend on observed prices and total expenditures. See also
our discussion in Chapter 1.
5 Strictly speaking, µj = 0 is excluded in Definition 2.1. As for that definition, we
note that the requirement µj ∈ R++ pertains to the Pareto efficiency interpreta-
tion of household consumption, which is, of course, irrelevant if there is only one
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member 1) as the ‘dictator’ in the household. This interpretation of the
unitary model as a dictatorship model will return in our discussion in
Section 2.4.
Using Definitions 1.1 and 1.3, we can now establish nonparametric con-
ditions for a collective rationalization of a set S. To do so, we first define
feasible personalized prices (p̂1j , p̂
2
j ) for observed aggregate prices pj , as
follows:
p̂1j = (p
1
j , p
2
j , p
h
j ) and p̂
2
j = (pj − p1j ,pj − p2j ,pj − phj )
with p1j , p
2
j , p
h
j ∈ Rn+ and pcj ≤ pj (c = 1, 2, h).
(2.2)
This concept complements the concept of feasible personalized quanti-
ties in (2.1): p̂1j and p̂
2
j capture the fraction of the price for the personal-
ized quantities q̂j that is borne by, respectively, member 1 and member
2; p1j and p
2
j pertain to private quantities and p
h
j to public quantities.
6
Based on (2.1) and (2.2), we define a set of feasible personalized prices
and quantities
Ŝ = {(p̂1j , p̂2j ; q̂j); j = 1, . . . , T}.
We then have the following result.
Proposition 2.2. Let S = {(pj ;qj); j = 1, . . . , T} be a set of observa-
tions. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) there exists a pair of concave and continuous utility functions U1
and U2 that provide a collective rationalization of S;
(ii) there exists a set of feasible personalized prices and quantities Ŝ
such that the sets {(p̂1j ; q̂j); j = 1, . . . , T} and {(p̂2j ; q̂j); j = 1, . . . , T}
both satisfy GARP;
(iii) there exists a set of feasible personalized prices and quantities Ŝ,
numbers Umj > 0 and λ
m
j > 0 (m = 1, 2) such that ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , T} :
U1i − U1j ≤ λ1j (p̂1j )′(q̂i − q̂j) and U2i − U2j ≤ λ2j (p̂2j )′(q̂i − q̂j).
(‘dictator’) household member. In fact, as shown in Chapter 1, unitary rationality
requires a collective rationalization for µj constant over all observations j; but we
prefer the dictatorship interpretation of the unitary model in view of our follow-
ing discussion. [Compare with Browning and Chiappori, 1998; see also Browning,
Chiappori and Lechene, 2006.] Further, the fact that we can use q1j = qj to ob-
tain the unitary rationalization condition illustrates that the distinction between
public and private consumption becomes irrelevant in the unitary model; which
contrasts with the collective model.
6 It is easily verified that (bp1j + bp2j )′bqi = p′jqi for any i and j.
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The nonparametric conditions (ii) and (iii) have a structure similar to
the one for the unitary model; see Varian (1982) for an extensive dis-
cussion of the nonparametric requirements for unitary rationalization.
The essential difference is that the conditions for collective rationaliza-
tion are expressed in terms of a set of feasible personalized prices and
quantities Ŝ. For a given specification of this set, Proposition 2.2 states
nonparametric conditions at the level of the household members 1 and
2 that are analogous to the unitary rationalization conditions at the
level of the aggregate household. But contrary to the unitary case, the
true personalized prices and quantities are unobserved. Therefore, it is
only imposed that there must exist at least one Ŝ that satisfies the con-
ditions. Referring to our discussion in Section 1.3, also note that this
result does not imply that the observed aggregate data should satisfy
GARP, as such this model is thus not nested with the unitary model.
Proposition 2.2 states that the representation of collective rationality
in Definition 2.1 can be decentralized in the following sense. There must
exist a set Ŝ such that the sets
{(p̂1j , q̂j); j = 1, . . . , T} and {(p̂2j , q̂j); j = 1, . . . , T}
both satisfy the GARP.7
A final note pertains to the interpretation of the nonparametric con-
ditions in Proposition 2.2. Following Chiappori (1988), we can inter-
pret the different goods as ‘public’ goods, given that they all enter
both members’ utility functions. In that interpretation, the personal-
ized prices (p̂1j , p̂
2
j ) can be understood as ‘Lindahl prices’: they must
add-up (over members 1 and 2) to the observed market prices in or-
der to be consistent with Pareto efficiency.8 Thus, no qualitative dis-
tinction should be made between public and private quantities (where
private quantities may be associated with externalities). Yet, there is a
7 Note the similarity between the above decentralization result and the well-known
decentralization result in the case of egoistic agents without public consumption;
this result forms the theoretical basis for many collective rationality tests (see,
e.g., Chiappori, 1988, Fortin and Lacroix, 1997, and Cherchye and Vermeulen,
2007).
8 See, e.g., Myles (1995) for a discussion of Lindahl prices. In this respect, note that
if member m has for each observation a zero Lindahl price for a given commodity,
then this actually means that this commodity does not enter in his utility func-
tion. So formally, we should then adapt our notations in Definition 2.1 and the
subsequent results. To keep the exposition simple and slightly abusing notation,
we refrain from this.
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clear quantitative difference: household members may accord another
marginal valuation to private consumption than to public consumption.
2.3 Testable necessity restrictions
The (necessary and sufficient) conditions for a collective rationalization
in Proposition 2.2 can be difficult to use in practice, since they are
nonlinear in terms of feasible personalized prices (p̂1j , p̂
2
j ) and quantities
q̂j ; they are namely defined in products of both concepts. See, e.g.,
Watson, Bartholomew-Biggs and Ford (2000) for a discussion of similar
nonlinearity problems. In the following, we present testable conditions
for collective rationality that solely use (observed) aggregate prices pj
and quantities qj . This section develops a necessary condition for a
collective rationalization of a set of observations S that has a similar
two-step structure as the unitary GARP (see our discussion following
Definition 1.3). The next section presents a complementary sufficiency
condition.
We first define the analogues of the relations R0 and R for members 1
and 2 in the collective model.
Definition 2.3. Let Ŝ = {(p̂1j , p̂2j ; q̂j); j = 1, . . . , T} be a set of feasible
personalized prices and quantities. Then for m = 1, 2: if (p̂mi )
′q̂i ≥
(p̂mi )
′q̂j then q̂i Rm0 q̂j; and if q̂i Rm0 q̂k, q̂k Rm0 q̂l, . . . , q̂z Rm0 q̂j for
some (possibly empty) sequence (k, l, . . . , z) then q̂i Rm q̂j .
Of course, different specifications of the set Ŝ generally imply different
relations Rm0 and R
m. To establish our testable necessary condition for
collectively rational behavior, we derive restrictions on the relations
Rm0 and R
m without reference to a specific Ŝ. In this respect, the next
lemma specifies a useful relationship between Rm0 and R0, which is
defined in terms of the set of observations S.
Lemma 2.4. Let S = {(pj ;qj); j = 1, . . . , T} be a set of observations.
We have qi R0 qj if and only if, for all sets Ŝ of feasible personalized
prices and quantities, q̂i R10 q̂j or q̂i R
2
0 q̂j .
The intuition of this result pertains to the Pareto efficient nature of
household behavior in the collective model. Specifically, if the house-
hold has chosen qi when qj was equally available (i.e. qi R0 qj , which
means p′iqi ≥ p′iqj), then we always have that, independently of the
specification of the set Ŝ, at least one household member must prefer
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the former (personalized) quantities to the latter (i.e. q̂i R10 q̂j or q̂i
R20 q̂j). As a result, if we want to avoid selecting specific feasible per-
sonalized prices and quantities -because we lack information to do so-,
then we can start from the relation R0 for specifying restrictions on the
relations R10 and R
2
0. Moreover, the equivalence result in Lemma 2.4 im-
plies that we cannot do better when only using the set of observations
S (rather than some Ŝ).
Lemma 2.4 provides the starting point for our testable necessity con-
dition for collective rationality. We sketch the basic intuition of that
condition by means of the next simple example.
Example 2.5. Consider the case of three observations and three goods
with prices and quantities
q1 = (8 2 1 )′,q2 = (2 1 8 )′,q3 = (1 8 2 )′;
p1 = (5 2 1 )′,p2 = (2 1 5 )′,p3 = (1 5 2 )′.
This specific data structure implies that
p′1q1 > p
′
1(q2 + q3), p
′
2q2 > p
′
2(q1 + q3) and p
′
3q3 > p
′
3(q1 + q2),
so that for all observations i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} we have qi R0 qj. Using
Lemma 2.4, we therefore conclude
∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} : q̂i R10 q̂j or q̂i R20 q̂j . (2.3)
Given this, one possible specification of the relations R10 and R
2
0 is
q̂1 R10 q̂2, q̂2 R
1
0 q̂3 and q̂3 R
2
0 q̂2, q̂2 R
2
0 q̂1. (2.4)
Intuitively, this specification means that member 1 prefers (personal-
ized) q̂1 over q̂2 while member 2 prefers q̂3 over q̂2. In that case, the
choice of the (aggregate) quantities q2 can be rationalized only if it is
not more expensive than the sum of q1 and q3, which requires that
p′2q2 ≤ p′2(q1 + q3). But this is inconsistent with p′2q2 > p′2(q1 + q3).
Because the same argument can be repeated for any other possible spec-
ification of the relations R10 and R
2
0 instead of (2.4), we conclude that
a collective rationalization of this set of observations is impossible.9
9 At this point, it is important that we can exclude for all i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} with i 6= j :bqi R10 bqj and bqi R20 bqj . Intuitively, the latter specification of the relations R10
and R20 means that both members 1 and 2 prefer (personalized) bqi over bqj . In
that case, the choice of (aggregate) qj can be rationalized only if it is not more
expensive than qi, which is inconsistent with p
′
jqj > p
′
jqi. The formal argument
is based on Lemma 2.6 (rule (iv)).
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The basic structure of the collective rationalization test in this example
parallels the two-step structure of the unitary GARP test. Specifically,
we first specified the relations R10 and R
2
0 in (2.4), and subsequently
verified the corresponding upper cost bound condition (in casu p′2q2 ≤
p′2(q1 + q3)), which is not met for this particular set of observations.
To generalize these ideas, we first specify some further restrictions that
must hold if a collective rationalization of the set of observations S is
possible in terms of Proposition 2.2. In that case, there exists a set
of feasible personalized prices and quantities Ŝ such that the corre-
sponding R10 and R
2
0 satisfy the following conditions in relation to their
transitive closures R1 and R2 and the aggregate prices pj and quanti-
ties qj .
Lemma 2.6. Suppose that there exists a pair of utility functions U1
and U2 that provide a collective rationalization of the set of observa-
tions S = {(pj ;qj); j = 1, . . . , T}. Then there exists a set of feasible
personalized prices and quantities Ŝ that defines the relations Rm0 , R
m
for each member m ∈ {1, 2} such that:
(i) if p′iqi ≥ p′iqj and q̂j Rm q̂i then q̂i Rl0 q̂j (with m 6= l);
(ii) if p′iqi ≥ p′i(qj1 +qj2) and q̂j1 Rm q̂i then q̂i Rl0 q̂j2 (with m 6= l);
(iii) if q̂i1 R
1 q̂j and q̂i2 R
2 q̂j then p′jqj ≤ p′j(qi1 + qi2);
(iv) if q̂i R1 q̂j and q̂i R2 q̂j then p′jqj ≤ p′jqi.
The interpretation of this result pertains to the very nature of the
collective model, which -to recall- explicitly recognizes the multi-person
nature of the household decision process. More specifically, the four
rules in Lemma 2.6 relate to rationality across household members for
a given specification of the feasible personalized prices and quantities.
First, rule (i) expresses that, if member m prefers (personalized) q̂j
over q̂i for (aggregate) qj not more expensive than qi, then the choice
of qi can be rationalized only if the other member l prefers q̂i over q̂j .
Next, the meaning of rule (ii) is that, if (aggregate) qi is more expensive
than the sum of qj1 and qj2 , while member m prefers (personalized)
q̂j1 over q̂i, then the only possibility for rationalizing the choice of qi
is that the other member l prefers q̂i over q̂j2 .
Rules (i) and (ii) define restrictions on the relations Rm0 and R
m. For
a specification of these relations, rules (iii) and (iv) define the corre-
sponding upper cost bound conditions. First, rule (iii) complements
rule (ii): if members 1 and 2 prefer respectively (personalized) q̂i1 and
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q̂i2 over q̂j , then the choice of (aggregate) qj can be rationalized only
if it is not more expensive than the sum of qi1 and qi2 . Finally, rule (iv)
considers the special case where both members prefer the same (per-
sonalized) quantities q̂i over q̂j ; in that case, under the prices pj the
quantities qj cannot be associated with a strictly higher expenditure
level than qi.
Lemma 2.6 states that, if a collective rationalization of the set of ob-
servations S is possible, then there exists a set of feasible personalized
prices and quantities Ŝ that is consistent with the rules (i)-(iv). To re-
call, Lemma 2.4 states that, if qi R0 qj (or, equivalently, p′iqi ≥ p′iqj),
then for any specification of the set Ŝ we must have q̂i R10 q̂j or q̂i R
2
0
q̂j . That is,
p′iqi ≥ p′iqj ⇒ q̂i R10 q̂j or q̂i R20 q̂j . (2.5)
Using this, we can specify restrictions on the relations R10 and R
2
0 in
terms of the set of observations S, i.e. without explicit reference to a set
of feasible personalized prices and quantities Ŝ. If there does not exist a
specification of the relations R10 and R
2
0, and corresponding transitive
closures R1 and R2, that are consistent with (2.5) and at the same
time meet rules (i)-(iv) in Lemma 2.6, then a collective rationalization
of the set of observations S is impossible. Or, a necessary condition
for a collective rationalization of the set S to be possible is that there
exists a specification of Rm0 and R
m (m = 1, 2) that is consistent with
(2.5) and rules (i)-(iv) in Lemma 2.6. This idea underlies our testable
necessity condition for collective rationality that is expressed directly
in terms of the set of observations S of aggregate prices and quantities;
the condition essentially combines the results in Lemmas 2.4 and 2.6.
To formalize the idea, we introduce some additional notation. First,
referring to (2.5), for p′iqi ≥ p′iqj we use qi H10 qj if we hypothesize
q̂i R10 q̂j and qi H
2
0 qj if we hypothesize q̂i R
2
0 q̂j ; let H
1 and H2
denote the transitive closures of these hypothetical relations H10 and
H20 . The existence of a set of feasible personalized prices and quantities
Ŝ that satisfies the conditions in Proposition 2.2 implies that there exist
relations Hm0 and H
m consistent with the analogues of rules (i)-(iv) in
Lemma 2.6.
Proposition 2.7. Suppose that there exists a pair of utility functions
U1 and U2 that provide a collective rationalization of the set of ob-
servations S = {(pj ;qj); j = 1, . . . , T}. Then there exist hypothetical
relations Hm0 , H
m for each member m ∈ {1, 2} such that:
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(i) if p′iqi ≥ p′iqj then qi H10 qj or qi H20 qj ;
(ii) if qi Hm0 qk, qk H
m
0 ql, . . . , qz H
m
0 qj for some (possibly empty)
sequence (k, l, . . . , z) then qi Hm qj ;
(iii) if p′iqi ≥ p′iqj and qj Hm qi then qi H l0 qj (with m 6= l);
(iv) if p′iqi ≥ p′i(qj1+qj2) and qj1 Hm qi then qi H l0 qj2 (with m 6= l);
(v) if qi1 H
1 qj and qi2 H
2 qj then p′jqj ≤ p′j(qi1 + qi2);
(vi) if qi H1 qj and qi H2 qj then p′jqj ≤ p′jqi.
The intuition of the different rules follows immediately from our dis-
cussion of Lemmas 2.4 and 2.6, when replacing the relations Rm0 and
Rm by their hypothetical counterparts Hm0 and H
m. More specifically,
rule (i) refers to the result in Lemma 2.4. Rule (ii) defines the transitive
closures H1 and H2 of the relations H10 and H
2
0 ; compare with Defi-
nition 2.3. Finally, rules (iii)-(vi) comply with rules (i)-(iv) in Lemma
2.6.
To illustrate the proposition, we recapture our Example 2.5.
Example 2.5 (continued). The first step of our argument in Example
2.5 pertains to rule (i) in Proposition 2.7. Specifically, we can rephrase
(2.3) in terms of the hypothetical relations H10 and H
2
0 as
∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} : p′iqi ≥ p′iqj ⇒ qi H10 qj or qi H20 qj .
Similarly, (2.4) complies with
q1 H10 q2, q2 H
1
0 q3 and q3 H
2
0 q2, q2 H
2
0 q1.
Rule (v) in Proposition 2.7 then requires p′2q2 ≤ p′2(q1+q3), and this
upper cost bound condition is not met by this set of observations. A
similar inconsistency result holds for any other specification of the hy-
pothetical relations Hm0 ,H
m(m = 1, 2): one can verify that any such
specification that is consistent with rules (i)-(iv) cannot meet the cor-
responding upper cost bound conditions (v)-(vi).
Interestingly, Example 2.5 implies that it is sufficient to have three
goods and three observations for rejecting collective rationality of ob-
served household behavior. The following proposition states that this
is also necessary.
Proposition 2.8. There do not always exist utility functions U1 and
U2 that provide a collective rationalization of the set of observations
S = {(pj ;qj); j = 1, . . . , T} if and only if (i) the number of goods n ≥ 3
and (ii) the number of observations T ≥ 3.
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We only sketch the basic idea for the necessity result.10 First, consider
that are only two goods (n = 2) and T (≥ 2) observations. In that
case, a collective rationalization of the set of observations S is always
achieved for the following specification of feasible personalized prices
and quantities (for (x)e the e-th entry of the vector x):
∀j : p1j = pj and p2j = phj = 0; (q1j )1 = (qj)1 and (q2j )2 = (qj)2.
In words, goods 1 and 2 are allocated exclusively to, respectively,
member 1 and member 2; for each observation j we have (p̂1j )
′q̂j =
(pj)1(qj)1 and (p̂2j )
′q̂j = (pj)2(qj)2. As in Chapter 1, since we have
to deal product of scalars, it is easily verified that this specification of
the feasible personalized quantities obtains consistency with the non-
parametric conditions (ii) in Proposition 2.2.
Next, consider that there are only two observations (T = 2) and n (≥ 2)
goods. In that case, a collective rationalization of the set of observations
S is always achieved for
p1j = pj and p
2
j = p
h
j = 0 for j = 1, 2;
q11 = q1 (or q
2
1 = q
h
1 = 0) and q
2
2 = q2 (or q
1
2 = q
h
2 = 0).
In words, members 1 and 2 are the ‘dictators’ in, respectively, observa-
tion 1 (as q11 = q1 and (p̂
1
1)
′q̂1 = p′1q1) and observation 2 (as q22 = q2
and (p̂22)
′q̂2 = p′2q2). Again, it is easy to verify consistency with con-
ditions (ii) in Proposition 2.2 for this specification of the feasible per-
sonalized prices and quantities.
Thus, the collective model can be rejected (or empirical testing is mean-
ingful) as soon as there are at least three goods and three observations.
Note that the lower bound of three goods is below the lower bound
derived by Browning and Chiappori (1998) in their parametric setting:
empirical falsification of their collective model necessitates at least five
goods. The reason is that these authors focus on pseudo-Slutsky sym-
metry, which requires at least five goods for testable implications. By
contrast, their parametric model equally needs only three goods for
testing pseudo-Slutsky negativity.11
10 The following arguments concentrate on n = 2 (for T ≥ 2) and on T = 2 (for
n ≥ 2); if the necessity result holds in these cases, then it certainly also holds for
n < 2 and T < 2.
11 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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To conclude, since the necessary condition in Proposition 2.7 only re-
quires aggregate prices pj and quantities qj , it enables an operational
collective rationality test that applies to the general case of T observa-
tions. Chapter 3 presents a finite algorithm for verifying the condition,
and contains some further discussion regarding the practicality of the
approach.
2.4 Testable sufficiency restrictions
While the condition in Proposition 2.7 is necessary for a collective ra-
tionalization, it is in general not sufficient.12 This follows from Example
2.9 below, which contains data that satisfy the condition but cannot
be collectively rationalized in the sense of Proposition 2.2.
Example 2.9.We prove in the Appendix that a collective rationaliza-
tion cannot be obtained for a set of seven observations with:
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , 7} : p′iqi > p′iqj ,∀j ∈ {1, . . . , 7}\{i};
∀i ∈ {1, 7} : p′iqi > p′i(qj + qk),∀j, k ∈ {1, . . . , 7}\{i}, j 6= k;
∀i ∈ {2, . . . , 6} : p′iqi = p′i(qj + qk)− ε, ∀j, k ∈ {1, . . . , 7}\{i}, j 6= k;
where
min
i,e
(pi)emin
i,e
(qi)e
6 > ε > 0 (i ∈ {1, . . . , 7} and e ∈ {1, . . . , n}).
For example, such a structure applies to qi, pi ∈ R7 with
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , 7} : (qi)i = 3 and (qi)e = 1 if e 6= i,
∀i ∈ {1, 7} : (pi)i = 11 and (pi)e = 1 if e 6= i, and
∀i ∈ {2, . . . , 6} : (pi)i = 10− ε and (pi)e = 1 if e 6= i,
where (1/6) > ε > 0.
We next present a sufficient condition for a collective rationalization
that solely uses observed (aggregate) prices and quantities. Essentially,
as compared to the necessary condition in Proposition 2.7, this suffi-
cient condition requires some additional structure in these prices and
quantities, so that we can always conceive a household decision model
12 In fact, it can be verified that the necessary condition in Proposition 2.7 is also
sufficient for T ≤ 4 (for compactness, we abstract from a formal statement).
While Example 2.9 uses T = 7 for mathematical elegance of the proof, it is
worth stressing that similar (but less elegant) arguments can be established for
4 < T < 7.
34 Chapter 2: Collective approach to household consumption
(and corresponding feasible personalized prices and quantities) consis-
tent with the collective rationality restrictions in Proposition 2.2; we
explain the particular decision model below. Like before, this condition
implies (in casu sufficiency) tests for collective rationality that hold for
the general case of T observations. Again a finite testing algorithm is
presented in the Chapter 3.
Proposition 2.10. Let S = {(pj ;qj); j = 1, . . . , T} be a set of obser-
vations. Suppose that there exist hypothetical relations Hm0 , H
m for
each member m ∈ {1, 2} that satisfy rules (i)-(vi) in Proposition 2.7
and in addition allow for constructing sets S1 and S2 with S1 ⊆ S and
S2 = S\S1 such that
(vii) Sm = {(pj ;qj) ∈ S | p′jqj ≤ p′jqi whenever qi Hm qj};
(viii) for each (pi;qi), (pj ;qj) ∈ Sm : qiHm0 qj whenever p′iqi ≥ p′iqj .
Then there exists a pair of utility functions U1 and U2 that provide a
collective rationalization of the set S.
Referring to the interpretation of the unitary model as a dictatorship
model (see Section 2.2), we can interpret this result in terms of a
situation-dependent dictatorship model. Specifically, we prove in the
Appendix that under conditions (i)-(viii) we can obtain consistency
with the nonparametric condition (ii) in Proposition 2.2 for the follow-
ing specification of the feasible personalized quantities and prices:
if (pj ;qj) ∈ S1 then q1j = qj ,
if (pj ;qj) ∈ S2 then q2j = qj ,
and p1j = pj , p
2
j = p
h
j = 0 for all (pj ;qj) ∈ S.
For all observations j such that (pj ;qj) ∈ S1, member 1 is the ‘dictator’
because q1j = qj (or, equivalently, q
2
j = q
h
j = 0) and (p̂
1
j )
′q̂j = p′jqj .
Similarly, member 2 is the dictator for the other observations.13 Or put
another way, the identity of the dictator depends on the observation
13 We note that, technically, this specification of the feasible personalized quantities
and prices is consistent with ∞ > µj > 0 for all j (see the Appendix for details).
An interpretation in terms of bargaining power is as follows (for the given speci-
fication of the personalized prices): for (pj ;qj) ∈ S1 the value of the bargaining
weight µj (> 0) of member 2 is too small for obtaining q
1
j 6= qj ; and, conversely,
for (pj ;qj) ∈ S2 the value of µj (< ∞) is too large for q2j 6= qj . Further, we
stress that the given specification of the feasible personalized prices and quan-
tities should not be the unique one that obtains consistency with condition (ii)
in Proposition 2.2 (and, thus, other interpretations of the sufficiency result are
equally possible).
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or situation at hand. In that interpretation, the statement qi H1 qj
means that the (situation-dependent) dictator 1 prefers the (aggregate)
qi over qj ; a directly similar interpretation holds for qi H2 qj . Rule
(vii) then specifies that the situation-dependent dictators 1 and 2 must
respect the corresponding upper cost bounds. The additional rule (viii)
indicates that, if memberm (1 or 2) is the dictator in situations i and j,
then the choice of qi when qj was equally obtainable under the prices
pi can be rationalized only if member m prefers (aggregate) qi over qj
(or qi Hm0 qj).
This situation-dependent dictatorship model can be regarded as a di-
rect ‘collective’ extension of the unitary decision model. Specifically,
in contrast to the latter model, the former model implies two separate
decision-makers in the household, who are each (fully) responsible for
a disjoint subset of the T observed aggregate quantities. Consequently,
the sufficiency condition implies that there must exist a partitioning of
the observed set S in two subsets that each individually meet the uni-
tary GARP ; i.e. each individual dictator must act consistent with the
unitary rationality condition for those quantities for which she or he
is (fully) responsible. It is this interpretation that underlies the testing
algorithm in the next chapter.14
In summary, violation of the necessary condition in Proposition 2.7
means that a collective rationalization is impossible, while consistency
with the sufficient condition in Proposition 2.10 entails the opposite
conclusion. As for data that meet the necessity but not the sufficiency
condition, we cannot directly tell from the observed (aggregate) prices
and quantities whether a collective rationalization of the data is effec-
tively possible.15 For instance, the proof of the inconsistency result in
14 At this point it is interesting to note that Proposition 2.10 need not be the
only sufficient condition. For instance, situation dependent dictators could be
responsible for sets of commodities instead of sets of whole bundles. However this
will lead to more time consuming algorithms. We thank I. Crawford for pointing
this out.
15 At this point, it is worth emphasizing the subtle difference between ‘collective
rationality of household behavior’ and ‘a collective rationalization of a set of
household observations S’. On the one hand, impossibility of a collective ratio-
nalization of S (e.g. inconsistency with the necessity condition in Proposition 2.7)
necessarily implies collectively irrational behavior. On the other hand, possibility
of a collective rationalization of S (e.g. consistency with the sufficiency condition
in Proposition 2.10) does not necessarily imply collectively rational behavior; it
only means that we cannot reject collective rationality on the basis of the available
set of observations.
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Example 2.9 starts from the necessity condition (which, like the uni-
tary GARP, focuses on the full consumption bundles), to subsequently
consider the construction of feasible personalized prices and quantities
for individual goods. Such practice generally boils down to checking
the inequalities in Proposition 2.2 that are nonlinear in these feasible
personalized prices and quantities. [We avoid this in our proof of the
result in Example 2.9 only because of our specific condition for ε.]
Still, even though the necessary condition should not generally coin-
cide with the sufficient condition, we may expect the two conditions
to become equally powerful (or ‘converge’) when the sample size in-
creases.16 Specifically, if T gets larger, we have for each observation j
that min
qi
{p′jqi | qi H1 qj and not qi H2 qj} or minqi {p
′
jqi | qi H2 qj
and not qi H1 qj} will generally get closer to zero (since a larger sam-
ple can induce extra price-quantity variation). Hence, the requirement
p′jqj ≤ p′j(qi1 +qi2) whenever qi1 H1 qj and qi2 H2 qj in Proposition
2.7 (rule (v)) will approach the condition p′jqj ≤ p′jqi whenever qi Hm
qj for m = 1 or 2 in Proposition 2.10 (rule (vii)).17
The associated ‘convergence rate’ will then of course depend (posi-
tively) upon the variation in the observed prices and quantities, and
hence we may expect it to increase with the number of goods. For
a given number of goods, the speed of convergence will vary with the
specific data generating process that underlies the aggregate prices and
quantities, which in turn depends on the household member utilities
and on the characteristics of the within-household bargaining process.
But, in general, we can safely argue that the empirical implications of
the fairly rudimentary situation-dependent dictatorship solution (see
the sufficient condition) will get closer to those of any more refined
intrahousehold decision process (see the necessary condition) when the
sample size increases.
16 See, e.g., Bronars (1987) for power notions in the context of nonparametric ra-
tionality tests.
17 Note that the necessary condition (rule (vi)) and the sufficient condition (rule
(vii)) both require p′jqj ≤ p′jqi whenever qiH1qj and qiH2qj . Also observe that
the empirical restrictions following from rule (iv) in Proposition 2.7 imply those
of rule (viii) in Proposition 2.10 when, for each observation j, min
qi
{p′jqi | qiH1qj
and not qiH
2qj} or min
qi
{p′jqi | qiH2qj and not qiH1qj} gets close to zero for
large T .
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2.5 Generalization towards M members
This section generalizes our main results for two-member households
towards M -member households (or more general groups): Subsection
2.5.1 contains the nonparametric characterization of collective ratio-
nality, Subsection 2.5.2 discusses the minimum number of goods and
observations that enable rejection of M -member collective rationality,
and Subsection 2.5.3 presents the testable collective rationality con-
ditions. Note that this general case includes the two-member model
(M = 2) and the unitary model (M = 1) as special cases.
2.5.1 A characterization of collective rationality for
M-member households
The household’s observed aggregate quantities q are now decomposed
into M quantities qm (m = 1, . . . ,M) that capture private consump-
tion and quantities qh that represent public consumption. The different
quantities are interrelated as follows:
q = q1 + q2 + . . .+ qM + qh.
Each member m is further characterized by own preferences that are
represented by a non-satiated utility function Um(q1,q2, . . . ,qM ,qh)
that is non-decreasing in its arguments.
As was the case for two-member households, we assume a set of T ob-
servations of prices and quantities; where S = {(pj ;qj), j = 1, . . . , T}
denotes the set of observations. To generalize Definition 2.1 of Section
2.2, for observed quantities qj , we define feasible personalized quantities
q̂j as
q̂j = (q1j , . . . , q
M
j , q
h
j )
with q1j , . . . , q
M
j , q
h
j ∈ Rn+ and q1j + . . .+ qMj + qhj = qj .
(2.6)
The interpretation is directly analogous to that for the two-member
model. Using (2.6), we have the following definition.
Definition 2.11. Let S = {(pj ;qj); j = 1, . . . , T} be a set of obser-
vations. A combination of M utility functions U1, . . . , UM provides an
M-member collective rationalization (CR-M) of S if for each observa-
tion j there exist feasible personalized quantities q̂j = (q1j , . . . , q
M
j , q
h
j )
and µ2j , . . . , µ
M
j ∈ R++ such that
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U1(q̂j) +
M∑
m=2
µmj U
2(q̂j) ≥ U1(ẑ) +
M∑
m=2
µmj U
2(ẑ)
for all ẑ = (z1, . . . , zM , zh) with z1, . . . , zM , zh ∈ Rn+ and
p′j(z
1 + . . .+ zM + zh) ≤ p′jqj .
Analogous to the two-member case, optimal household quantities re-
sult from the maximization of a weighted sum of household member
utilities, with weights representing the bargaining power of the house-
hold members. Once more, optimality is to be understood in a Pareto
efficiency sense.
To introduce the collective rationalization conditions for theM -member
case, we define feasible personalized prices (p̂1j , . . . , p̂
M
j ) as
p̂mj = (p
1,m
j , . . . , p
M,m
j , p
h,m
j ) for m = 1, . . . ,M − 1 and
p̂Mj = (pj −
M−1∑
m=1
p
1,m
j , . . . ,pj −
M−1∑
m=1
p
M,m
j ,pj −
M−1∑
m=1
p
h,m
j ),
with
p
1,m
j , p
2,m
j , p
h,m
j ∈ Rn+ and
M−1∑
m=1
p
c,m
j ≤ pj (c = 1, . . . ,M, h);
(2.7)
and a set of feasible personalized prices and quantities
Ŝ = {(p̂1j , . . . , p̂Mj ; q̂j); j = 1, . . . , T}.
Once more, the interpretation is analogous to that for the two-member
case. We then have the following result, which generalizes Proposition
2.2.
Proposition 2.12. Let S = {(pj ;qj); j = 1, . . . , T} be a set of obser-
vations. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) there exists a combination ofM concave and continuous utility func-
tions U1, . . . , UM that provide a CR-M of S;
(ii) there exists a set of feasible personalized prices and quantities Ŝ
such that for each m = 1, . . . ,M the sets {(p̂mj ; q̂j); j = 1, . . . , T} all
satisfy GARP;
(iii) there exists a set of feasible personalized prices and quantities Ŝ
and numbers Umj , λ
m
j > 0 such that for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , T} : Umi −
Umj ≤ λmj (p̂mj )′(q̂i − q̂j) with (m = 1, . . . ,M).
Note that this proposition naturally complies with the unitary GARP
condition if M = 1.
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2.5.2 Minimum number of goods and observations to enable
rejection of M-member collective rationality
Let us then regard the minimal empirical conditions for possible rejec-
tion of the CR-M conditions in Proposition 2.12. These are given in
the following result, which generalizes Proposition 2.8.
Proposition 2.13. There does not always exist a combination of utility
functions U1, . . . , UM that provide a CR-M of the set of observations
S = {(pj ;qj); j = 1, . . . , T} if and only if (i) the number of goods
n ≥M + 1 and (ii) the number of observations T ≥M + 1.
In words, as soon as there are more goods and observations than house-
hold members, the collective model can be rejected. If one of the con-
ditions (i) and (ii) in Proposition 2.13 is not fulfilled, then a CR-M of
the set of observations S is always possible.
To further illustrate, we next provide a general price-quantity data
structure that cannot be collectively rationalized.
Example 2.14. In the proof of Proposition 2.13, we establish that a
CR-M of the set S = {(pj ;qj), j = 1, . . . ,M + 1} is impossible if the
following conditions are met:
∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,M + 1} : p′jqj > p′j(
M+1∑
i=1,i6=j
qi). (2.8)
We investigate these conditions for pj ∈ RM+1++ and qj ∈ RM+1+ (j =
1, . . . ,M + 1) that have the following structure:
pj = (1 · · · 1 p 1 · · · 1 )′ and qj = (1 · · · 1 q 1 · · · 1 )′,
where p and q always appear as the j-th row elements of respectively
pj and qj. This specific set of observations S obtains:
p′jqj = pq +M ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,M + 1}, and
p′jqi = p+ q +M − 1 ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,M + 1}, j 6= i.
Hence, the set S meets 2.8 if and only if
pq +M > M(p+ q +M − 1). (2.9)
Rewriting 2.9 as
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p(q −M) > M(q +M − 2),
it is easy to see that for all q > M there exists p such that 2.9 is met.
To give a numerical example, we reject collective rationality for M =
5 if q = 10 and p = 14. Similar constructions are conceivable for
alternative M values.
2.5.3 Testable collective rationality restrictions
We next generalize the testable collective rationality restrictions of Sec-
tion 2.3 and 2.4. First, as for the necessity restrictions, we can establish
similar results as Lemmas 2.4 and 2.6. For compactness, we abstract
from a formal statement, but the analogy with the two-member case is
easy. Using this, we have the following result.
Proposition 2.15. Suppose that there exists a combination of utility
functions U1, . . . , UM that provide a CR-M of the set of observations
S = {(pj ;qj); j = 1, . . . , T}. Then there exist hypothetical relations
Hm0 , H
m for each member m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} such that:
(i) if p′iqi ≥ p′iqj then qi Hm0 qj for some m;
(ii) if qi Hm0 qk, qk H
m
0 ql, . . . , qz H
m
0 qj for some (possibly empty)
sequence (k, l, . . . , z) then qi Hm qj ;
(iii) for M∗ ≤ M and M  {1, ...,M} : if p′sqs ≥ p′s(
∑M∗
k=1 qtk) and
for all m ∈M we have qtk(m)Hmqs for some k(m) ≤M∗, then qs H l0
qtk for some l /∈M and k ≤M∗;
(iv) for M∗ ≤ M and M  {1, ...,M} : if p′sqs ≥ p′s(
∑M∗
k=1 qtk) and
for all m ∈M we have qtk(m)Hmqs for some k(m) ≤M∗ − 1, then qs
H l0 qtM∗ for some l /∈M;
(v) forM∗ ≤M : if for allm we have qsk(m)Hmqt for some k(m) ≤M∗,
then p′tqt ≤ p′t(
∑M∗
k=1 qsk).
This necessary condition has a directly similar interpretation as its two-
member analogue. Rules (i)-(iv) contain restrictions on the specification
of the hypothetical relations Hm0 , H
m for the given set of observations
S. Rule (v), which complies with rules (v)-(vi) in Proposition 2.7, sub-
sequently states that, if each household member m prefers qim over
qj , then qj cannot be more expensive than the combination of these
preferred quantities under the prices pj . It is easy to verify that this
condition reduces to the unitary GARP condition forM = 1 (i.e. there
is only one household member).
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Note that we do not need to extend rule (iv) towards right hand sides
with more than two terms since these are already captured by rule
(iv). To be more precise, if p′iqi ≥ p′i(qj1 + · · · + qjk) with k > 2
then we a fortiori also have that p′iqi ≥ p′i(qjs + qjt) for any js, jt ∈
{j1, . . . jk}. Therefore our rule (iv) refines the rule (iv) of Proposition
S4 of Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007s).
We next define the complementary sufficiency condition for a CR-M of
the set of observations S.
Proposition 2.16. Let S = {(pj ;qj); j = 1, . . . , T} be a set of ob-
servations. Suppose that there exist hypothetical relations Hm0 , H
m
for each member m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} that satisfy rules (i)-(v) in Proposi-
tion 2.15 and in addition allow for constructing sets S1, . . . , SM with
∪mSm = S and Sm ∩ Sl = ∅ for m 6= l such that
(v) Sm = {(pj ;qj) ∈ S | p′jqj ≤ p′jqi whenever qi Hm qj};
(vi) for each (pi;qi), (pj ;qj) ∈ Sm : qiHm0 qj whenever p′iqi ≥ p′iqj .
Then there exists a combination of utility functions U1, . . . , UM that
provide a CR-M of the set S.
Like in the two-member case, this sufficient condition can be inter-
preted in terms of a situation-dependent dictatorship model. Just like
the necessity condition, the sufficiency condition reduces to the GARP
condition for M = 1. In that case, the only feasible personalized prices
and quantities are the observed aggregate prices and quantities, and
the necessary and sufficient conditions for rational household behavior
always coincide. In the more general case (M > 1), we may expect the
necessity condition to converge towards the sufficiency condition when
the sample size increases; compare with our discussion in Section 2.4.
Finally, since the necessary and sufficient conditions in Propositions
2.15 and 2.16 only require aggregate prices pjand quantities qj , they
enable operational collective rationality tests that apply to the general
case of T observations. Finite algorithms for verifying the conditions
are directly similar to the one present in Chapter 3 for the two-member
case.
2.6 Summary and concluding remarks
To conclude, we recall that the collective model under study considers
general member-specific preferences, and only assumes that the empir-
ical analyst observes the aggregate household consumption quantities
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and prices. Attractively, the model encompasses a large variety of al-
ternative behavioral models as special cases, which include additional
prior information that implies extra restrictions regarding the feasible
personalized quantities and prices (see (2.6) and (2.7) for the general
model under study). For example, such additional structure may per-
tain to observability of private and/or public consumption quantities or
to the nature of the individual members’ preferences (namely, egoistic
rather than altruistic); notable cases are the traditional unitary model
and the collective model of Chiappori (1988). As we will show in the
following chapters, such special cases entail in general more stringent
testable necessary and sufficient conditions for collective rationalization
that solely use observed prices and quantities.
As a final note, we recall that the testable collective rationality con-
ditions in Propositions 2.15 and 2.16 have an analogous structure as
the (unitary) GARP, which allows for easy adaptations of the exist-
ing power and goodness-of-fit measures for nonparametric consumption
analysis (see respectively Bronars, 1987, and Varian, 1990, for inspir-
ing results and our applications in the Chapters 3 and 4 for examples).
Specifically, using the necessary and sufficient conditions one can gen-
erate upper and lower bounds for each of these measures. [If these
upper and lower bounds are situated close to each other, one possible
interpretation is that the empirical content of the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions is practically the same for the set of observations under
study.]
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.2:
Varian (1982) proves the equivalence between conditions (ii) and (iii)
of the proposition. Therefore, it suffices to prove equivalence between
(i) and (iii).18
((i) ⇒ (iii)) Under condition (i), for each observation j there exists
q̂j = (q1j , q
2
j , q
h
j ) that solves the problem (for ẑ = (z
1, z2, zh) with
z1, z2, zh ∈ Rn+)
maxbz U1(z1, z2, zh) + µjU2(z1, z2, zh) s.t. p′j(z1 + z2 + zh) ≤ p′jqj .
Given concavity, both individual utility functions are subdifferentiable,
which carries over to their weighted sum U1 + µjU2.19 An optimal
solution to the above maximization problem must therefore satisfy (for
ηj the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint)
U1qcj + µjU
2
qcj
≤ ηjpj ,
where Umqcj (m = 1, 2) is a subgradient of the utility function U
m defined
for the vector zc ∈ Rn+ and evaluated at qcj (c = 1, 2, h). Letting pcj =
U1
qc
j
ηj
, λ1j = ηj and λ
2
j =
ηj
µj
thus gives
U1qcj = λ
1
jp
c
j and U
2
qcj
≤ λ2j (pj − pcj). (2.10)
Next, concavity of the functions U1 and U2 implies (m = 1, 2)
Um(q̂i)− Um(q̂j) ≤
∑
c=1,2,h
Umqcj (q
c
i − qcj). (2.11)
Substituting (2.10) in (2.11) and setting Umk = U
m(q̂k) (m = 1, 2;
k = i, j) obtains the conditions (iii) of the proposition.
18 This proof generalizes that of Chiappori (1988), who focuses on the specific case of
household labor supply. Another difference is that Chiappori focuses on (a strong
version of) the SARP conditions (see Chiappori and Rochet, 1987, p. 688, for a
precise definition) while our proof uses the (less stringent) GARP conditions. It
is worth pointing out that all our results for the GARP can be adapted to apply
for the (strong) SARP.
19 To be precise, −Um (m = 1, 2) is convex and therefore subdifferentiable. This, of
course, does not affect our argument.
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((iii) ⇒ (i)) Under condition (iii), we can define for any q̂=(q1, q2, qh)
such that p′j(q
1 + q2 + qh) ≤ p′jqj
U1(q̂) = min
i∈{1,...,T}
[
U1i + λ
1
i (p̂
1
i )
′(q̂− q̂i)
]
and (2.12)
U2(q̂) = min
i∈{1,...,T}
[
U2i + λ
2
i (p̂
2
i )
′(q̂− q̂i)
]
. (2.13)
Varian (1982) proves that U1(q̂j) = U1j and U
2(q̂j) = U2j . Next, given
µj ∈ R++, we have that
U1(q̂) + µjU2(q̂) ≤ U1j + λ1j (p̂1j )′(q̂− q̂j) + µj
[
U2j + λ
2
j (p̂
2
j )
′(q̂− q̂j)
]
.
Without losing generality, we concentrate on µj = (λ1j/λ
2
j ), which ob-
tains
U1(q̂) + µjU2(q̂) ≤ U1j + µjU2j + λ1j (pj)′(q− qj),
where q = (q1 + q2 + qh). Since p′jq ≤ p′jqj , we thus have
U1(q̂) + µjU2(q̂) ≤ U1j + µjU2j = U1(q̂j) + µjU2(q̂j),
which proves that q̂j maximizes U1(q̂) + µjU2(q̂) subject to the con-
straint p′j(q
1 + q2 + qh) ≤ p′jqj . We conclude that the functions U1
and U2 in (2.12)-(2.13) provide a collective rationalization of S. These
functions satisfy the conditions in part (i) of the proposition (compare
with Varian, 1982). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2.4:
(Necessity) We first derive that qi R0 qj implies q̂i R10 q̂j or q̂i R
2
0
q̂j for any set Ŝ. The result follows from the fact that p′iqi ≥ p′iqj
(or qi R0 qj) is incompatible with the existence of some Ŝ such that
(p̂1i )
′q̂i < (p̂1i )
′q̂j and (p̂2i )
′q̂i < (p̂2i )
′q̂j . Indeed, summing these last
inequalities immediately yields p′iqi < p
′
iqj .
(Sufficiency) We next derive that if, for all sets of feasible personalized
prices and quantities Ŝ, q̂i R10 q̂j or q̂i R
2
0 q̂j then qi R0 qj . The result
is obtained by noting that p′iqi < p
′
iqj implies (p̂
1
i )
′q̂i + (p̂2i )
′q̂i <
(p̂1i )
′q̂j+(p̂2i )
′q̂j for all Ŝ. It is then easy to see that, if p′iqi < p
′
iqj , then
there exists Ŝ such that (p̂1i )
′q̂i < (p̂1i )
′q̂j and (p̂2i )
′q̂i < (p̂2i )
′q̂j (i.e.
we have neither q̂i R10 q̂j nor q̂i R
2
0 q̂j); e.g. one may use p
1
k = (1/2)pk
and q1k = qk (k = i, j). Hence, we have for all sets Ŝ that q̂i R
1
0 q̂j or
q̂i R20 q̂j only if p
′
iqi ≥ p′iqj , i.e. qi R0 qj . Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 2.6:
Given that a collective rationalization of the set of observations S is
possible, we consider a set Ŝ that is consistent with condition (ii) in
Proposition 2.2. Using Definition 2.3, this set Ŝ defines relations Rm0
and Rm (m = 1, 2). We will show that these relations satisfy rules
(i)-(iv) in Lemma 2.6.
As for rule (i), we establish that, if p′iqi ≥ p′iqj and q̂j R1 q̂i, then
q̂i R20 q̂j (the argument for the other case is directly analogous). For
q̂j R1 q̂i, consistency with condition (ii) in Proposition 2.2 requires
(p̂1i )
′q̂i ≤ (p̂1i )′q̂j . Given p′iqi ≥ p′iqj , this last inequality implies
(p̂2i )
′q̂i ≥ (p̂2i )′q̂j or q̂i R20 q̂j , which gives the result.
To derive rule (ii), suppose that p′iqi ≥ p′i(qj1 + qj2) in combina-
tion with q̂j1 R
1 q̂i while not q̂i R20 q̂j2 . On the one hand, not q̂i
R20 q̂j2 means that (p̂
2
i )
′q̂i < (p̂2i )
′q̂j2 . On the other hand, q̂j1 R1
q̂i requires that (p̂1i )
′q̂i ≤ (p̂1i )′q̂j1 for the consistency with condition
(ii) in Proposition 2.2. Combining these two inequalities would imply
p′iqi < (p̂
1
i )
′q̂j1+ (p̂2i )
′q̂j2 ≤ p′i(qj1 + qj2), which contradicts p′iqi ≥
p′i(qj1+qj2). Thus, we conclude that (p
′
iqi ≥ p′i(qj1+qj2)∧ q̂j1 R1 q̂i)
⇒ q̂i R20 q̂j2 . A directly analogous argument holds for the other case.
As for rules (iii) and (iv), under q̂i1 R
1 q̂j and q̂i2 R
2 q̂j consistency
with condition (ii) in Proposition 2.2 is obtained only if (p̂1j )
′q̂j ≤
(p̂1j )
′q̂i1 and (p̂2j )
′q̂j ≤ (p̂2j )′q̂i2 . This last result immediately yields
p′jqj ≤ (p̂1j )′q̂i1+ (p̂2j )′q̂i2 ≤ p′j(qi1 + qi2) if qi1 6= qi2 and, similarly,
p′jqj ≤ p′jqi if qi1 = qi2 = qi. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.7:
The result follows immediately from combining Lemmas 2.4 and 2.6,
when replacing the relations Rm0 and R
m by their hypothetical counter-
parts Hm0 and H
m. Rule (i) follows from Lemma 2.4. Rule (ii) defines
the transitive closures H1 and H2 of the relations H10 and H
2
0 ; compare
with Definition 2.3. Finally, rules (iii)-(vi) follow from rules (i)-(iv) in
Lemma 2.6. Q.E.D.
Proof of the result in Example 2.9:
For the specific data structure, consistency with the condition in Propo-
sition 2.7 implies that there exist hypothetical relations that must sat-
isfy for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , 7}, i 6= j : qi Hm qj and not qi H l qj for
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m 6= l; and we cannot have qi H1 qk and qj H2 qk for k ∈ {1, 7} and
for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , 7}\{k}. Given this, one possible specification of the
relations Hm0 ,H
m is20
∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , 7} : (i > j ⇒ qj H1 qi) and (i < j ⇒ qj H2 qi).
Combining the corresponding requirements following from condition
(ii) in Proposition 2.2 obtains for all i ∈ {2, . . . , 6} and j ∈ {1, . . . , 7}
(i > j ⇒ p′iqj − ε ≤ (p̂1i )′q̂j ≤ p′iqj)
and (i < j ⇒ 0 ≤ (p̂1i )′q̂j ≤ ε). (2.14)
Next, because (qj)e = (q1j )e + (q
2
j )e + (q
h
j )e and p
c
i ≤ pi (c = 1, 2, h),
we obtain that p′iqj − ε ≤ (p̂1i )′q̂j ≤ p′iqj implies for all e ∈ {1, . . . , n}
(pi)e(qj)e − ε ≤
∑
c∈{1,2,h}
(pci )e(q
c
j)e ≤ (pi)e(qj)e,
which in turn entails for all c ∈ {1, 2, h} with (qcj)e > 0
(pi)e − ε(qcj)e
≤ (pci )e ≤ (pi)e.
Similarly, the restriction 0 ≤ (p̂1i )′q̂j ≤ ε requires0 ≤ ∑
c∈{1,2,h}
(pci )e(q
c
j)e ≤ ε
⇒ [∀c ∈ {1, 2, h} : 0 ≤ (pci )e ≤ ε(qcj)e
]
.
Let us take e = 1 and consider 0 < σ = min
j∈{1,...,7},e∈{1,...,n}
(qj)e. The
Pigeon Hole Principle implies ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , 7} : ∃cj ∈ {1, 2, h} : (qcjj )1 ≥
(σ/3), so that we get [
p′iqj − ε ≤ (p̂1i )′q̂j ≤ p′iqj
]⇒[
∃cj ∈ {1, 2, h} : (pi)1 − 3ε
σ
≤ (pcji )1 ≤ (pi)1
]
and
20 The following argument can be repeated for any alternative specification of the
relations Hm0 , H
m that meets the necessity condition in Proposition 2.7.
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[
0 ≤ (p̂1i )′q̂j ≤ ε
]⇒ [∃cj ∈ {1, 2, h} : 0 ≤ (pcji )1 ≤ 3εσ
]
.
Remark that
min
j,e
(pj)emin
j,e
(qj)e
6 > ε implies (pi)1 − 3εσ > 3εσ . Using this,
the preference structure in (2.14) obtains ∀i ∈ {2, . . . , 6}
∀j1, j2 ∈ {1, . . . , 7} : (i > j1 ∧ i < j2 ⇒ cj1 6= cj2); (2.15)
the reasoning is that (i > j1 ⇒ (pi)1 − 3εσ ≤ (p
cj1
i )1 ≤ (pi)1) and
(i < j2 ⇒ 0 ≤ (pcj2i )1 ≤ 3εσ ), which excludes cj1 = cj2 . Inconsistency
with the collective rationalization conditions in Proposition 2.2 follows
as (2.15) implies cj1 6= cj2 for all j1, j2 ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7}, j1 6= j2; and this
contradicts cj ∈ {1, 2, h} ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , 7}. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.10:
Suppose that we can construct sets S1 and S2 in Proposition 2.10.
Then we can construct a set of feasible prices and quantities Ŝ that
meets condition (ii) in Proposition 2.2. Specifically, define Ŝ such that
if (pj ;qj) ∈ S1 then q1j = qj (and thus q2j = qhj = 0);
if (pj ;qj) ∈ S2 then q2j = qj (and thus q1j = qhj = 0);
and p1j = pj , p
2
j = p
h
j = 0 for all (pj ;qj) ∈ S.
We restrict attention to household member 1; but a directly analo-
gous reasoning applies to member 2. Condition (ii) in Proposition 2.2
states that (p̂1i )
′q̂i ≥ (p̂1i )′q̂k, . . . , (p̂1z)′q̂z ≥ (p̂1z)′q̂j for some (possibly
empty) sequence (k, . . . , z) implies (p̂1j )
′q̂j ≤ (p̂1j )′q̂i. As a preliminary
step, we note that under the above specification of the set Ŝ we have
for all (pl1 ;ql1) ∈ S1 that (p̂1l1)′q̂l2 = 0 if (pl2 ;ql2) ∈ S2. This makes
that the only interesting case is (pl;ql) ∈ S1 for all l = i, j, k, . . . , z.
Hence, obtaining (p̂1i )
′q̂i ≥ (p̂1i )′q̂k, . . . , (p̂1z)′q̂z ≥ (p̂1z)′q̂j ⇒ (p̂1j )′q̂j ≤
(p̂1j )
′q̂i boils down to verifying p′iqi ≥ p′iqk, . . . , p′zqz ≥ p′zqj ⇒
p′jqj ≤ p′jqi for any possible sequence of (i, k, . . . , z, j) with (pl;ql)
∈ S1 for all l = i, j, k, . . . , z.
Using rule (viii) in Proposition 2.10, we have p′iqi ≥ p′iqk, . . . , p′zqz ≥
p′zqj ⇒ qi H10 qk, . . . , qz H10 qj , which in turn implies qi H1 qj .
Rule (vii) in Proposition 2.10 consequently guarantees p′jqj ≤ p′jqi,
i.e. condition (ii) in Proposition 2.2 is met for member 1. Q.E.D.
48 Chapter 2: Collective approach to household consumption
Proof of Proposition 2.12:
The construction of the proof is directly analogous to that of Proposi-
tion 2.2.
Proof of Proposition 2.13:
(Necessity) The basic intuition is the same as the one explained in
Section 2.4
(Sufficiency) Let S = {(pj ;qj), j = 1, . . . ,M + 1}, then we show that
a CR-M is impossible if the following conditions are met:
∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,M + 1} : p′jqj > p′j(
M+1∑
i=1,i6=j
qi). (2.16)
As a preliminary step, we note that for all sets Ŝ we have ∀ i, j ∈
{1, ..,M + 1} :
M∑
m=1
(p̂mj )
′q̂i = p′jqi; (2.17)
this follows from the definitions of p̂mj and q̂i, and will prove useful in
our following discussion.
Let us then rewrite the CR-M conditions (iii) of Proposition 2.12 as
(for each i, j ∈ {1, ..,M + 1} and m ∈ {1, . . . ,M})
1
λmj
(Umi − Umj ) ≤ (p̂mj )′(q̂i − q̂j). (2.18)
Next observe that, if there are M + 1 observations, and given that
there are only M household members, then for any possible ordering
of each member m’s (m = 1, . . . ,M) ‘utilities’ Umk (k = 1, . . . ,M + 1)
there is at least one observation j ∈ {1, . . . ,M +1} of which each m-th
(m = 1, . . . ,M) household member is dominated ‘in utility terms’ by
some other observation i(m) ∈ {1, . . . ,M+1}; i.e. ∃j ∈ {1, . . . ,M+1} :
∀m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} : ∃i(m) ∈ {1, . . . ,M + 1}, i(m) 6= j : Umj ≤ Umi(m).
Let us then concentrate on such an observation j when constructing
necessary conditions for a CR-M of the set S. For all m = 1, . . . ,M it
holds that (see (2.18))
0 ≤ 1
λmj
(Umi(m) − Umj ) ≤ (p̂mj )′(q̂i(m) − q̂j),
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or,
(p̂mj )
′q̂j ≤ (p̂mj )′q̂i(m).
Using (2.17), we thus have
p′jqj =
M∑
m=1
(p̂mj )
′q̂j ≤
M∑
m=1
(p̂mj )
′q̂i(m), (2.19)
which provides a lower bound for
∑
m=1,...,M
(p̂mj )
′q̂i(m).
On the other hand, an upper bound can be constructed on the basis of
(2.17), which implies for any subset M ⊆ {1, . . . ,M}
∑
l∈M
(p̂lj)
′q̂i(m) ≤
M∑
l=1
(p̂lj)
′q̂i(m) ≤ p′jqi(m); ∀i(m),m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}.
Define Mi = {m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} | i(m) = i} for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,M + 1};
note that Mj = ∅ by construction. Then
M∑
m=1
(p̂mj )
′q̂i(m) =
∑
l∈M1
(p̂lj)
′q̂1 + · · ·+
∑
l∈MM+1
(p̂lj)
′q̂M+1 ≤ p′j(
M+1∑
i=1,i6=j
qi). (2.20)
From (2.19) and (2.20), we derive a necessary condition for a CR-M of
the set S
p′jqj ≤ p′j(
M+1∑
i=1,i6=j
qi),
which conflicts with the property (2.16) of the observed prices and
quantities under consideration.
We conclude that it is impossible to construct U1, . . . , UM that provide
a CR-M of a set S that satisfies (2.16). This shows sufficiency for (at
least)M+1 observations. Sufficiency for (at least)M+1 goods follows
from Example 1 (CR-M rejection). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.15:
The construction of the proof is directly analogous to that of Proposi-
tion 2.7.
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Proof of Proposition 2.16:
It can be shown that, if the set of observations S meets the sufficiency
condition, then the conditions for a CR-M of the data are met for
the following specification of the set of feasible personalized prices and
quantities Ŝ: (i) we specify the feasible personalized quantities such
that for (pi;qi) ∈ Sm : qmi = qi and qli = 0 for l 6= m; (ii) for each
observation i we specify feasible personalized prices such that pm,mi =
pi for m ∈ {1, . . . , M − 1} and pl,mi = 0 for l 6= m. The construction
of the proof is directly analogous to that of Proposition 2.10. Q.E.D.
Bargaining power and ‘situation-dependent dictatorship’
This section shows that the requirement of a strictly positive bargain-
ing power for each household member (i.e. ∞ > µj > 0 in Definition
2.1 of the main text) is compatible with the ‘situation-dependent dicta-
torship’ solution underlying the sufficiency result in Proposition 2.10.
The following argument concentrates on two-member households for
simplicity; but it can directly be generalized to hold for M -member
households.
To formally explain the compatibility, we first recall the sufficiency part
(“(iii)⇒ (i)”) in the proof of Proposition 2.2. That proof shows that, if
the data are consistent with the inequalities in part (iii) of Proposition
2.2, then consistency with a collective rationalization of the observed
set S is possible for µj = (λ1j/λ
2
j ).
The proof of Proposition 2.10 then shows consistency with the GARP
conditions in part (ii) of Proposition 2.2 for the following specification
of the feasible personalized quantities and prices:
if (pj ;qj) ∈ S1 then q1j = qj , and if (pj ;qj) ∈ S2 then q2j = qj ;
and p1j = pj , p
2
j = p
h
j = 0 for all (pj ;qj) ∈ S.
We note that consistency with these GARP conditions implies consis-
tency with the inequalities in part (iii) of Proposition 2.2. In fact, it can
be verified that for the given specification of the feasible personalized
quantities and prices, consistency with these inequalities does not in
any way impose λ1j = 0 or λ
2
j = 0. For example, let us give a specific
solution for the inequalities for member 1:
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∀(pi;qi) ∈ S1, (pj ;qj) ∈ S1 : U1i − U1j ≤ λ1j (pj)′(qi − qj); (2.21)
∀(pi;qi) ∈ S1, (pj ;qj) ∈ S2 : U1i − U1j ≤ λ1j (pj)′(qi); (2.22)
∀(pi;qi) ∈ S2, (pj ;qj) ∈ S1 : U1i − U1j ≤ −λ1j (pj)′(qj); (2.23)
∀(pi;qi) ∈ S2, (pj ;qj) ∈ S2 : U1i − U1j ≤ 0. (2.24)
To construct the solution, we first take, for all (pi;qi) ∈ S1, U1i > 0
and λ1i > 0 that obtain consistency with (2.21); this is possible because
the subset S1 is consistent with GARP. Subsequently, we specify for all
(pj ;qj) ∈ S2 that U1j = U with min
(pi;qi)∈S1
U1i > U (> 0) (note that this
guarantees consistency with (2.24)). In that case, we can always choose
λ1j > 0 for all (pj ;qj) ∈ S; see in particular (2.22)-(2.23). We conclude
that the set of inequalities (2.21)-(2.24) does not impose λ1j = 0 for
any j. A directly analogous argument obtains that we can always set
λ2j > 0 for any j when the sufficiency condition in Proposition 2.10 is
met.
As a result, we can always specify (for all observations j) µj such
that ∞ > µj > 0 to obtain consistency with Definition 2.1. We thus
conclude that our specification of the personalized prices and quantities
(i.e. the ‘situation-dependent dictatorship’ solution) for establishing the
sufficiency result in Proposition 2.10 is consistent with the requirement
that ∞ > µj > 0 in Definition 2.1.

Chapter 3
Modeling collective rationality: nonparametric
tests on real-life data
Abstract
We nonparametrically test a general collective consumption model with
public consumption and externalities inside the household. We further
propose a novel approach to model special cases of the general collec-
tive model. These special cases include alternative restrictions on the
‘sharing rule’ that applies to each household, and that defines the dis-
tribution of the household budget over the household members. Our
application uses data from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey
(RLMS); the panel structure of this data set allows nonparametric test-
ing of the behavioral models without relying on preference homogeneity
assumptions across similar individuals. This application includes test
results but also a power analysis for different specifications of the collec-
tive consumption model. Our main findings are that the most general
collective model, together with a large class of special but still fairly
general cases, cannot be rejected by the data, while other, restricted,
versions of the general model, including the unitary alternative, are
rejected. Since these tests are entirely nonparametric, this provides
strong evidence in favor of models focusing on intrahousehold decision-
making.1
1 This chapter is adapted from Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007c). We are
grateful to Andre´ Decoster for useful comments and for giving an introduction
to the RLMS. We also thank seminar participants in Leuven, London, Tilburg,
Toulouse and at the 2006 European Meeting of the Econometric Society in Vienna
for useful discussions.
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3.1 Introduction
It is clear that a realistic modeling of the household consumption pro-
cess should account for (partial) public consumption of certain com-
modities (e.g., rent and car use) and externalities (e.g., related to cloth-
ing) within the household. Using the tests presented in Chapter 2 we
can nonparametrically test such a general consumption model with-
out requiring any information on the intrahousehold allocation of the
observed consumption bundle.
Nonparametric tests of collective models have been very scarce up to
now. Snyder (2000) tests Chiappori’s (1988) labor supply model with
egoistic agents and observed labor supply. Using semi-algebraic theory
for quantifier elimination, she develops a strict necessary and sufficient
test for data consistency with collective rationality. Her tests however
(only) applies for data sets with two observations. Cherchye and Ver-
meulen (2007) test unitary and collective models by directly starting
from the respective GARP conditions. Their procedure can be applied
in settings with T observations but, again, the study focuses on the
restrictive setting of labor supply behavior of egoistic individuals.
As for the practical implementation of the general collective rational-
ity restrictions, it is to be recognized that the basic tests derived in
Chapter 2 may be computationally burdensome if there are many ob-
servations. Still, as we will show in Section 3.2, some basic theoretical
insights enable considerable efficiency gains in practical applications.
The derivation and application of efficient testing algorithms consti-
tutes a first objective of this chapter.
To the best of our knowledge, general collective models with public
goods and/or externalities have not yet been tested nonparametrically
on real-life data. In Section 3.3 we fill this gap. More specifically, we test
the necessary condition in Proposition 2.7 on data that is drawn from
the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). The RLMS is one
of the few surveys that enables constructing a very detailed panel of
household consumption. This is interesting, since it permits nonpara-
metric tests without having to assume that preferences are homoge-
nous across similar individuals (or, in the unitary case, households).
Moreover, although our sample covers a time series of only eight ob-
servations, there is enough relative price variation over time to test
behavioral models in a meaningful way.
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If the general collective model cannot be rejected, a further step may
consist of testing more restrictive versions of the collective model. Ev-
idently, such a more restrictive model implies a higher probability of
rejection. Usually, restrictions to the general collective model are de-
fined with respect to individual preferences or to the observability of
certain intrahousehold allocations. An example is Chiappori’s (1988,
1992) collective labor supply model with egoistic preferences and ob-
served individual labor; see also our application in Chapter 4. In this
chapter, we propose a novel approach to model restricted versions of
the general collective model. Specifically, we consider the possibility of
including alternative positions regarding the ‘sharing rule’ that applies
to each household; this sharing rule defines the within-household dis-
tribution of the household budget, so reflecting the intrahousehold bar-
gaining power of the different household members.2 In Section 3.4 we
derive the results that will enable us to nonparametrically test plausible
but more restrictive alternatives of the general collective consumption
model.
Finally, one potential drawback of a collective consumption model that
takes into account externalities and public consumption inside the
household, is that its generality makes it hardly rejectable. Although
Proposition 2.8 shows that such a model can be rejected on the basis
of couples’ data when there are at least three commodities and three
observations, the question remains how powerful the theoretical impli-
cations are in real-life empirical applications. Therefore, in addition to
the nonparametric tests, we also include a power analysis of the various
specifications of the collective consumption model. Such an analysis fo-
cuses on the probability of detecting an alternative hypothesis (e.g.,
based on Becker’s (1962) notion of irrational behavior) to the detri-
ment of the behavioral model under study. See also Bronars (1987),
who introduced power assessment tools for the nonparametric unitary
(GARP) condition; Andreoni and Harbaugh (2006) provide a survey
of nonparametric power assessment tools that are currently available.
Section 3.5 then contains the empirical results for alternative specifica-
tions of the collective consumption model, with a special focus on the
power of the different specifications. Section 3.6 concludes.
2 See Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2006) for a discussion of this sharing rule
concept in a parametric treatment of the collective consumption model.
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3.2 Algorithms for testing the general collective model
In this section we describe (basic) algorithms for testing the Proposi-
tions 2.7 and 2.10. As we will argue, these algorithms could be time
consuming and therefore we also describe some efficiency enhancing
mechanisms in subsection 3.2.2.3
3.2.1 Testing algorithms
We first present an algorithm for checking the necessary condition for a
collective rationalization of the set of observations S in Proposition 2.7.
This (necessity) test checks the condition in Proposition 2.7 for each
possible configuration of the hypothetical relations. More formally, for
any couple of observations (i, j) for which p′iqi ≥ p′iqj we must hy-
pothesize qi H10 qj or qi H
2
0 qj ; this implies 3 possible scenarios for
each couple (i, j): qi H10 qj , qi H
2
0 qj and (qi H
1
0 qj∧qi H20 qj). Subse-
quently, for any combination of the respective scenarios, we should con-
struct relations H1and H2 consistent with rules (ii)-(vi) of Proposition
2.7. Finally, the necessity condition stated in Proposition 2.7 should be
satisfied for at least one such construction of hypothetical relations in
order not to reject the general collective consumption model.
Before presenting the outline of the algorithm that we implemented,
we introduce some additional notation. First, we define the set
Dj = {(pi;qi) | qi R0 qj}.
Next, we use that every specification of the hypothetical relations H10
and H20 (and the corresponding transitive closures H
1 and H2) defines
the sets (m = 1, 2)
Dmj = {(pi;qi) | qi Hm0 qj} and IDmj = {(pi;qi) | qi Hm qj}.
The following algorithm will be expressed in terms of the sets Dmj and
IDmj rather than the relations H
m
0 and H
m. It goes as follows:
3 In Cherchye, De Rock, Sabbe and Vermeulen (2007) we discuss more efficient
algorithms, based on integer and linear programming techniques, which are ca-
pable to deal with larger data sets. Basically, these authors focus on an efficient
(implicit) enumeration of all possible configurations of the hypothetical relations.
In Section 3.3 we show that in our application the basic algorithm is sufficient.
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Algorithm for necessity test
Step 1: For all j ∈ {1, . . . , T}: construct the set Dj and set Cj = ∅.
[Each set Cj captures all possible specifications of the sets D1j and D
2
j
or, equivalently, the relations H10 and H
2
0 that the algorithm considers
in the successive iterations.]
Step 2: [See rule (i) in Proposition 2.7.] For all j ∈ {1, . . . , T}: con-
struct (D1j , D
2
j ) such that: (a) D
m
j ⊆ Dj (m = 1, 2), (b) D1j ∪ D2j =
Dj (c) (D1j , D
2
j ) /∈ Cj . If for any j such (D1j , D2j ) does not exist, then
STOP algorithm: a collective rationalization of the set S is impossible.
Step 3: [See rule (ii) in Proposition 2.7.] ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , T}: construct
(ID1j , ID
2
j ) using Warshall’s algorithm (Varian, 1982).
Step 4: For j = 1, . . . , T verify rule (iii) in Proposition 2.7: if OK, then
go to j+1, unless j = T then go to Step 5; else (a) Cj = Cj ∪ (D1j , D2j ),
(b) go to Step 2.
Step 5: For j = 1, . . . , T verify rule (iv) Proposition 2.7: if OK, then
go to j+1, unless j = T then go to Step 6; else (a) Cj = Cj ∪ (D1j , D2j ),
(b) go to Step 2.
Step 6: For j = 1, . . . , T verify rules (v) and (vi) in Proposition 2.7
for the constructed (ID1j , ID
2
j ): if OK, then go to j + 1, unless j = T
then STOP algorithm: the set S meets the necessary condition for a
collective rationalization; else (a) Cj = Cj∪ (D1j , D2j ), (b) go to Step 2.
This algorithm is finite in nature and is of order 3|D1|+|D2|+···+|DT |.
Specifically, for any (pi;qi) ∈ Dj we must (maximally) consider three
possibilities: (pi;qi) ∈ D1j , (pi;qi) ∈ D2j and (pi;qi) ∈ D1j ∩ D2j ; for
each j ∈ {1, . . . , T} this gives us 3|Dj | possible specifications of the sets
Dmj . Since 3
|D1|+|D2|+···+|DT | ≤ 3T 2 , for T observations, we obtain a
finite upper bound for the number of specifications to be checked. Note
that this upper bound 3T
2
only applies if Dj = S for all observations
j, which is of course an extreme scenario.
We next consider the sufficient condition for a collective rationalization
of the set of observations S in Proposition 2.10. This condition can be
checked by means of the following algorithm:
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Algorithm for sufficiency test
Step 1 For the given set S, define S∗ = {(S1, S2)| S1 ⊆ S and S2 =
S\S1}. [The set S∗ captures all possible specifications of S1 and S2.]
Step 2 For (S1, S2) ∈ S∗ verify GARP for S1 and S2 (separately): if
OK for some (S1, S2) ∈ S∗, then STOP algorithm: a collective ratio-
nalization of the set S is possible; if not OK for any (S1, S2) ∈ S∗,
then STOP algorithm: the set S does not meet the sufficient condition
for a collective rationalization.
Again, this algorithm is finite in nature: we maximally have to con-
sider all possible subsets of S, which is exactly of magnitude 2T for T
observations.
3.2.2 Efficiency enhancing mechanisms
Given all this, the above algorithm implies checking the necessity condi-
tion (Proposition 2.7) for at most 3T
2
configurations of the hypothetical
relations. Although this is an extreme scenario, also other more realistic
scenarios may effectively entail a huge computational burden if there
are many observations. This may be problematic even for present-day
computers. We next present a procedure that may considerably en-
hance the efficiency of the necessity tests. Essentially, starting from
the unitary GARP test, this procedure constructs mutually indepen-
dent subsets of observations for which the necessity condition can be
tested separately.
As will be clear, this same procedure can also be applied to the algo-
rithm for the sufficiency test (Proposition 2.10). Given that this suffi-
ciency test is based on ‘only’ 2T configurations, we focus below on the
more cumbersome necessity condition.
Finally, besides applying the efficiency enhancing mechanisms, one can
also successively apply the existing algorithms. For each subset of, say,
k (≤ T ) observations one can exploit that a collective rationalization
is possible for the first l (≤ k) observations only if it is possible for the
first l − 1 observations. Hence, one may successively apply the testing
algorithms to larger l (starting from l = 3), while each time respecting
the feasibility restrictions associated with the (preceding) l − 1 case
(i.e. regarding possible specifications (D1j , D
2
j ) for the necessity test
and (S1, S2) for the sufficiency test). Given that in our applications
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T was not too large (i.e. T=8, see Section 3.3.1), we did not use this
insight to obtain the results in the next sections.
Unitary GARP testing
As a preliminary step, we recall that the standard (unitary) GARP test
(see Definition 1.3) starts from the R0 relations, which subsequently
form the basis for constructing (unitary) revealed preference relations
(via Warshall’s algorithm; see Varian, 1982). TheGARP condition then
states that each observation j should be cost minimizing over its re-
vealed preferred bundles.
Our efficiency enhancing procedure concentrates on the GARP violat-
ing condition for a couple of observations (i, j), i.e.
qi R qj and p′jqj > p
′
jqi. (3.1)
If (3.1) is not met, the couple (i, j) cannot be involved (at the level of
the individual household members) in a rejection of the necessity con-
dition for a collective rationalization of the data.4 Specifically, in such
a case each constellation of the member-specific hypothetical relations
H1 and H2 consistent with the rules (i)-(iv) in Proposition 2.7 will
never imply a violation of the closing conditions (v) and (vi) of Propo-
sition 2.7 that involves i and j. This is obtained by noting that qi Hm
qj (m = 1 or 2) only if qi R qj , which in turn entails p′jqj ≤ p′jqi
given that (3.1) is not met.
Filtering
The first step of the procedure ‘filters out’ from the original data set the
observations that are, as we will explain, ‘irrelevant’ for the necessity
test. Specifically, it uses the above insight to concentrate exclusively
on couples of observations (i, j) that satisfy (3.1). Of course, given
the construction of the member-specific hypothetical relations H1 and
H2, we should also include the sequence(s) of observations k that lie
between i and j (i.e. qi R qk and qk R qj). More generally, for each
couple (i, j) we define the set
Seq(i, j) = {k | qi R qk and qk R qj} if (3.1),
Seq(i, j) = ∅ if not (3.1).
4 We note that the order of the GARP violating couple (i, j) is relevant. Specifically,
the empirical content of the condition (qi R qj∧ p′jqj > p′jqi) is clearly different
from that of (qj R qi∧ p′iqi > p′iqj).
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It follows from our above argument that we may concentrate on the
union of the sets Seq(i, j); we further refer to that union as Useq. Intu-
itively, this means focusing on the couples of observations i and j (and
the associated ‘in between’ observations k) that cannot be rationalized
by the unitary model.
The observations that do not belong to some Seq(i, j) as defined above
become ‘irrelevant’ for the necessity test. Given the exponential in-
crease of the number of computations needed to test collective rational-
ity for larger data sets, excluding these observations may considerably
shorten the time needed to reach a verdict. In fact, GARP consistency
of a particular sample means that all observations are ‘filtered out’ by
construction. In that case, all observations become irrelevant for the
collective necessity test, meaning that the test itself becomes redun-
dant.
Subset testing
The second step, which we refer to as ‘subset testing’, partitions the
(filtered) data set Useq into subsets that are mutually independent
when testing the necessity condition. In this context, ‘mutual indepen-
dence’ indicates that for any two subsets, say Useq1 and Useq2 (with⋃
l=1,2Useq
l ⊆ Useq and ⋂l=1,2Useq l = ∅), we have that Useq1 does not
include observations that are implicated in some GARP violation con-
tained in the subset Useq2, and vice versa. Formally, this means that
for each combination of couples (i1, j1) ∈ Useq1× Useq1 and (i2, j2) ∈
Useq2× Useq2, we have il, jl /∈ Seq(im, jm) (l,m ∈ {1, 2}, l 6= m).
Indeed, a similar argument as before implies that we may restrict to
testing the necessity condition for a collective rationalization of the data
at the level of the separate subsets rather than the (unpartitioned)
union Useq. Again, this subset testing may considerably reduce the
computational burden of the necessity test, especially when the number
of mutually independent subsets gets large.
To conclude, we remark that the partitioning of Useq can proceed effi-
ciently by starting from the sets Seq(i, j). Specifically, using the earlier
definitions, it can be imposed that for any (i1, j1) ∈ Useq1× Useq1 and
(i2, j2) ∈ Useq2× Useq2 : Seq(i1, j1) ∩ Seq(i2, j2) = ∅. Evidently, one
should then only focus on the GARP violating couples of observations
(which satisfy condition (3.1)). As a result, a simple enumeration al-
gorithm, which consecutively considers the different violations of the
3.3. Empirical application of the necessity tests for collective rationality 61
unitary GARP test, can identify the maximum number of independent
subsets of Useq.
3.3 Empirical application of the necessity tests for
collective rationality
This section presents the empirical results for our application of the
necessity tests to data taken from the Russia Longitudinal Monitor-
ing Survey (RLMS). Before presenting these results, we discuss some
particularities of the RLMS data set.
3.3.1 Data
The data are drawn from the RLMS. More specifically, they come from
Phase II of the RLMS, which covers the time period between 1994 and
2003 (Rounds V-XII). The RLMS contains a lot of socioeconomic in-
formation like detailed expenditures, incomes, assets and health from a
nationally representative sample of Russian households. It was designed
to measure the impact of Russian reforms on the economic well-being
of households and individuals. Although the RLMS survey design fo-
cuses on a longitudinal study of populations of dwelling units, it allows
a panel analysis of those households remaining in the original dwelling
unit over time.
The sample selection for the present study is for households consist-
ing of a couple only. We select households where both members are
employed to mitigate the issue of the non-separability between con-
sumption and leisure (see Browning and Meghir, 1991). Finally, we
only consider households that were observed in all the available rounds
of Phase II of the RLMS. This results in a sample of 148 couples that
are observed eight times.
Using the same criteria we also selected a sample of 108 single house-
holds, consisting of 9 males and 99 females. Given that economic theory
predicts consistency with GARP for this sample, it will be used to per-
form a validity check of our GARP test.
In our empirical exercises, we focus on a fairly detailed commodity bun-
dle that consists of 21 nondurable goods: (1) bread, (2) potatoes, (3)
vegetables, (4) fruit, (5) meat, (6) dairy products, (7) fat, (8) sugar,
(9) eggs, (10) fish, (11) other food items, (12) alcohol, (13) tobacco,
(14) food outside the home, (15) clothing, (16) car fuel, (17) wood fuel,
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(18) gas fuel, (19) luxury goods, (20) services and (21) rent. Although
the disaggregation of food items may appear far too detailed, it should
be noted that the average budget share of food equals 40% for the se-
lected sample (see also the Appendix). Prices are obtained by averaging
recorded prices across the households in a given census region. Some
of the commodities that we use are aggregate commodities. The price
index for a composite commodity is the weighted geometric mean of
the prices of the different items in the aggregate good, with weights
equal to the average budget shares in a given census region (the Stone
price index). Some summary statistics for our sample are given in the
Appendix.
Anticipating the empirical results, it should be stressed that we apply
the nonparametric collective rationality test to each separate house-
hold, which implies that each household’s quantity and price observa-
tions form a separate set S. As shown in Chapter 2, falsification of
the general collective model requires (at least) three commodities and
three observations. Hence, given that each household is observed eight
times and the commodity bundle consists of more than three goods, the
general collective model is potentially rejectable. Another advantage of
testing at the household level is that we do not need to rely on possibly
controversial preference homogeneity assumptions across individuals in
different households. Of course, given that we focus on a static model,
the results are still vulnerable for heterogeneity through time such as,
e.g., habits formation (see Crawford, 2007, for nonparametric results
for the unitary model).
3.3.2 Empirical results
As a preliminary step, we verified if the GARP test is a good starting
point for our analysis of rationality. Assuming individual rationality for
single households, the economic theory predicts that these households
satisfy GARP. From Table 3.1 we conclude that this indeed holds for
the single households in the RLMS.
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Table 3.1. GARP test results for single households
Frequency Percentage
GARP rejected 0 0.00
GARP not rejected 108 100.00
Table 3.2 summarizes the empirical results for the necessity test of the
general collective consumption model. It is clear from the upper panel
of the table that all couples in our sample pass the necessity test. From
the middle panel, it can be deduced that the consumption behavior of
117 couples (79% out of the 148 couples) can be described by means
of a unitary model. In other words, their set of observed quantity-price
bundles satisfies the GARP condition. Following our filtering proce-
dure, all eight observations of these households are irrelevant for the
necessity test in the sense described above. Note that the 21% rejec-
tions of the unitary model show that there is enough price variation to
test behavioral models.
Next, all households that do not pass the GARP test have at least three
irrelevant observations. In fact, most of these households have five or
six irrelevant observations, which considerably favors the efficiency of
the necessity test algorithm. This indicates that the suggested filter-
ing procedure may considerably enhance the efficiency of the testing
algorithm in practical applications.
The results of the subset testing procedure are given in the bottom
panel of Table 3.2. For most households that do not satisfy the GARP,
only a single subset can be created from the original data sets. In such
cases, all ‘relevant’ observations are linked to each other via revealed
preference relationships, which makes a separate analysis of subsets im-
possible. For one household, we can distinguish two subsets for which
the necessity conditions can be tested separately. It has five relevant
observations, which are allocated to subsets with, respectively, two and
three observations. More generally, one may expect this subset proce-
dure to be particularly useful for larger data sets.
What can we infer from these results? A first conclusion is that the
general collective consumption model seems to provide an adequate
description of the observed consumption behavior of the couples in our
sample, at least if the evaluation criterion is non-rejection of its theoret-
ical implications when tested on real data. The unitary model’s GARP
condition, on the other hand, is rejected for 21% of the households in
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our sample. In view of the fact that we only have eight observations
per household, this gives fairly strong evidence in favor of the collec-
tive approach. Moreover, we performed the nonparametric tests at the
individual household level, which excludes the interpretation of the
GARP violations as revealing cross-sectional unobserved heterogene-
ity. Finally, we also recall that GARP was not rejected for households
with only one member.
According to these unitary results, we have to note that we imple-
mented a ‘basic’ GARP test, meaning that we did not control for
measurement error. That is, we assumed that the observed prices and
quantity are exactly the ones that the individuals face; as such we ig-
nored for instance misreporting of the price-quantity data.5 Of course,
one could argue that rejections of GARP can be explained by these
measurement errors and that therefore the number of rejections of the
unitary model is actually lower. Indeed, it could be that in reality a
given household satisfies GARP, but that because of measurement er-
ror we reject it. See, e.g., Varian (1985) for a more thorough discussion
of integrating measurement error in nonparametric tests.
Clearly, integrating measurement error would enrich our results and
for the unitary model there are several methods to do this; see, e.g.,
Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2003, 2007) and Crawford (2007) for
recent applications of the idea of Varian (1985). However, to the best of
our knowledge, there are currently no similar results for the collective
model. Therefore in order to compare the results for our unitary and
collective tests, we opted in this chapter to ignore measurement error in
both settings. Tackling this problem, is work for the near future. In this
respect, Cherchye, De Rock, Sabbe and Vermeulen (2007) discuss the
possibility to use their IP formulation for dealing with measurement
errors in practical applications; i.e. they show that the IP formulation
can be adapted to include the idea of Varian (1985) for dealing with
such errors.
Another conclusion may be that the theoretical implications of the gen-
eral collective consumption model are simply too ‘generous’ to obtain
violations from realistic data. This alternative interpretation motivates
our next section, which discusses how far we can go in restricting the
general model. The empirical assessment in Section 3.5 also includes a
power analysis of the restricted collective consumption model, which
5 As is standard in the literature, measurement error only refers to wrongly ob-
served prices and/or quantities
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should give a deeper insight into the effective ‘generosity’ of the alter-
native model specifications.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the following empirical analysis
focuses on sufficiency conditions for collective rationality, which natu-
rally complements this first-step assessment of the necessity conditions.
In particular, while the results in Table 3.2 imply that we cannot ex-
clude a collective rationalization of the data, these further sufficiency
results will reveal whether or not it is certainly feasible to define (re-
stricted) collective consumption models that rationalize the observed
couples’ behavior.
Table 3.2. Necessity test results for couples
Frequency Percentage
Necessity test
CR rejected 0 0.00
CR not rejected 148 100.00
Number of irrelevant observations
0 0 0.00
1 0 0.00
2 0 0.00
3 1 0.68
4 1 0.68
5 8 5.41
6 21 14.19
7 0 0.00
8 117 79.05
Number of subsets (of relevant observations)
0 117 79.05
1 30 20.27
2 1 0.68
3.4 Restricting the general collective model: a new
approach
Given that in the previous section we were not able to reject the general
collective model, one may investigate the extent to which more restric-
tive models are equally plausible. This may be an interesting research
question from an empirical point of view. For example, it may exam-
ine the validity of (frequently employed) restrictions with respect to
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individual preferences or to the observability of certain intrahousehold
allocations.
This section proposes a novel way to define restrictions on the gen-
eral collective model. Specifically, the restrictions directly constrain
the sharing rule that applies within each household. After introduc-
ing some general concepts, we present operational sufficient conditions
that enable testing data consistency with collective rationality under
alternative specifications of the sharing rule restrictions. As we will
indicate, these sufficiency tests actually boil down to verifying the uni-
tary GARP condition on a transformed data set. This suggests the
consumption models that underlie the sufficiency tests as direct collec-
tive extensions of the unitary model.
3.4.1 Collective rationality under sharing rule restrictions
We suggest an approach that is as general as possible with respect
to the structure of individual preferences and the non-observability of
intrahousehold allocations. The approach is directly based on the de-
centralization result discussed in Chapter 2, which essentially implies
that observed household consumption results from a two-step alloca-
tion procedure. In the first step, individuals divide the household’s total
expenditures among each other. In the second step, each individual al-
locates her or his expenditure share to the household’s decomposed
(private and public) consumption bundles. An important difference
with the more usual decentralization result (that applies under egois-
tic preferences), is that this (individual) consumption may encompass
not only one’s own private consumption, but also the partner’s pri-
vate consumption and public consumption. Given the assumption of
Pareto-efficiency, this implies that the intrahousehold allocation pro-
cess involves personalized (or Lindahl) prices, which add up to observed
prices.
Suppose that for each member we observe the true personalized quan-
tities q1j , q
2
j and q
h
j and the true personalized prices p
1
j , p
2
j and
phj . Formally, using (2.1) and (2.2), this means that we can specify
q̂j = (q1j ,q
2
j ,q
h
j ), p̂
1
j = (p
1
j ,p
2
j ,p
h
j ) and p̂
2
j = (pj−p1j ,pj−p2j ,pj−phj ).
Then by the decentralization result, we can define for each household
member the respective individual budget shares.
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Definition 3.1. Let S be a set of observations and q1j ,q
2
j ,q
h
j and
p1j ,p
2
j ,p
h
j be the true observed personalized quantities and prices. Then
for each observation j: ηj =
(bp1j )′bqj
p′jqj
equals the share of individual 1 and
(bp2j )′bqj
p′jqj
= 1− ηj equals the share of individual 2, with q̂j = (q1j ,q2j ,qhj ),
p̂1j = (p
1
j ,p
2
j ,p
h
j ) and p̂
2
j = (pj − p1j ,pj − p2j ,pj − phj ).
Individual m’s share thus equals the ratio of that individuals’ expen-
ditures on the true personalized consumption bundle, valued at true
personalized prices, to the household’s total expenditures. In general,
however, we do not observe the true personalized quantities or person-
alized prices. Therefore, we replace them by the feasible personalized
quantities (respectively prices) introduced in (2.1) (respectively (2.2)),
which obtains ‘feasible shares’.
The rationality condition for the restricted collective consumption
model essentially includes restrictions for the so-called sharing rule,
which specifies the individuals’ shares in Definition 3.1. (This sharing
rule may be interpreted as reflecting the bargaining power of the dif-
ferent household members in the household allocation process; see in
particular the duality result in Proposition 3 of Browning, Chiappori
and Lewbel, 2006.) More specifically, a broad class of special cases of
the general collective model can be defined through alternative sharing
rule restrictions of the form of α(p′jqj) ≤ (p̂mj )′q̂j ≤ (1 − α)(p′jqj).
This effectively imposes that each individual receives a budget share
of at least α ∈ [0, 0.5]. For example, α can then be interpreted as a
minimum requirement for both individuals to prevent the dissolution
of the couple.
To avoid any possible confusion, we stress that restrictions on sharing
rules do not imply any specific assumption regarding the true (unob-
served) values of the personalized quantities or prices, but only regard-
ing their product. More formally, it is easy to verify that, for any given
share η and any given personalized quantities q̂ (or, conversely, p̂1and
p̂2) one can always find personalized prices p̂1and p̂2 (or q̂) such that
η = (bp1)′bqp′q and 1− η = (bp2)′bqp′q .6
6 Note that this does not exclude that these extra restrictions on the sharing rule
imply extra restrictions on the primitives of our model (i.e. on the individual pref-
erences and the bargaining weights). As such, our results hereafter, also implicitly
test these extra assumptions.
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Based on Definition 2.1, the condition for a collective rationalization
of a set of observations S under the additional sharing rule restrictions
α(p′jqj) ≤ (p̂mj )′q̂j ≤ (1− α)(p′jqj) is defined as follows.
Definition 3.2. Let S = {(pj ;qj); j = 1, . . . , T}be a set of obser-
vations and α ∈ [0, 0.5]. A pair of utility functions U1 and U2 pro-
vides an α-restricted collective rationalization (α-CR) of the observed
set S if for each observation j there exist feasible personalized quantities
q̂j = (q1j , q
2
j , q
h
j ) and µj ∈ Rn++ such that
(i) α(p′jqj) ≤ (p̂1j )′q̂j ≤ (1− α)(p′jqj);
(ii) U1(q̂j) + µjU2(q̂j) ≥ U1(ẑ) + µjU2(ẑ)
for all ẑ = (z1, z2, zh) with z1, z2, zh ∈ Rn+ and pj ′(z1 + z2 + zh) ≤ p′jqj .
The interpretation is directly analogous to that of Definition 2.1.7 The
mere difference is the sharing rule restriction that is included in (i). As
indicated above, such a restriction may be motivated by dissolution-
preventing arguments in practical applications. Still, it is worth stress-
ing that it also encompasses a multitude of other special cases, in-
cluding the more standard restrictions that are defined with respect to
(possibly egoistic) individual preferences or the observability of certain
intrahousehold allocations.
More generally, one may use alternative sharing rule restrictions for
different household observations, where these restrictions may vary de-
pending on the household and the specific situation under considera-
tion. We will not explicitly consider such variants in this study, but
our following discussion is easily extended to include such cases. Such
extensions may for instance be worthwhile to consider in applications
where additional prior information regarding the intrahousehold pro-
cess is available, or when sharing rule recovery forms a main purpose
of the testing exercise.
3.4.2 Sufficiency conditions for collective rationality
Contrary to Section 3.2, we exclusively focus on sufficient collective ra-
tionality conditions in the following. Consistency with the sufficiency
7 Because of the decentralization result discussed before rule (ii) is equivalent with
the existence of personalized prices bpmj = (p1j , p2j , phj ) such that (a) U1(bqj) ≥
U1(bz) for all bz = (z1, z2, zh) with z1, z2, zh ∈ Rn+ and (bp1j )′(z1 + z2 + zh) ≤
(bp1j )′bqj and (b) U2(bqj) ≥ U2(bz) for all bz = (z1, z2, zh) with z1, z2, zh ∈ Rn+ and
(bp2j )′(z1 + z2 + zh) ≤ (bp2j )′bqj .
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condition (for particular α) means that there certainly exists at least
one specification of the intrahousehold allocation that guarantees con-
sistency of observed behavior with collective rationality as defined in
Definition 3.2.8 Building further on Proposition 2.10, we get the fol-
lowing sufficiency condition for an α-CR of the data.9
Proposition 3.3. A sufficient condition for the existence of utility
functions U1 and U2 that provide an α-CR of the observed set S is that
there exists a partitioning N1, N2 (N1 ∪N2 = {1, . . . , T};N1 ∩N2 = ∅)
such that
(i) ∀j ∈ N1 : q1j = αqj, q2j = (1− α)qj and qhj = 0;
(ii) ∀j ∈ N2 : q1j = (1− α)qj , q2j = αqj and qhj = 0;
(iii) ∀j ∈ S : p1j = pj, p2j = phj = 0;
(iv) {(p̂1j , q̂j); j = 1, . . . , T} and {(p̂2j , q̂j); j = 1, . . . , T} both satisfy
the GARP.
Clearly the solution in this proposition is a technical one. Therefore we
stress once more that if the data satisfy Proposition 3.3, then this does
not imply that other (more realistic) solutions are excluded. It only
states that there is certainly one solution that satisfies the conditions
of Definition 3.2. For example, it could be that the preferences are not
egoistic, but if the data satisfies Proposition 3.3 then we cannot exclude
egoism. Indeed the proposed solution of personalized prices in Propo-
sition 3.3, shows that each individual pays for his own consumption
(recall that, e.g., externalities of member 1 are captured by p2j 6= 0).
We refer to Chapter 4 for a more thorough discussion of the ‘egoistic
model’.
One interpretation of this sufficiency condition is that it requires that
the set S can be transformed into two sets S1 and S2 that both sat-
isfy the GARP. More specifically, S1 = {(pj ;αjqj), j = 1, . . . , T} and
S2 = {(pj ; (1 − αj)qj), j = 1, . . . , T} where αj = α if j ∈ N1 (i.e.,
individual 1 receives the share α) and αj = (1−α) if j ∈ N2 (i.e., indi-
vidual 1 receives the share (1 − α)). To give an example, assume that
α is equal to 0.3. In terms of Definition 3.2 , this means that each indi-
vidual member gets at least 30 percent of the total household means. A
8 One could equally derive a necessity condition for data consistency with the col-
lective model for particular α. The derivation is easily analogous to that of Propo-
sition 2.7. Still, given our main focus on sufficiency conditions in the following,
we refrain from explicitly including this result here.
9 Again this sufficient condition could be adapted to groups of commodities instead
of whole bundles. See also footnote 14 in Chapter 2.
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sufficient condition for such a collective rationalization to be possible is
data consistency with the member-specific GARP conditions when the
two household members receive 30 or 70 percent of the total household
means. However, the specific value may vary depending on the specific
observation. Consequently, for some observations an individual may re-
ceive a share of 70 percent, whereas it may amount to only 30 percent
in other situations.
The nonparametric test for an α-CR first transforms the observed con-
sumption bundles qj (j = 1, . . . , T ) to αjqj and subsequently tests the
standard GARP condition on the resulting sets S1 and S2. The intu-
ition behind the result is that both individuals should maximize their
utility subject to the shares that are allocated to them, and that their
choices should be consistent across the observations, independently of
the fact whether they received the share α or (1− α). Of course, since
intrahousehold allocations are assumed Pareto-efficient, the above re-
quirements should be simultaneously satisfied for both individuals.
A few observations are in order with respect to the α-CR restrictions.
First, if α equals 0.5, then the implications of the above restricted
collective model reduce to the standard unitary model. Indeed, if all
consumption bundles are multiplied by 0.5, then it is easily verified that
the corresponding GARP tests for the individual members is formally
equivalent to the unitary GARP test for the household.10 As such, we
cannot distinguish the 0.5-CR model from the unitary model. More
generally, the empirical implementations of the unitary model coincide
with those of the α-CR model if α is constant over all observations.
A second limiting case is the so-called situation-dependent dictatorship
situation, which is described in Proposition 2.10. This model can be ra-
tionalized by setting α equal to zero, implying that an individual either
has control of expenditures equal to the household’s total resources, or
controls no expenditures at all.
A final observation concerns the fact that the sufficiency collective ra-
tionality conditions (such as the ones in Proposition 2.10 and 3.3) are
generally much easier to test than the necessity conditions (in Proposi-
tion 2.7). Specifically, independent of the chosen α, they require check-
ing at most 2T alternative specifications of the sets N1 and N2, which
10 More precisely, given the specification of the personalized prices and quantities,bpmj bqj ≥ bpmj bqi if and only if pi(0.5qi) ≥ pi(0.5qj). Clearly this is also equivalent
with piqi ≥ piqj). So member m satisfies GARP if and only if the household as
a whole satisfies GARP.
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is much below the maximum number of 3T
2
configurations in the ne-
cessity tests. Again, further efficiency gains may be realized by vari-
ous refinements of the testing algorithm (including filtering and subset
testing). For the sake of compactness, we refrain from a detailed discus-
sion here, but the treatment is analogous to that in Section 3.2. Also,
our own application, including the computation of the power measures
(which imply 1000 iterations for each household and for the different
α-specifications under consideration), does not utilize such efficiency-
enhancing strategies. Nevertheless, our different exercises required lit-
tle computation time (e.g., for a given α the power assessment for the
whole sample of all households only took a couple of minutes for a
standard PC configuration).
3.5 Empirical application of the α-restricted tests for
collective rationality
This section presents the results for α-restricted collective rationality
tests when applied to our RLMS data set. As a main focus will be
on the power of the alternative collective rationality models, we first
outline our procedure for the power assessment.11
3.5.1 Power assessment method
Generally, a power analysis evaluates the probability of detecting an
alternative hypothesis to the model under study. Bronars (1987) first
defined power measures for the unitary model. His alternative hypoth-
esis was based on Becker’s (1962) notion of irrational behavior, which
states that households randomly choose consumption bundles that ex-
haust the available budget. Bronars’ power measures then capture the
probability of rejecting the GARP condition for such randomly drawn
consumption bundles from the observed budget hyperplanes. In this
chapter, our power assessment basically extends Bronars’ (unitary)
11 As we concentrate on sufficient conditions for α-restricted collective rationality,
our power estimates may also be interpreted as ‘upper bounds’ for the power of
necessary and sufficient (α-restricted) collective rationality conditions. One could
similarly conceive ‘lower bounds’ for the power measures starting from operational
necessity conditions for collective rationality. Like before, these lower bounds will
lie closer to the upper bounds for α closer to their maximum value of 0.5.
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procedure for the collective rationality tests, except from some mod-
ifications that specifically relate to the nature of our RLMS data. In
Chapter 4, we introduce an alternative power measure.
At least two data features impact on the power assessment. First, as
Bronars has illustrated, power measures crucially depend on the degree
of relative price variation in the data. For example, if budget hyper-
planes do not intersect for a particular data set, then the unitary model
can never be rejected for this data. The results in Section 3.3 show that
there is enough price variation in our sample for such rejection. Second,
and more specific to our application, the power assessments should ac-
count for the presence of zero expenditures in the data. Generally, this
is an important feature of microdata on detailed consumption, which
is a particularly relevant consideration for the RLMS (where the data
for each survey round refer to the consumption in a single week).
It should be noted that our focus on nondurables mitigates the zero
expenditure problem to some extent. In addition, given the relative
importance of food in the Russian consumption, the issue of zero ex-
penditures on detailed food items due to infrequency of purchase is
probably less important than in OECD countries.12 Still, we do believe
it is important to explicitly take up the presence of zero expenditures
in our power assessment. In fact, without explicit correction, randomly
drawing commodity bundles from a household’s budget constraint ob-
tains a zero probability of simulating zero consumption of a certain
item. Clearly, such a simulation does not match reality if zero expen-
ditures are effectively observed.
Given all this, we use a power assessment procedure that starts from
Becker’s (1962) irrational behavior, but takes into account the observed
zero expenditures. More specifically, we first calculate per household h
and per commodity i the proportion of strictly positive expenditures in
the eight household observations. Let us denote this proportion by zhi.
The drawing of household-specific irrational commodity bundles then
proceeds as follows. First, per commodity i and per time period t we
draw a random number from the uniform distribution between 0 and 1.
If this commodity- and time-specific number is greater than zhi, then
12 Also, our evaluation of the collective rationality conditions at the individual
household level alleviates the potential problem of zero expenditures: if there are
no expenditures on a given commodity in all eight rounds, then this household
simply has a smaller consumption set than a household that has expenditures on
all the commodities.
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the number vhit is set equal to zero. In the opposite case, the number
vhit is the result of a new drawing from the uniform distribution (be-
tween 0 and 1). Subsequently, the budget share whit for household h
of commodity i at time t is defined as (vhit/
∑
i vhit). Finally, the ran-
dom/irrational quantity bundle for household h at time t is obtained by
multiplying the thus obtained vector of budget shares by the observed
expenditure level (of household h at time t), and dividing the different
components of the resulting vector by the corresponding components
of the observed commodity price vector (for household h at time t).13
For each household and per RLMS-round, 1000 random consumption
bundles are constructed in the way just described. The advantage of
the procedure is that it results in an expected proportion of zero ex-
penditures that complies with the observed proportion. Moreover, if a
household does not have any expenditures on a particular commodity
in all eight rounds of the RLMS, then it will never be randomly allo-
cated a consumption bundle with strictly positive expenditures on that
commodity.
The randomly constructed consumption bundles can now be used to es-
timate the power of the rationality tests associated with different collec-
tive consumption models. A power measure gives the probability that
a particular collective rationality test detects such irrational (budget-
exhausting) behavior.14 Our empirical exercise specifically considers
two power measures, which exploit the panel structure of our data set
and provide useful complementary information. The first measure (la-
beled Power 1 ) captures the proportion of the 1000 random cases where
Becker’s irrational behavior is detected for at least one household in the
sample. The underlying idea is that a behavioral model is rejected if not
all households can be fit in its theoretical implications. However, it is
well possible that an outlier-household completely determines this first
power measure. Therefore, our second power measure (labeled Power
2 ) gives the average proportion of households where Becker’s irrational
13 This modeling of irrational behavior actually complies with Bronars’ (1987)
Method 2. Compared to his first method, where he uses budget shares that are
uniformly distributed over the budget set, this method excludes extreme irrational
behavior (and, hence, by construction implies lower power estimates).
14 Remark that there may be some confusion of tongues when using the notion of
irrational behavior. In our study, we use the term to refer to randomly drawn
commodity bundles, and not to household behavior that cannot be fit in the
unitary model, which may actually be consistent with a more general collective
specification.
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behavior is detected across all (1000) randomly drawn scenarios. Sum-
marizing, the Power 1 measure captures the power of the model at the
level of the sample as a whole, while the Power 2 measure provides
complementary information regarding the power of the model at the
level of the individual households.
3.5.2 Empirical results
Table 3.3 summarizes the test results associated with the α-restricted
collective consumption models. Before discussing these results in greater
detail, recall that our analysis focuses on sufficiency tests for collective
rationality. As mentioned before, consistency with these sufficiency con-
ditions for particular α means that there exists at least one definition
of the collective consumption model (corresponding to specific sharing
rule restrictions) that rationalizes the observed behavior.
A first observation then pertains to the case where α equals 0.50, which
states that the two members divide the resources equally under all cir-
cumstances. As discussed before, the empirical implications of this col-
lective model are indistinguishable from those of the unitary model.
Given this, the 31 households that did not pass the GARP test (see
our discussion of the necessity test results) can never meet the em-
pirical conditions corresponding to this limiting case of the collective
consumption model. This also appears in Table 3.3.
Next, we find in the table that all couples meet the other (‘extreme’)
situation-dependent dictatorship condition (for α = 0). This implies
that there certainly exists a collective rationalization of the data for
the general collective consumption model. To recall, in Section 3.3.
we obtained that the necessary conditions for collective rationality are
satisfied and here we construct a possible solution that satisfies the
restrictions of the general collective model. Given this, one can then
investigate which extra restrictions can be added to this general model.
More precisely, here we regard to what extent the above findings change
for alternative sharing rule constraints. Table 3.3 makes clear that lower
α values result in less households not passing the associated rational-
ity tests. For example, 19 couples do not satisfy the α-CR restrictions
under α = 0.495 (i.e., the couples’ members receive either 49.5% or
50.5% of the total expenditures). This number steadily decreases to-
wards zero for lower α: only a single couple violates the α-CR restric-
tions for α = 0.45; and all households meet the sufficiency restrictions
when α is not above 0.40.
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These findings suggest that, even though the definition of the collec-
tive consumption models underlying the respective sufficient rationality
conditions may seem restrictive to some, a wide range of such models is
effectively able to describe the observed couples’ consumption behav-
ior. Interestingly, these favorable test results should not necessarily be
attributed to a low power of the different α-CR models: the Power 1
values above 90% for all the models where α is at least equal to 0.45;
and it equals no less than 67% for the model that uses α equal to 0.40,
which -to recall- cannot be rejected for any couple in our sample.
As discussed in the previous subsection, the measure Power 2 reveals
to what extent these high Power 1 values are supported by generally
high power at the level of the individual households. As for this second
measure, we find that the variation across the different collective mod-
els is somewhat more pronounced and that, in general, the values are
rather low. For example, the unitary model (i.e., for α = 0.50) is asso-
ciated with a Power 2 value of no more than 12.64 percent: on average,
about 13% of the couples do not satisfy the (unitary) empirical impli-
cations when behaving randomly. This percentage further decreases for
smaller α-values. For example, when α equals 40 percent, the Power 2
value drops to only 0.75%, which means that irrational consumption
behavior is detected for an average proportion of less than 1 percent of
the households.
Given our specific purpose of testing alternative behavioral models,
we attribute a relatively high weight to the favorable Power 1 results.
Indeed, the construction of that measure directly complies with our
practice to conclude data consistency with a behavioral model only if
all households simultaneously pass the associated rationality tests. Still,
in some instances the Power 2 results may seem more informative.
For example, generally high power estimates at the level of individual
households seem recommendable when addressing recovery questions
(e.g. regarding the intrahousehold allocation or the preferences of the
individual household members) or forecasting issues; see, e.g., Varian
(2006) for a survey of recovery and forecasting tools that are currently
available in the (unitary) nonparametric approach.
From that perspective, it may be interesting to have a look at the pos-
sible causes of the relatively low Power 2 values. One reasonable expla-
nation for these low values lies in the fact that we have only eight obser-
vations per household: we may generally expect higher power for larger
samples. Moreover, we conduct our analysis at the level of individual
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households. Parametric applications usually assume that at least part
of the preference parameters are similar across different households,
which may result in a higher power to detect alternative hypotheses.
Obviously, by its very nature this parametric treatment of household
heterogeneity is subject to the same risk of specification error as the
parametric rationality tests themselves. In view of the particular (non-
parametric testing) orientation of the current study, we believe it is
recommendable to abstract from a homogeneity assumption across dif-
ferent households, to maximally avoid specification errors.
Another reason pertains to the assumption (in the general collective
model) that we do not have any information concerning the intrahouse-
hold allocation. Such information, for instance in the form of assignable
goods (see Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori, 2006, and Chiap-
pori and Ekeland, 2005 and 2006), can be used to increase the power.
Our general model can be adapted, to deal with such additional a
priori information. For example, information on assignable goods im-
plies additional restrictions regarding the feasible personalized prices
and quantities, which in turn entails more stringent necessity and suf-
ficiency tests for collective rationality.
Table 3.3. Sufficiency test results for couples
Model Number of rejections Power 1 Power 2
α = 0.5 31 100 12.64
α = 0.495 19 100 8.41
α = 0.49 16 100 6.09
α = 0.47 5 98.80 2.81
α = 0.45 1 93.40 1.70
α = 0.4 0 67.00 0.75
α = 0.3 0 26.90 0.21
α = 0.2 0 12.90 0.10
α = 0.01 0 7.50 0.06
α = 0.005 0 7.50 0.06
α = 0 (situation-dependent dictatorship) 0 7.50 0.05
Note: Power measures are in percentages. Power 1 gives the proportion of randomly
drawn data sets for which at least one household does not satisfy the tested condi-
tion. Power 2 gives the average proportion of couples that does not satisfy the tested
condition across the randomly drawn data sets.
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3.6 Summary and concluding remarks
This chapter presents a first empirical application of nonparametric
collective rationality tests that account for public consumption and ex-
ternalities within the household. Specifically, we analyzed the collective
rationalization of couples that were drawn from the Russia Longitudi-
nal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). Interestingly, the panel structure of
this data set allows us to nonparametrically test the collective con-
sumption model without relying on preference homogeneity assump-
tions across similar individuals.
First, we conceived an efficient procedure to test the necessity condi-
tion for the general collective consumption model, which does not put
any structure on the public consumption or the within-household ex-
ternalities. This procedure includes a number of efficiency enhancing
mechanisms that may substantially lower the computational burden
associated with the necessity tests; these operational refinements build
on basic theoretical insights regarding the revealed preference relation-
ships for individual household members. Application of these tests ob-
tains that collective rationality cannot be rejected for the RLMS data.
In addition, it shows the practical usefulness of the suggested efficiency
enhancing testing strategies.
Next, we have investigated sufficiency conditions for collective rational-
ity. We first developed a novel nonparametric framework for collective
consumption models. This framework is based on the sharing rule con-
cept, which defines the within-household distribution of the household
means. Interestingly, the framework incorporates a wide range of spe-
cial cases of the general collective consumption model (e.g., pertaining
to observability of the intrahousehold allocation of some commodities
and specific assumptions regarding the individual preferences). We then
conceived operational sufficiency conditions that enable testing alter-
native positions regarding the specification of the household-specific
sharing rules. Interestingly, these sufficient conditions for collective ra-
tionality can be conceived as direct extensions of the standard unitary
rationality conditions. Specifically, the associated collective tests imply
the unitary GARP tests for simple transformations of the original data
set.
Consistency with these sufficiency conditions means that there exists
at least one definition of the collective consumption model (satisfying
specific sharing rule restrictions) that rationalizes the observed behav-
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ior. Using this, our empirical investigation obtained that a multitude
of collective consumption models is able to describe the couples’ con-
sumption behavior in the RLMS data. For example, we found that
there certainly exists a collective rationalization of each couple within
the data set under the assumption that each household member re-
ceives at least 40 percent of the total household means. By contrast,
we obtained that the unitary model, which is empirically equivalent
to assuming that each household member always gets the same con-
stant share of the total means, is not able to rationalize the observed
behavior.
Finally, we have analyzed the power of alternative specifications of the
collective model (which correspond to different sharing rule restric-
tions). A first power measure captures the probability of detecting ir-
rational behavior of at least one household in the sample. We conclude
that the collective rationality tests are rather powerful at the sample
level, which provides a strong support for our above empirical findings.
A second, complementary power measure captures the average or ex-
pected proportion of households of which irrational behavior is de-
tected. The values of this measure were rather low for all model spec-
ifications (including the unitary specification). We believe this result
can at least partly be explained by the availability of only eight ob-
servations per household. In this respect, it is worth noting that our
(necessity and sufficiency) tests also apply to larger data sets. Such
larger data sets may entail higher power at the level of individual house-
holds (captured by our second power measure). More powerful tests at
the level of individual households may be especially interesting if the
ultimate objective of the analysis is not so much to test data consis-
tency with the behavioral model (as in this study) but rather to recover
more detailed information regarding the intrahousehold allocation and
member-specific preferences, to subsequently forecast household behav-
ior in new situations. See for instance Varian (1982, 1983 and 2006) and
Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2003, 2007), for nonparametric re-
covery and forecasting tools in the unitary setting.
Apart from increasing the sample size, another potentially fruitful
strategy for obtaining more powerful collective rationality tests uses
more stringent household-specific sharing rule restrictions (rather than
a common restriction for all households, as in our study). Such restric-
tions can for instance be conceived on the basis of additional prior
information about the intrahousehold allocation process. As we indi-
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cated, it is easy to extend the proposed testing tools for such sharing
rule restrictions that vary for different households and according to the
specific situation at hand.
Finally, to increase the realism of our tests , we should also develop the
machinery for integrating measurement errors in our nonparametric
collective tests.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.3:
Suppose that we can construct the sets S1 and S2 of Proposition 3.3
that specify the feasible personalized quantities (see (i) and (ii)) and
feasible personalized prices (see (iii)). For these feasible prices and
quantities we have for all i ∈ 1, . . . , T : if j ∈ S1 then (p̂1i )′q̂j = αp′iqj
and if j ∈ S2 then (p̂1i )′q̂j = (1−α)p′iqj . Therefore we obtain for each
j ∈ S that α(p′jqj) ≤ (p̂1j )′q̂j ≤ (1 − α)(p′jqj) which shows that for
the given feasible personalized prices and quantities, condition (i) of
Definition 3.2 is met.
To prove that condition (ii) of Definition 3.2 also holds, we use Propo-
sition 2.2, which states that there exists U1 and U2 that provide an
collective rationalization of the observed set S if and only if there ex-
ist feasible personalized prices p̂1j , p̂
2
j and quantities q̂j such that both
members satisfy the GARP. By the construction of S1 and S2, we
indeed have that this latter condition holds for the given personalized
prices and quantities. Q.E.D.
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Table 3.4. Summary statistics
Mean Std. dev.
Budget shares
Bread 0.103 0.141
Potatoes 0.010 0.054
Vegetables 0.018 0.055
Fruit 0.013 0.029
Meat 0.093 0.119
Dairy 0.047 0.063
Fat 0.025 0.049
Sugar 0.047 0.092
Eggs 0.011 0.022
Fish 0.016 0.039
Other food 0.017 0.041
Alcohol 0.014 0.041
Tobacco 0.016 0.058
Food outside the home 0.029 0.107
Clothing 0.073 0.158
Car fuel 0.054 0.123
Wood fuel 0.034 0.134
Gas fuel 0.022 0.072
Luxury goods 0.018 0.097
Services 0.191 0.222
Rent 0.146 0.170
Expenditures on nondurables 2578.30 3947.30
Note: Expenditures are in December 2003 Russian rubles per week (1 RUB = 0.03401
USD).

Chapter 4
Modeling collective rationality: nonparametric
tests on experimental data
Abstract
We provide a first nonparametric test of the collective consumption
model on the basis of experimental data. By using nonparametric test-
ing tools and experimental data, we avoid the usual problems associated
with parametric tests (e.g. non-verifiable parametric structure) and the
use of ‘real life’ data sets (e.g. preference heterogeneity). In addition,
our collective rationality test complements the existing nonparametric-
experimental evidence on individual rationality. Our main focus is on
testing the ‘egoistic’ collective consumption model; we perform such a
(powerful) test for dyads consisting of individuals that both pass the
test for individual rationality. Our test results provide strong support
for the egoistic model as a tool for describing dyads’ choice behavior
in simple consumption decision settings, such as the one considered in
our experiment. This is a useful result because the parsimonious (and
powerful) egoistic model is mostly assumed in real-life applications of
the collective model. Next, we find that the egoistically irrational dyads
do pass our (less powerful) test for the general collective model, which
accounts for consumption externalities and public consumption. This
suggests that the general model can be useful even for modeling such
simple decision settings, and so a fortiori for more complicated real-life
settings.1
1 This chapter is adapted from Bruyneel, Cherchye, and De Rock (2007). We are
grateful to Siegfried Dewitte and Andre´ Watteyne for their helpful comments.
We also thank seminar participants in Leuven and Tilburg for useful discussions.
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4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present a nonparametric (revealed preference) test
of the collective consumption model on the basis of experimental data.
As argued before, the use of nonparametric tools should provide a more
convincing case for the goodness of the collective model (as compared
to the existing parametric evidence), essentially because it does not
require debatable a priori ’s. Moreover, the laboratory nature of exper-
iments effectively avoids the usual preference heterogeneity and data
problems. Indeed, it easily allows us to create panel data, without mea-
surement error, for which we may reasonably assume that the prefer-
ences are static. As such, we avoid the problems with real-life data that
we mentioned in Chapter 3.
In fact, it has been argued that the nonparametric testing tools are es-
pecially useful within an experimental context (see, e.g., Sippel, 1997,
who focuses on individual rationality). In addition, and specific for our
own study, the experimental set-up allows for obtaining information on
consumption quantities for the individual group members; such infor-
mation is typically not available in ‘real life’ data sets (e.g. household
data sets usually only contain consumption quantity information at the
level of the aggregate household as a whole, and do not reveal the indi-
vidual members’ consumption quantities). This additional information
allows more powerful tests of the collective consumption model.
Our study also complements the existing nonparametric-experimental
literature that focuses on the goodness of the utility maximization
model for describing rational individual behavior; see, e.g., Sippel
(1997), Harbaugh, Krause and Berry (2001), Andreoni and Miller
(2002) and references therein. As we argued before, the collective model
is the natural extension of the individual utility maximization model.
Therefore, it is interesting to investigate to what extent the model in-
deed does succeed in describing observed group behavior, using similar
nonparametric tools within an experimental context. The current study
provides a first such test. More generally, it demonstrates the potential
of the nonparametric analysis of experimental data for gaining insight
in group decision processes; see our discussion in the concluding section.
Apart from a mere test of collective rationality as such, the second main
question that we want to address pertains to the specification of the
collective model itself. A simple collective consumption model, which
we will refer to as the egoistic model, excludes public consumption and
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consumption externalities (also referred to as ‘altruism’ in the follow-
ing) within the decision making group.2 As we will show, starting from
the nonparametric characterization for the general model, it is easy to
define testable necessary and sufficient conditions for data consistency
with the egoistic model.
Our empirical analysis mainly focuses on the egoistic model. The reason
is that empirical applications of the collective model based on real-life
data mostly assume this model: the parsimonious nature of the model
allows for a powerful empirical analysis (e.g., in terms of recovering the
preference structure of individual group members and the characteris-
tics of the within-group bargaining process, and in terms of forecasting
group behavior in new situations). In fact, this powerful nature of the
egoistic model also appears in our own nonparametric tests: our tests
for the egoistic model turn out to be substantially more powerful than
those for the general collective model. Our laboratory test considers
an unsophisticated consumption setting, which involves a very limited
number of commodities and a low budget (see the experimental de-
sign in Section 4.3). The underlying argument is that, if the egoistic
model is to hold in the more sophisticated settings that are usually
considered in empirical applications, then it must certainly hold for
this unsophisticated setting.
While our main focus is on testing the egoistic model, we also con-
sider the general collective model. Specifically, we test consistency with
this general model if observed choices are inconsistent with the egoistic
model. If we subsequently conclude consistency with the general model,
then we provide an interpretation in terms of consumption externalities
and public consumption. In doing so, we consider the specific character-
istics of the decision making groups (in casu dyads; e.g. partners versus
friends, and differences in terms of gender composition) and the choice
setting (i.e. possibility of public consumption or not). This provides a
deeper insight into the usefulness of generalizing the egoistic model: if
consumption externalities and public consumption can be considered
relevant for the unsophisticated choice setting in our experiment, then
we can expect it to be even more relevant for more sophisticated set-
tings.
The rest of the chapter unfolds as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the
nonparametric tests for the egoistic model and the Afriat efficiency
2 This is essentially the original collective consumption model as it was presented
by Chiappori (1988) (for modeling labor supply behavior).
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index. Section 4.3 presents the experimental design and Section 4.4
discusses the results of our empirical analysis. Section 4.5 summarizes
and contains some concluding remarks.
4.2 Collective rationality decisions: nonparametric
theory
4.2.1 Collective rationality: the egoistic model
The general collective consumption model presented in Chapter 2 al-
lows for both consumption externalities and public consumption within
the dyad. In principle, any consumption commodity can be used for pri-
vate consumption as well as public consumption (or combinations of
both). Of course, for some commodities public consumption can be ex-
cluded a priori (e.g. in our own experiment this is the case for the
‘private’ commodities red wine, orange juice and M&Ms).
Our empirical investigation will mainly focus on a parsimonious speci-
fication of the collective consumption model, which excludes consump-
tion externalities as well as public consumption. This obtains a model of
group behavior in which the utility of each member only depends on her
or his private consumption (i.e. U1(q̂) = U1(q1) and U2(q̂) = U2(q2)
in Definition 2.1), whence we call it the egoistic model.
As mentioned before, the specific set-up of our experiment allows for
recovering the personalized quantities q1 and q2 (if we exclude public
consumption, i.e. qh = 0). If we can observe the private consump-
tion of each group member, we say that a commodity is ‘assignable’.
In the literature on collective consumption models, such assignability
has proven useful for strengthening the empirical analysis. See, e.g.,
Browning et al., 1994, and Chiappori and Ekeland, 2006, on empiri-
cal identification of the (parametric) structure underlying the observed
group behavior if (partial) assignable information is available. A similar
power-enhancing effect applies to our nonparametric tests: as we will
explain, the assignability information enables a powerful necessary and
sufficient nonparametric test for collectively rational group behavior in
terms of the egoistic model. In our opinion, this provides yet another
argument pro using an experiment such as ours for testing the empiri-
cal validity of collective rationality models, because it allows us to fully
assign each commodity under the egoistic model.
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To obtain the test, we first note that excluding consumption externali-
ties implies for each observation j that p1j = pj and p
2
j = 0, so that the
personalized prices p̂1j = (p
1
j , p
2
j ) = (pj ,0) and p̂
2
j = (pj−p1j ,pj−p2j ) =
(0,pj) (we can ignore public consumption (i.e. phj ) since q
h
j = 0 by
construction). Hence, given that also q1j and q
2
j are fully observed, we
effectively dispose of all relevant personalized price and quantity in-
formation for the egoistic model. Starting from the corresponding set
of observations Ŝ = {(pj ; q1j , q2j ); j = 1, . . . , T} for the evaluated dyad,
the nonparametric condition follows directly from Proposition 2.2:
Corollary 4.1. Let Ŝ = {(pj ; q1j , q2j ); j = 1, . . . , T} be a set of obser-
vations. There exists a pair of concave and continuous utility functions
U1 and U2 that provide an egoistic rationalization of S if and only
if the sets {(pj ; q1j ); j = 1, . . . , T} and {(pj ; q2j ); j = 1, . . . , T} both
satisfy GARP.
Thus, testing consistency with the egoistic model is formally similar
to testing consistency with the individual rationality model: for each
individual member we test consistency with the GARP condition using
the observed set Ŝ; egoistic rationality is obtained if both members si-
multaneously meet the corresponding individual rationality conditions.
As such we now, in opposite to the tests in Chapters 2 and 3, have a
necessary and sufficient test in terms of observable information.
Recall that in the egoistic model the group consumption process can
also be characterized as a two-stage budgeting process (see Chiappori,
1988 and 1992). To recapture this alternative interpretation more for-
mally, we represent the total dyad budget/income in observation j
as yj (= p′jqj). The first stage then divides this aggregate income
over the dyad members on the basis of a so-called sharing rule; this
is a function φ that maps the price-income combination (pj , yj) to
φ(pj , yj) = (y1j , y
2
j ) such that y
1
j + y
2
j = yj , with y
1
j and y
2
j the income
shares allocated to the members 1 and 2. In the second stage, each indi-
vidual member m (= 1, 2) consequently faces a maximization problem
that is formally similar to the individual decision problem:
max
qm
Um(qm) s.t. p′jq
m ≤ ymj . (4.1)
This characterization of egoistic rationality actually provides an alter-
native rationale for the necessary and sufficient nonparametric con-
dition in Corollary 4.1: given that we know the private consumption
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quantities q1j and q
2
j , and thus also y
1
j (= p
′
jq
1
j ) and y
2
j (= p
′
jq
2
j ), the
maximization problem (4.1) leads to the GARP tests for the individual
group members just like in Definition 1.3.
Under egoistic rationality, the outcome of this two-stage process equals
the observed consumption quantities q1j and q
2
j for the members 1 and 2.
In fact, given Ŝ we can reconstruct the sharing rule for the T observed
consumption choices, namely y1j = p
′
jq
1
j and y
2
j = p
′
jq
2
j . We will use this
in our empirical (power) assessment of the egoistic rationality tests in
Section 4.4.
To conclude, we note that Proposition 2.8 states that the general collec-
tive rationality condition has testable implications (i.e. can be rejected)
for a dyad as soon as T ≥ 3 and n ≥ 3. For the egoistic model this
already holds as soon as T ≥ 2 and n ≥ 2, since it boils down to testing
GARP for each individual. In our application T = 9 and n = 3 or 4
for each evaluated dyad, so all our tests are meaningful.
4.2.2 Afriat efficiency index
To capture the degree of consistency with GARP, we use the ‘Afriat
efficiency index’, which is defined as follows for each observation j:
θj =
min
qiRqj
p′jqi
p′jqj
; (4.2)
the measure θj divides the expenditure level that is needed for obtain-
ing consistency with GARP (i.e. min
qiRqj
p′jqi) by the actual expenditure
level (i.e. p′jqj). Evidently, rational (or ‘efficient’) behavior complies
with θj = 1. More generally, the value of θj captures the expenditure
reduction that is required for obtaining consistency with the utility
maximization problem. The corresponding Afriat efficiency index for
the observed set S takes the minimum θj over all T choices:
θ = min{θj | (pj ;qj) ∈ S}; (4.3)
the measure θ can be interpreted as a ‘goodness-of-fit’ measure in that
it indicates to what extent utility maximization effectively fits the ob-
served individual choice behavior. We refer to Varian (1990, 1993) for
a detailed discussion.
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Since in the egoistic model, both members have to satisfy GARP, we
can use an analogously defined Afriat efficiency index as in (4.3) for
capturing the degree of consistency with the egoistic model:
θ = min{θj | (pj ; q1j , q2j ) ∈ Ŝ}
with θj = min{
min
q1
i
Rq1
j
p′jq
1
i
p′jq
1
j
,
min
q2
i
Rq2
j
p′jq
2
i
p′jq
2
j
}.
(4.4)
As compared to (4.2), each measure θj now captures the expenditure
reduction that is required for obtaining consistency with the GARP
conditions in Corollary 4.1 (based on Ŝ) for the two dyad members
simultaneously.
To end this section, we remark that the above Afriat indices in 4.2
and 4.4 are ‘worse case’ scenarios, given that they calculate the mini-
mum for a given preference structure. That is, given R it computes the
needed expenditure reduction for obtaining consistency with GARP.
However, it could be that smaller expenditure reductions (than the
ones suggested by the Afriat indices) also result in GARP consistency.
More precisely, by taking into account that the expenditure reduction
may alter the revealed preference structure. Therefore Varian (1990,
1993), also discusses an improved goodness-of-fit measure which tries
to calculate the minimal expenditure reduction that is needed to obtain
GARP consistency.
However, this improved goodness-of-fit measure does not change our
conclusions below, given that we only use our θ in a descriptive way
(see the discussion and tables in Section 4.4). More precisely, only the
numbers different from 1 (i.e. when there is GARP inconsistency) will
increase, but the main picture remains the same. Therefore, for sim-
plicity, we opt for the above defined Afriat index.
4.3 Experimental design
Participants of our experiment were 206 undergraduate students (102
women). Ages ranged from 18 years to 29 years (mean value = 20.92;
standard deviation = 1.88). As we wanted to analyze collective choice
behavior, both men and women were asked to sign up for an exper-
imental session together with either a male or a female friend or a
romantic partner. This procedure enabled us to study four different
types of dyads, namely, male dyads or two male friends (‘friends (m-
m)’; 26 in total), female dyads or two female friends (‘friends (f-f)’;
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25 in total), mixed dyads or one male and one female friend (‘friends
(f-m)’; 25 in total), and romantic dyads or one man and one woman
who were in a romantic relationship together (‘partners (f-m)’; 27 in
total). Participants were scheduled to come to the laboratory in groups
of eight (i.e., four dyads). Each participant was assigned a seat in a
partially enclosed cubicle, and worked individually for the main part of
the session. Dyads were asked to engage in one experimental task to-
gether. Participants were rewarded with money and with a commodity
bundle for their cooperation. Each dyad received money and a com-
modity bundle with a combined value of AC 20. In the Appendix, we
include the instructions that were handed out to the participants.
Our experiment is similar in design to the one of Harbaugh, Krause,
and Berry (2001). Upon entering the laboratory, participants were given
the opportunity to taste small quantities of red wine, orange juice, and
M&Ms (i.e. a type of chocolate candy). They were truthfully told that
they would be making consumption decisions with respect to these
three commodities later on, and that we wanted them to familiarize
themselves with the commodities. Participants were then presented
with 9 choice problems. For (approximately) one half of the partici-
pants (i.e. in the 3-commodities condition), each choice consisted of
the three commodities red wine, orange juice, and M&Ms. Each choice
problem was characterized by a different price regime; the prices of the
three commodities are shown in Table 4.1. We indicate that the price
variation enables rejection of the general collective rationality condi-
tion in Proposition 2.2. E.g., for the given prices and income one can
conceive quantity bundles that lead to a rejection of collective ratio-
nality in an analogous way as the quantity bundles in Example 2.5.
This price configuration implies a high power of our rationality tests,
essentially because there is no variation in income (AC 10) but a lot of
variation in prices. See, e.g., Bronars (1987) and Blundell, Browning,
and Crawford (2003) for a discussion in a unitary setting. Given the
similarity of our collective tests, we can also apply these insights for
our setting.
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Table 4.1. Experimental design-prices for 9 choice problems
Choice problem Wine Orange juice M&Ms
1 8 4 1
2 8 3 2
3 9 3 1
4 1 8 4
5 2 8 3
6 1 9 3
7 4 1 8
8 3 2 8
9 3 1 9
Notes: Prices are displayed in eurocents per commodity unit. A unit of red wine is
1 centiliter, a unit of orange juice is 3 centiliters, and a unit of M&Ms is 5 grams.
For each choice problem, participants were asked to indicate, accord-
ing to their preferences, how much of the expenditures they wanted to
pay for, and hence, how much they wanted to obtain from each com-
modity, given that the total budget they could allocate to the three
commodities was AC 10. Obviously, for this ‘3-commodities group’ we
can exclude the possibility of public consumption: the consumption
of the three commodities must be private by construction. As such,
the egoistic rationality test presented in the previous section effectively
tests whether or not the collective decision process is characterized by
consumption externalities (or altruism): in the ‘3-commodities condi-
tion’, dyad choice data that are consistent with the general collective
consumption model but not with the egoistic model can be interpreted
as revealing consumption externalities.
The other half of the participants (i.e. in the ‘4-commodities condi-
tion’) was confronted with nine almost identical decision problems (i.e.
they had to state their demand for red wine, orange juice, and M&Ms,
given the same relative price variations as presented in Table 4.1 and
a budget of AC 10). The only difference is that they had the option of
receiving in cash any amount of the budget they wanted to in each
decision situation; the price of this additional ‘cash’ commodity equals
1 for all choice problems. We note that, since the destination (public
or private consumption) of the cashed amount is not defined, this ‘4-
commodities group’ has the possibility of public consumption. More
generally, the fourth commodity of this 4-commodities group stands
for a composite ‘Hicksian good’, which in casu captures any additional
private consumption (on top of the chosen quantities of red wine, or-
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ange juice and M&Ms) and/or public consumption that is financed by
the cashed amount. Thus, differences between the egoistic rationality
results for the 4-commodities and the 3-commodities group may be
interpreted in terms of public consumption. In fact, similar interpreta-
tions of a composite Hicksian good capturing public as well as private
consumption have been used in the context of collective models of labor
supply behavior (see also Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir, 2005).
Participants in both conditions were asked to make the 9 allocation
decisions twice: once individually and once together with their friend
or romantic partner. The order in which both sets of decisions were to
be made was counterbalanced: one half of the dyads first made the de-
cisions individually and only afterwards collectively, whereas the other
half of the dyads first made the decisions collectively and only after-
wards individually; changing the order in this way did not yield signifi-
cantly different results in terms of (individual or collective) rationality.
Table 4.11 in the Appendix presents summary information on the bud-
get shares corresponding with the individuals’ and the dyads’ choices
under the 9 price regimes; this expenditure information also allows for
reconstructing the corresponding (mean) quantities that have been cho-
sen under the different price regimes in Table 4.1. In case of collective
decision-making, participants were asked to indicate for each of the
three commodities (and also for the cashed amount, or Hicksian good,
in the 4-commodities condition) which percentage of their demand was
intended for each individual. This provides the personalized quantity
information that we use for the egoistic rationality test (see Corollary
4.1).
The decision problems participants were faced with were supposed to
mimic real-life difficulties that both individual consumers and groups
often encounter when having to pick their optimal commodity bundles
out of the available budget sets. To enhance the external validity of our
study, participants were told that, when all experimental sessions were
over (i.e., two weeks after they themselves participated at the utmost),
they would actually receive one of the commodity bundles they had put
together. They were also told that they would be informed through
e-mail about where and when to pick it up. We picked this bundle
randomly from the set of decisions that participants had made collec-
tively (and we thus ignored the individually chosen bundles), although
they were not informed of this beforehand. The knowledge that each
choice ostensibly had the same chance of actually being implemented
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was supposed to give economic significance to otherwise merely hy-
pothetical decisions, thus providing participants with an incentive for
making choices that truly represented their preferences. More gener-
ally, we believe that the overall set-up of our experiment is such that
we can have reasonable confidence in the representative nature of the
choices that were made.
As making the allocation decisions required a considerable amount of
calculation (multiplying prices and demand for each commodity and
adding up to check whether the budget is exhausted), participants in
both the 4-commodities and the 3-commodities condition were encour-
aged to use a calculator to check their decisions. Participants could also
spend as much time as they liked on their decisions and were free to
compare, reconsider, and correct previous choices. When they felt that
the decisions they had made represented their actual preferences, the
experimenter provided them with the instructions for the next task.
4.4 Test results
4.4.1 Individual rationality tests
We first regard test results for individual rationality. Table 4.2 reports
on the individuals that violate the GARP condition; it gives the num-
ber of individuals violating GARP as well as some descriptive statistics
for the distribution of the Afriat efficiency index values (see (4.3)) for
those GARP violating individuals. We find that less than 10 percent of
all individuals (5 out of 104 individuals in the 4-commodities condition
and 8 out of 102 in the 3-commodities condition) violate the nonpara-
metric individual rationality condition. Still, we also find that some
individuals quite severely violate the GARP condition; see the mini-
mal Afriat index values of 0.36 for the 4-commodities group and 0.48
for the 3-commodities group. But, given the small fraction of violations,
these may safely be regarded as accidental outliers.
To gain some further insight into the goodness-of-fit of the individual
rationality model, Table 4.3 shows the distribution of the number of
GARP violations (i.e. the number of observations j with θj < 1 in
(4.2)), again for the 4-commodities group and the 3-commodities group
separately. Table 4.3 tells us whether the results in Table 4.2 are driven
by many or by a few violations for the GARP violating individuals.
We find that all but one GARP violating individual have no more
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than 4 observed consumption choices that are inconsistent with this
(observation-specific) rationality condition. One individual (in the 4-
commodities group) exhibits no less than 8 observed choices that are
inconsistent with GARP. But, again, this can reasonably be considered
as a casual outlier.
As a further base of comparison, we also include the distribution
of violations corresponding to random behavior; see the columns ‘4-
commodities (bootstrap)’ and ‘3-commodities (bootstrap)’ in Table 4.3.
Random behavior is modeled using the bootstrap method for panel data
as described by Andreoni and Miller (2002) and applied by Harbaugh,
Krause and Berry (2001) within a similar experimental context.3 The
method essentially mimics random behavior for each price regime (or
budget) by drawing randomly from the observed set of choices under
that price regime (e.g. our experiment observes 104 choices for the
4-commodities group and 102 choices for the 3-commodities group, un-
der 9 different price regimes). This gives information on the expected
distribution of violations under random choice, while incorporating in-
formation on the participants’ actual choices. All bootstrap results re-
ported in this chapter (including those in Table 4.3) are based on Monte
Carlo-type simulations that include approximately 50000 iterations.
On the basis of Table 4.3 we conclude that random behavior would
yield a distribution of GARP violations that significantly differs from
the one that is actually observed. For example, random behavior as de-
scribed above would yield GARP consistency only in approximately 18
percent of the cases for both the 4-commodities and the 3-commodities
group, as compared to no less than respectively 95 percent and 92
percent GARP consistencies in the observed choices. We may also in-
terpret that the GARP test has a power (i.e. a probability of detecting
the random behavior) of about 82 percent for both groups. In fact,
random behavior entails a substantially higher probability mass for
any positive number of GARP violations; and the relative difference
3 This bootstrap method is similar to the randomization method proposed by
Bronars (1987), which has also been used frequently in the literature. The mere
difference is that ‘random’ choices (for each price regime) are drawn from the
observed distribution whereas Bronars randomly draws from the uniform distri-
bution (which may significantly differ from the observed distribution). We refer
to Andreoni and Harbaugh (2006) for a detailed discussion of the strengths and
weaknesses of alternative randomization procedures, and corresponding power
measures, that have been used within a nonparametric context.
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with the observed distribution generally increases for larger numbers
of violations.4
Generally, we may conclude that the individual rationality model is
strongly supported for our specific choice setting. The next question is
to what extent the collective decisions, which are taken under the same
9 price regimes, are effectively consistent with collective rationality.
This is discussed next.
Table 4.2. Individual rationality; GARP violations - Afriat efficiency indices; de-
scriptive statistics
4-commodities 3-commodities
(104) (102)
number 5 8
maximum 0.990 0.990
3rd quartile 0.987 0.977
median 0.800 0.966
1st quartile 0.722 0.942
minimum 0.360 0.475
Notes: For each group of observations (4-commodities and 3-commodities) the total
number of evaluated individuals is reported between parentheses; ‘number’ stands
for the number of individuals violating GARP. Descriptive statistics (maximum, 3rd
quartile, median, 1st quartile and minimum) pertain to the distribution of the Afriat
efficiency index as defined over the subgroups of GARP violating individuals.
4 In Subsection 4.4.3, we use an alternative bootstrap procedure for calculating the
power of the sufficiency condition in Proposition 2.10. For compactness, we have
not included the results of this alternative procedure for the individual rationality
test. Still, it is worth indicating that this alternative procedure obtained even
more favorable power results for our individual rationality test. [A similar remark
holds for the egoistic rationality results in Table 4.4.]
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Table 4.3. Individual rationality; distribution of GARP violations
Percentage of group
with violations
GARP- 4-com. 3-com. 4-com. 3-com.
violations (104) (102) (bootstrap) (bootstrap)
0 95.2 92.2 18.2 18.1
1 1.0 2.9 5.5 2.4
2 1.0 3.9 17.2 18.6
3 1.0 0.0 13.1 11.7
4 1.0 1.0 13.3 13.5
5 0.0 0.0 11.9 12.5
6 0.0 0.0 9.5 10.4
7 0.0 0.0 6.3 7.0
8 1.0 0.0 3.6 4.1
9 0.0 0.0 1.4 1.6
Notes: For each group of observations (4-commodities and 3-commodities) the to-
tal number of evaluated individuals is reported between parentheses. The column
‘GARP violations’ stands for the number of GARP violations (ranging from mini-
mally 0 to maximally 9). For each group (4-commodities and 3-commodities), the
table reports the percentage of (observed and random/‘bootstrap’) choices corre-
sponding to different numbers of violations.
4.4.2 Egoistic rationality tests
Individually rational behavior is a necessary condition for collectively
rational behavior. Therefore, we investigate data consistency with the
collective consumption model for those dyads of which both members
act consistent with the individual rationality test. This obtains 47 dyads
(94 individuals) for the 4-commodities group and 43 dyads (86 individ-
uals) for the 3-commodities group.5
As argued before, our main focus is on the egoistic model. The fact
that our experiment fully recovers the personalized quantities allows
for testing a necessary and sufficient condition for egoistic rationality,
which essentially consists of two GARP tests per dyad, i.e. one for each
individual member (see Corollary 4.1). Consistency of the collective
5 We note that excluding the couples with ‘irrational’ individuals in this way does
not affect our main qualitative conclusions. Still, because individual rationality
is a prerequisite for collective rationality, we find it logically consistent to focus
our discussion on couples with rational singles. A slightly different approach is
followed in Subsection 4.4.3, when we regard alternative efficiency criteria that
allow for (small) deviations from ‘exactly’ rational behavior (as captured by the
Afriat efficiency index). See our discussion of Table 4.8.
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decisions with the ‘rudimentary’ egoistic model should not be counter-
intuitive for the unsophisticated decision setting under study: it may
well be that none of the commodities taken up in the experiment is
associated with consumption externalities; and (for the 4-commodities
group) the cashed amount (or Hicksian good), which does allow for
public consumption, should of course not necessarily be used for such
public consumption. At least, we can argue that, if the egoistic model is
to hold in more sophisticated settings (as is mostly assumed in empirical
applications), then it must certainly hold in this setting.
Table 4.4 has a similar interpretation as Table 4.2, but now pertains to
egoistic rationality; it gives information on violations of the correspond-
ing GARP conditions at the level of the individual dyads’ members. We
find that less than ten percent of all observations (9 out of 94 individual
members for the 4-commodities case and 8 out of 86 members for the
3-commodities case) is inconsistent with the egoistic rationality condi-
tion. Of course, stricto sensu consistency with the egoistic model (see
Corollary 4.1) requires that both individual members simultaneously
meet the corresponding GARP condition. When using that criterion
we find that 39 out of 47 dyads (83 percent) in the 4-commodities group
and 37 out of 43 dyads (86 percent) in the 3-commodities group behave
egoistically rational. See also our following discussion of Table 4.8.
The other descriptive statistics are closely similar to those in Table 4.2
for individual rationality. Table 4.5 gives the corresponding distribution
of the number of (egoistic rationality) GARP violations. Once more,
we find strong support for the (in casu egoistic) collective rationality
model. For example, no individual member exhibits more than three
GARP violations.
Table 4.5 also gives the distribution of the GARP violations under ran-
dom behavior. To obtain these results, we use a similar randomization
procedure as for computing the results in Table 4.3. But in this case we
exploit the two-step budgeting interpretation of the egoistic model; see
our discussion leading up to the decision problem (4.1) for each indi-
vidual dyad member. This two-step structure underlies our bootstrap
procedure for constructing random choices, as follows: for each price
regime, we randomly select the income share for each individual mem-
ber from the observed distribution; and, subsequently, we randomly se-
lect the budget allocation (i.e. the relative budget shares), again draw-
ing from the observed distribution corresponding to the given price
regime. The resulting bootstrap distributions (for the 4-commodities
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and the 3-commodities group) are based on 50000 such random choices
for the 9 price regimes. We find that these distributions are very differ-
ent from the ones that are observed. The corresponding power estimates
amount to about 76 percent for the 4-commodities group and 72 per-
cent for the 3-commodities group. While slightly below the power of
the individual rationality test (see Table 4.3), the distribution of GARP
violations for the observed choice behavior (including the observed pro-
portion of GARP inconsistencies) is sufficiently different from the one
corresponding to random behavior to safely conclude strong support of
the egoistic rationality model.
As a general conclusion we can state that our results provide convinc-
ing support for the collective rationality model, which here takes the
form of the parsimonious (and therefore powerful) egoistic rationality
model. The fact that this ‘rudimentary’ version of the collective deci-
sion model adequately describes most of the observed behavior in our
experiment seems intuitively reasonable given the simple choice setting
at hand. Still, it also seems interesting to consider in somewhat more
detail the about 10 percent observations that are inconsistent with this
egoistic model, in particular because the results in Tables 4.4 and 4.5
pertain to dyads for which both individuals act consistent with the in-
dividual rationality condition. Therefore, in the next section we inves-
tigate data consistency with the general collective consumption model.
That is, we explore whether it is possible to ‘rationalize’ the observed
egoistic irrationality in terms of consumption externalities and public
consumption.
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Table 4.4. Egoistic rationality; GARP violations - Afriat efficiency indices; descrip-
tive statistics
4-commodities 3-commodities
(94) (86)
number 9 8
maximum 0.991 0.999
3rd quartile 0.986 0.997
median 0.944 0.980
1st quartile 0.550 0.958
minimum 0.521 0.925
Notes: For each group of observations (4-commodities and 3-commodities) the total
number of evaluated individual members is reported between parentheses; ‘num-
ber’ stands for the number of individual members violating GARP corresponding
with egoistic rationality. Descriptive statistics (maximum, 3rd quartile, median, 1st
quartile and minimum) pertain to the distribution of the Afriat efficiency index as
defined over the subgroups of GARP violating individual members.
Table 4.5. Egoistic rationality; distribution of GARP violations
Percentage of group
with violations
GARP- 4-com. 3-com. 4-com. 3-com.
violations (94) (86) (bootstrap) (bootstrap)
0 90.4 90.7 24.1 21.9
1 1.1 0.0 1.7 0.4
2 6.4 9.3 18.5 17.7
3 2.1 0.0 11.0 10.4
4 0.0 0.0 12.8 12.7
5 0.0 0.0 11.3 11.6
6 0.0 0.0 9.3 10.5
7 0.0 0.0 6.4 7.7
8 0.0 0.0 3.6 5.0
9 0.0 0.0 1.4 2.2
Notes: For each group of observations (4-commodities and 3-commodities) the total
number of evaluated individual members is reported between parentheses. The col-
umn ‘GARP violations’ stands for the number of GARP violations corresponding
with the egoistic rationality model (ranging from minimally 0 to maximally 9). For
each group (4-commodities and 3-commodities), the table reports the percentage of
(observed and bootstrap) choices corresponding to different numbers of violations.
4.4.3 ‘Rationalizing’ egoistic irrationality
When testing the general rationality condition in Proposition 2.2, we
conclude that all ‘egoistically irrational’ dyads act fully consistent with
the general collective model. Specifically, we find that all but one of the
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dyads are consistent with the sufficient condition in Proposition 2.10.
The Appendix proves consistency with the collective rationality condi-
tion for the remaining one dyad (from the 4-commodities group) that
is inconsistent with the sufficiency condition: it presents a specification
of personalized prices and quantities that makes the dyad’s observed
behavior obey the necessary and sufficient condition in Proposition 2.2.
This positive result for the general model suggests that consumption
externalities and/or public consumption can ‘rationalize’ the observed
egoistic irrationality. To further explore this possibility, we will regard
in more detail the egoistic rationality violations of the 4-commodities
group and of the 3-commodities group. In addition, recalling our dis-
cussion of the experimental design in Section 4.3, we use the distinction
between four different types of dyads, namely friends (m-m), friends
(f-f), friends (f-m) and partners (f-m).
We first regard consumption externalities (or altruism). As explained
before, we can exclude public consumption for the 3-commodities
group, which implies that the egoistic rationality test effectively boils
down to testing for the presence of such externalities. Given this, we re-
gard the lower panel of Table 4.6, which has a similar structure as Table
4.4 but now presents the results for the four dyad types under investiga-
tion. Table 4.7 similarly decomposes the aggregate (4-commodities and
3-commodities) results in Table 4.5. According to the results in these
tables, ‘altruistic’ decision makers (who account for consumption ex-
ternalities in their consumption decisions) seem to be situated in dyads
containing two friends with at least one female member (i.e. the types
friends (f-m) and friends (f-f)). Interestingly, this result falls in line
with existing evidence that females are more altruistic towards friends
and other close individuals than males (see, e.g., the meta-analysis of
Eagley and Crowley, 1986; Croson and Gneezy, 2005, provide a recent
review of studies on gender differences in preferences).6 In that inter-
pretation, the observation that all dyads of the category partners (f-m)
6 In this respect, it is also interesting to note that our results on the sharing rule
seem to comply with existing evidence that females propose equal split more
than males (see Croson and Gneezy, 2005, for a survey of results). For example,
an equal split of the income under all 9 price regimes, when using the specification
of personalized prices that applies under egoistic rationality, is used by no less
than 37.5 percent of all dyads in the category friends (f-f) and 33.33 percent
of all dyads in the category friends (f-m), as opposed to only 13.0 percent of
all dyads in the category friends (m-m) and 12.0 percent of all dyads in the
category partners (f-m). In our opinion, a detailed investigation of these sharing
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in the 3-commodities group are consistent with egoistic rationality may
seem paradoxical. Still, this last result might be explained by the fact
that for these dyads the consumption decisions in our experiment (for
a joint budget of AC 10) account for only a small proportion of their
collective decisions; and thus consumption externalities (altruism) may
well affect other (‘more important’) collective choices not taken up in
this experiment. Of course, the evidence in Table 4.6 is far too weak
for drawing robust conclusions; see the small number of violations of
the egoistic rationality conditions, and the high Afriat efficiency index
values (with overall minimum = 0.925). Although these results should
be interpreted as indicative rather than conclusive, they do suggest the
nonparametric collective rationality tests proposed in this chapter as
potentially useful tools for investigating this type of questions; specially
targeted experiments may help to further investigate the observed pat-
terns in greater detail.
Let us then consider the possibility of public consumption. As indicated
in Section 4.3, public consumption is possible for the 4-commodities
group (through the cashed amount, which is interpreted as a Hick-
sian good) and not for the 3-commodities group. Therefore, comparing
the violations of egoistic rationality for the 4-commodities group with
those for the 3-commodities group may reveal whether or not public
consumption is relevant within our choice setting. Again, we make the
distinction between the four dyad types. Comparison of the upper and
lower panels of Tables 4.6 and 4.7 indeed seems to confirm that vi-
olation of the egoistic rationality model may be rationalized through
public consumption, thus suggesting that such public consumption is
a relevant dimension of collective decision making even for unsophis-
ticated choice settings. Specifically, recall that our results for the 3-
commodities group suggest the absence of consumption externalities
for the dyad types friends (m-m) and partners (f-m) in the simple
choice setting of our experiment. Under that maintained assumption,
public consumption may explain the observed violations of collective
rationality for the 4-commodities group. As for the other categories
friends (f-m) and friends (f-f), because we did observe violations of
egoistic rationality in the 3-commodities condition, we cannot distin-
guish between consumption externalities and public consumption in the
4-commodities condition. Still, we do find that the violations of ego-
rule mechanics may constitute yet another interesting research avenue in which
the nonparametric collective rationality testing tools can be instrumental.
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istic rationality are more severe when public consumption is possible;
see in particular the changes of the descriptive statistics of the Afriat
efficiency index for these two dyad types. Once more, we should stress
that the current set-up only allows for tentative conclusions.
So far we have considered egoistic rationality tests at the level of the
individual dyad members. Of course, collective rationality and thus also
egoistic rationality should actually be considered at the dyad level: a
dyad behaves egoistically rational only if both individual members si-
multaneously meet the corresponding GARP condition. Our final Table
4.8 reports such dyad level egoistic rationality results. Specifically, it
gives the number of dyad observations and the percentage of so-called
‘egoistically rational’ dyads (again subdivided by type) for alternative
criteria expressed in terms of the Afriat efficiency index (4.4): each
X% efficiency criterion (X = 100, 99 or 95) states that a dyad is X%
egoistically rational if the corresponding Afriat efficiency index is at
least X% (e.g. the earlier results in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 comply with
the 100% efficiency criterion). To be exact, each X% efficiency crite-
rion only considers dyad observations for which each individual dyad
member passes the similarly defined X% efficiency criterion defined in
terms of the Afriat efficiency index (4.3) for individuals. This makes
that the number of dyad observations increases for lower X . Varian
(1990) suggested a similar efficiency criterion for individual rationality,
and he proposed the 95% cut-off level. We apply the idea to collective
rationality, and additionally consider the 100% and 99% cut-off levels.
The results in Table 4.8 support the same (tentative) conclusions as
before. From the 3-commodities results, we may derive that altruism
helps in explaining violations of egoistic rationality for dyads of the
types friends (f-f) and friends (f-m). For example, we find that only
63.6 (75, 92.3) percent dyads of the type friends (f-f) are consistent
with the 100% (99%, 95%) egoistic rationality criterion. A similar, al-
beit less strongly marked, result also applies to the category friends
(f-m). In addition, comparison of the 3-commodities results and the 4-
commodities results indicates that public consumption can rationalize
egoistically irrational behavior of, most notably, dyads of the types
friends (m-m) and partners (f-m). For example, while 100 percent
dyads of the type friends (m-m) are consistent with egoistic ratio-
nality in the 3-commodities condition (for all three efficiency criteria),
only 78.6 (85.7, 92.9) percent is consistent with the 100% (99%, 95%)
egoistic rationality criterion in the 4-commodities condition. Similar
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differences, albeit to a somewhat lesser extent, hold for the category
partners (f-m).
We may conclude that our findings at least suggest that both consump-
tion externalities and public consumption are relevant for modeling col-
lective decisions, even in simple choice settings such as the one of our
experiment. Obviously, we may expect these features to become even
more important in real-life applications that are generally character-
ized by more complicated collective decisions. In turn, this suggests a
general usefulness of the general collective consumption model.
As a final exercise, we compute the power of the sufficiency condition
in Proposition 2.10 for the general collective consumption model; this
power estimate can be interpreted as an upper bound for the power
of the necessary and sufficient condition in Proposition 2.2. We first
consider a similar randomization procedure as before: for each price
regime we randomly draw consumption choices from the set of ob-
served dyads’ choices (47 for the 4-commodities group and 43 for the
3-commodities group). The resulting power estimate equals 4.6 percent
for the 4-commodities case and 5.0 percent for the 3-commodities case.
While these figures are effectively above the percentage of violations
that is actually observed (namely 1/47 percent for the 4-commodities
case and zero percent for the 3-commodities case), they are far below
the power estimates that apply for the individual and egoistic rational-
ity tests.
At this point, it is worth indicating that the randomization procedure
that is used for computing the power may be subject to criticism; it puts
a lot of prior structure on the so-called ‘random’ choices by condition-
ing their selection on the price regime. An alternative randomization
procedure does not consider the specific price regime, but considers
the full set of all actually observed budget allocations (i.e. relative
budget shares) as potentially ‘random’ choices for every price regime.
For our application, this implies for each price regime 9 × 47 possible
choices for the 4-commodities case and 9×43 possible choices for the 3-
commodities case. This alternative procedure obtains a power estimate
for the sufficiency test that equals 15.3 percent for the 4-commodities
group and 13.2 percent for the 3-commodities group. While these esti-
mates are obviously more favorable for the general collective rationality
test, they are again rather low. These results signal a general need for
methods that increase the power of the nonparametric tests for the
general collective consumption model, of which the usefulness has been
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argued before. We discuss some possible avenues in the following con-
cluding section.
Table 4.6. Egoistic rationality; GARP violations - Afriat efficiency indices; descrip-
tive statistics per type
4-commodities partners (f-m) friends (f-m) friends (f-f) friends (m-m)
(26) (22) (18) (28)
number 1 2 3 3
maximum 0.944 0.984 0.990 0.991
3rd quartile 0.944 0.868 0.770 0.989
median 0.944 0.752 0.550 0.986
1st quartile 0.944 0.636 0.550 0.918
minimum 0.944 0.521 0.550 0.851
3-commodities partners (f-m) friends (f-m) friends (f-f) friends (m-m)
(22) (24) (22) (18)
number 0 3 5 0
maximum - 0.996 0.999 -
3rd quartile - 0.961 0.998 -
median - 0.925 0.980 -
1st quartile - 0.925 0.980 -
minimum - 0.925 0.969 -
Notes: For each group of observations (4-commodities and 3-commodities; four dyad
types) the total number of evaluated individual members is reported between paren-
theses; ‘number’ stands for the number of individual members violating GARP cor-
responding with egoistic rationality. Descriptive statistics (maximum, 3rd quartile,
median, 1st quartile and minimum) pertain to the distribution of the Afriat effi-
ciency index as defined over the subgroups of GARP violating individual members.
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Table 4.7. Egoistic rationality; distribution of GARP violations per type
Percentage of group with violations (4-commodities)
GARP- partners (f-m) friends (f-m) friends (f-f) friends (m-m)
violations (26) (22) (18) (28)
0 96.2 90.9 83.3 89.3
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.6
2 3.8 9.1 5.6 7.1
3 0.0 0.0 11.1 0.0
4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Percentage of group with violations (3-commodities)
GARP- partners (f-m) friends (f-m) friends (f-f) friends (m-m)
violations (22) (24) (22) (18)
0 100.0 87.5 77.3 100.0
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 0.0 12.5 22.7 0.0
3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Notes: For each group of observations (4-commodities and 3-commodities; four dyad
types) the total number of evaluated individual members is reported between paren-
theses. The column ‘GARP violations’ stands for the number of GARP violations
corresponding with the egoistic rationality model (ranging from minimally 0 to
maximally 9). For each group, the table reports the percentage of observed choices
corresponding to different numbers of violations.
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Table 4.8. Egoistic rationality at the dyad level; alternative efficiency criteria; per
type
100% eff. crit. 99% eff. crit. 95% eff. crit.
all 4-com. 3-com. all 4-com. 3-com. all 4-com. 3-com.
all types
number 90 47 43 92 48 44 98 49 49
% pass test 84.4 83.0 86.0 89.1 87.5 90.9 93.9 91.8 95.9
partners (f-m)
number 24 13 11 25 14 11 26 15 11
% pass test 95.8 92.3 100.0 96.0 92.9 100.0 96.2 93.3 100.0
friends (f-m)
number 23 11 12 23 11 12 24 11 13
% pass test 82.6 81.8 83.3 87.0 81.8 91.7 91.7 90.9 92.3
friends (f-f)
number 20 9 11 21 9 12 22 9 13
% pass test 70.0 77.8 63.6 81.0 88.9 75.0 90.9 88.9 92.3
friends (m-m)
number 23 14 9 23 14 9 26 14 12
% pass test 87.0 78.6 100.0 91.3 85.7 100.0 96.2 92.9 100.0
Notes: For each group of observations (4-commodities and 3-commodities; four dyad
types) the table reports the efficiency results according to alternative X% efficiency
criteria (X = 100, 99, 95). For a given X the row ‘number’ gives the number of dyad
observations with an Afriat efficiency index (4.3) of at least X% for each individual
member; and the row ‘% pass test’ gives the percentage of such dyad observations
with an Afriat efficiency index (4.4) of at least X%.
4.5 Summary and concluding remarks
We have provided a first nonparametric-experimental test of the col-
lective consumption model. First, focusing on dyads consisting of indi-
viduals that both pass the test for individual rationality, we have per-
formed a test for collective rationality in terms of the egoistic model.
Our test results provide strong support for egoistically rational dyad
behavior in simple consumption decision settings, such as the one con-
sidered in our experiment: a large proportion of dyads (i.e. above 90
percent) is effectively consistent with the (powerful) egoistic rationality
conditions. This is a useful result, as the parsimonious egoistic model
is mostly assumed in real-life empirical applications, which are usually
characterized by more sophisticated decision settings; a minimal test
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for the validity of that assumption is that the model holds in simple
consumption settings. Second, we find that observed dyad behavior
that is inconsistent with the egoistic model turns out to be consistent
with the general collective consumption model, which incorporates the
possibility of consumption externalities and public consumption. This
result suggest that this general model can be useful even for modeling
such simple decision settings, and so a fortiori for more complicated
real-life settings.
At a more general level, we believe that this first test demonstrates that
the nonparametric (collective consumption) analysis of experimental
data can be particularly useful for gaining insight in the mechanics of
group decision making under alternative choice conditions. For exam-
ple, our own empirical application suggests that in particular female
friends seem to behave altruistically, which corresponds to consumption
externalities, and that some dyads effectively seem to use (even fairly
small) amounts of cash for public consumption (captured by a compos-
ite Hicksian good in our set-up). Still, although these rationalization
arguments have intuitive appeal, they can at best be interpreted as
tentative, mainly because of the small number of egoistically irrational
dyads in our experiment. Follow-up research can focus on experimental
choice settings that are specially designed for studying the specificities
that cause consumption externalities (or altruism) and public consump-
tion; this complements the existing literature that focuses on altruism
in individual decision making (see, e.g., Andreoni and Miller, 2002).
Alternative research questions can relate to other specific features of the
collective decision process. For example, follow-up research that uses
experimental data may concentrate on the bargaining idea (including
the determinants of the bargaining power) that underlies the collective
consumption model. Or, whereas this first study restricted attention
to dyads, future research may investigate group decisions that involve
more than two decision makers. In such settings, one may e.g. be inter-
ested in the number of decision makers that are effectively involved in
the group decision process. That is, how many decision makers have to
be accounted for in order to make the observed group behavior consis-
tent with collective rationality? In a family context, a closely related
research question is whether and to what extent children bear on the
bargaining process or do have actual bargaining power within house-
holds. From a closely related perspective, one can study the group
decision behavior of young children, including the nature of the un-
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derlying preferences (egoistic or altruistic); this would complement the
results of Harbaugh, Krause and Berry (2001) on the individual ra-
tionality of young children. Once more, specially targeted experiments
that use the nonparametric collective rationality tests may enhance our
understanding of these issues.
A final important conclusion of our study pertains to the specification
of the rationality tests themselves. In particular, our comparison of the
general collective rationality results with the egoistic rationality results
shows that knowledge of personalized quantities and prices (which in
our case were fully observed under egoistic rationality) may dramati-
cally increase the power of the tests. From a practical perspective, more
powerful tests obviously imply more powerful recovery and forecasting
results. [See Varian (1982, 2006) for surveys of nonparametric recov-
ery and forecasting tools that build on the GARP test for individual
rationality; these tools could be adapted to the collective consump-
tion context.] This pleads for developing collective consumption data
sets that incorporate such personalized quantity and price information;
such detailed data sets seem especially valuable given the good fit of
the collective consumption model.
Two final remarks are in order with respect to increasing the power of
the nonparametric tests in practical applications. First, it is clear that,
if we knew the individual members’ orderings of the (collectively cho-
sen) consumption bundles, then we could design more powerful tests of
collectively rational behavior. Such tests would have a formally similar
structure as the ones in Chapter 5 that apply in a production setting
(where the observed outputs reveal the ordering information). Within
experimental set-ups it is actually possible to directly ask the partici-
pants for the ordering information; this suggests an interesting exercise
for follow-up research. Second, the power of the nonparametric tests
may be increased by extending the existing tests to include the ‘se-
quential maximum power path’ idea of Blundell, Browning and Craw-
ford (2003,2007), who originally focused on the GARP condition for
individual rationality. Such an extension could render the nonparamet-
ric toolkit for the collective model, which effectively seems to provide
an adequate description of the observed group decision behavior, par-
ticularly useful for addressing real-life research questions (such as the
prediction of group behavior in new situations and/or welfare analysis).
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Appendix
Additional information: instructions for experiment
For completeness, given that this chapter uses experimental data, we
also add the instructions that were given to the participants of the
experiment and which are not explicitly taken up in the main text:
Introduction and product-tasting
In a moment, you will be asked to make a series of choices regarding
the three products standing on the desk in front of you: wine, orange
juice, and M&Ms.
In order to enable you to make these choices in an informed way, you
have the opportunity to taste these three products (wine, orange juice,
and M&Ms) right now. You can consume everything if you want to.
You will be asked to make the choices partly on your own and partly
together with the person who accompanied you to the lab.
It is in your own and in your joint interest to make these choices as
truthfully as possible, that is, to make the same choices you would in
real-life. This is because one of your choices will be randomly selected
for you to take home.
Because of practical reasons, you will not receive your choice right away.
You will however be invited to pick up your choice afterwards. Each
choice will consist of a product package (of wine, orange juice, and
M&Ms) that is worth AC 10.
Decision-making
In the following, you are asked to make a series of choices. Each
time, relative prices of three different products (wine, orange juice,
and M&Ms) are given. It is up to you to decide how much you are
willing to spend on each product (and, added in the 4-commodities
condition: and how much you possibly would like to save), given these
relative price variations. Each time, your budget amounts to AC10 or
1000 eurocents. Please make each choice as truthfully as possible, that
is, as you would in real life, as one of your choices will be randomly
selected for you to take home.
For each choice that you make as a dyad, you have to indicate how you
divide the chosen products over the individuals in the dyad.
If you want to, you can use the computer’s calculator. You are also free
to use the back of the questionnaire for scrap paper if you want to.
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Collective rationalization in terms of Proposition 2.2
We provide a collective rationalization in terms of the nonparametric
conditions in Proposition 2.2 for the one dyad observation that does
not meet the sufficiency condition in Proposition 2.10. Table 4.9 reports
the observed aggregate (dyad level) quantities and the corresponding
(member level) personalized quantities for this dyad. Combining the
aggregate quantity information with the price information in Table 4.1
(and using that the price of cash equals 1), it can be verified that
this dyad does not meet the sufficiency condition. Specifically, we have
for the three choice observations 2, 3 and 5 that for each pair i, j ∈
{2, 3, 5} : p′iqi > p′iqj and p′jqj > p′jqi. In such a case there does not
exist a partitioning of the observed set S (of aggregate quantities and
prices) that distributes these three observations over two subsets S1
and S2 so that each individual subset meets the corresponding GARP
condition.
Still, the dyad does meet the necessary and sufficient condition in
Proposition 2.2. For example, Table 4.10 gives a feasible specification
of the personalized prices for which such consistency can be verified:
assuming that the cashed amounts are pooled to spend on a publicly
consumed good (i.e. the Hicksian good is a pure ‘public good’, with an
aggregate price of unity), both dyad members simultaneously meet the
corresponding GARP conditions in terms of the personalized quanti-
ties (for the goods wine, orange juice and M&Ms) in Table 4.9 and the
corresponding personalized prices in Table 4.10. Of course, such a data
rationalizing specification of the personalized prices should in general
not be unique; alternative specifications can obtain the same consis-
tency result (e.g.: our interpretation of cashed amounts in terms of
public consumption is not necessary for establishing the consistency).
collectively rationalizing personalized prices for the 9 choice problems
Table 4.9. Aggregate and personalized quantities for the 9 choice problems
Choice problem Wine Orange juice M&Ms Public good
Aggregate quantities
1 75 50 200 0
2 75 0 100 200
3 75 50 75 100
4 450 0 0 550
5 0 50 100 300
6 450 0 100 250
7 0 400 0 600
8 225 112 0 100
9 100 600 0 100
Personalized quantities member 1
1 37.5 25 100 0
2 37.5 0 50 100
3 37.5 25 37.5 50
4 225 0 0 275
5 0 25 50 150
6 225 0 50 125
7 0 200 0 300
8 112.5 56 0 0
9 50 300 0 50
Personalized quantities member 2
1 37.5 25 100 0
2 37.5 0 50 100
3 37.5 25 37.5 50
4 225 0 0 275
5 0 25 50 150
6 225 0 50 125
7 0 200 0 300
8 112.5 56 0 100
9 50 300 0 50
Notes: Consumption quantities are expressed in terms of the same commodity units
as the prices in Table 4.1: a unit of red wine is 1 centiliter, a unit of orange juice is
3 centiliters, and a unit of M&Ms is 5 grams.
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Table 4.10. Collectively rationalizing personalized prices for the 9 choice problems
Choice Wine Orange M&Ms Wine Orange M&Ms Public good
problem juice juice
Pers. prices member 1 Pers. prices member 1 Pers. price
own (= member 1) cons. other (= member 2) cons. member 1
1 8 4 1 8 4 1 0.5
2 8 3 2 8 3 2 0.5
3 9 3 1 9 3 1 0.5
4 1 8 4 1 8 4 0.5
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5
6 1 9 3 1 9 3 0.5
7 4 1 8 4 1 8 0.5
8 3 2 8 3 2 8 0
9 3 1 9 3 1 9 0.5
Pers. prices member 2 Pers. prices member 2 Pers. price
own (= member 2) cons. other (= member 1) cons. member 2
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5
5 2 8 3 2 8 3 0.5
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5
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Table 4.11. Experimental results - budget shares for the 9 choice problems
Choice Wine Orange M&Ms Hicksian Wine Orange M&Ms Hicksian
problem juice juice
4-com. - 104 ind. 4-com. - 52 dyads
1 mean 0.186 0.209 0.208 0.395 0.226 0.228 0.232 0.315
st. dev. 0.218 0.181 0.230 0.285 0.243 0.197 0.239 0.267
2 mean 0.182 0.247 0.184 0.387 0.215 0.222 0.200 0.347
st. dev. 0.216 0.205 0.195 0.277 0.246 0.199 0.200 0.265
3 mean 0.164 0.243 0.219 0.374 0.174 0.243 0.263 0.317
st. dev. 0.213 0.204 0.239 0.284 0.231 0.218 0.262 0.278
4 mean 0.345 0.138 0.123 0.393 0.373 0.132 0.153 0.337
st. dev. 0.315 0.188 0.179 0.286 0.332 0.182 0.207 0.273
5 mean 0.325 0.153 0.133 0.388 0.318 0.146 0.194 0.342
st. dev. 0.273 0.200 0.174 0.270 0.288 0.187 0.224 0.270
6 mean 0.342 0.142 0.143 0.373 0.372 0.111 0.200 0.318
st. dev. 0.305 0.211 0.196 0.289 0.334 0.172 0.246 0.279
7 mean 0.214 0.323 0.109 0.347 0.226 0.299 0.133 0.340
st. dev. 0.230 0.290 0.180 0.277 0.254 0.272 0.213 0.294
8 mean 0.253 0.271 0.109 0.366 0.280 0.251 0.131 0.330
st. dev. 0.234 0.234 0.178 0.271 0.242 0.186 0.191 0.274
9 mean 0.235 0.307 0.107 0.354 0.261 0.290 0.132 0.319
st. dev. 0.237 0.269 0.191 0.286 0.277 0.264 0.230 0.287
3-com. - 102 ind. 3-com. - 51 dyads
1 mean 0.310 0.361 0.329 0.261 0.331 0.407
st. dev. 0.296 0.248 0.297 0.291 0.226 0.282
2 mean 0.299 0.382 0.320 0.261 0.369 0.370
st. dev. 0.292 0.260 0.292 0.303 0.245 0.283
3 mean 0.261 0.381 0.355 0.211 0.369 0.420
st. dev. 0.289 0.276 0.305 0.271 0.247 0.299
4 mean 0.457 0.251 0.293 0.432 0.232 0.333
st. dev. 0.354 0.255 0.301 0.360 0.253 0.315
5 mean 0.421 0.238 0.338 0.392 0.234 0.376
st. dev. 0.323 0.234 0.293 0.329 0.233 0.299
6 mean 0.454 0.217 0.323 0.440 0.189 0.367
st. dev. 0.346 0.250 0.308 0.367 0.241 0.328
7 mean 0.307 0.443 0.240 0.289 0.435 0.276
st. dev. 0.315 0.321 0.301 0.303 0.304 0.315
8 mean 0.344 0.434 0.227 0.316 0.396 0.289
st. dev. 0.303 0.294 0.292 0.308 0.261 0.305
9 mean 0.340 0.429 0.231 0.329 0.411 0.262
st. dev. 0.318 0.321 0.316 0.332 0.332 0.342
Notes: For each choice problem and each group of observations (4-commodities and
3-commodities), the table reports the mean budget shares (‘mean’) over all partici-
pants (individuals and dyads), together with the corresponding standard deviations
(‘st.dev.’).

Chapter 5
Collective approach to firm production: cost
efficiency analysis of multi-output firms
Abstract
In designing a production model for firms that generate multiple out-
puts, we take as a starting point that such multi-output production
refers to economies of scope, which in turn originate from joint input
use and input externalities. We provide a nonparametric characteriza-
tion of cost efficient behavior under these conditions, and subsequently
institute necessary and sufficient conditions for data consistency with
such efficient behavior that only include observed firm demand and
supply data. We illustrate our methodology by examining the cost ef-
ficiency of research programs in Economics and Business Management
faculties of Dutch universities. This application shows that the pro-
posed methodology may entail robust conclusions regarding cost ef-
ficiency differences between universities within specific specialization
areas, even when using shadow prices to evaluate the different inputs.1
1 This chapter is adapted from Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007b). We
are grateful to two anonymous referees for insightful comments and suggestions.
We also thank seminar participants at the European Workshop on Efficiency and
Productivity Analysis 2007 in Lille for useful discussions.
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5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we exploit the conceptual analogy between the collective
model of multi-person household consumption (with public consump-
tion and consumption externalities) and the ‘scope economies’-based
model of multi-output firm production (with joint inputs and pro-
duction externalities). Deviating from the mainstream literature (see
Cooper, Seiford and Tone, 2000, and Fried, Lovell and Schmidt, 2007,
for surveys), we start from the position that such multi-output pro-
duction refers to economies of scope, which in turn originate from joint
input use and production externalities. Economies of scope may loosely
be defined as situations where the average total cost of production de-
creases as a result of increasing the number of different goods produced
(see, e.g., Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1982). Given this, we stress that
we do not want to present a methodology for investigating the ex-
tent to which economies of scope are actually present. Rather, as we
explain below, we present a nonparametric toolkit for analyzing cost
efficient production behavior that exploits a number of specific features
related to scope economies. This is an important difference between our
approach and most other contributions on scope economies in the pro-
duction literature, which indeed essentially aim at recovering whether
and to what extent the production technology under study is character-
ized by economies of scope. See, e.g., Kim et al. (2005) and references
therein.
As before, a first specificity of our approach is that it is embedded in
a nonparametric methodology. Also in the production setting this ap-
proach has some well-known advantages when compared to a paramet-
ric approach.2 For example, it does not rely on a functional specification
of a firm’s production technology, which again is typically non-testable.
Further, it deals in a very natural way with the widely observed simul-
taneous occurrence of multiple inputs and outputs. Finally, it easily
accounts for the possibility that input-output combinations do not nec-
essarily have to lie on the production frontier: production behavior can
be analyzed while allowing for observed inefficiencies.3
2 See, e.g., Varian (1984), Fa¨re, Grosskopf and Lovell (1994) and Cooper, Seiford
and Tone (2000) for introductory texts on nonparametric production and effi-
ciency analysis.
3 See, e.g., the ‘subset rationalization’ concept of Banker and Maindiratta (1988)
and the ‘goodness-of-fit’ concept of Varian (1990), which essentially reconcile the
neoclassical nonparametric production analysis literature (see, e.g., Afriat, 1972;
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As for our specific methodology, rather than resorting to some paramet-
ric specification of the production technology, we use the mere techno-
logical postulates of nested input requirement sets (or free output dis-
posability) and convexity in output space. Both technology properties
have often been used in a nonparametric setting. For example, Var-
ian (1984) suggests the assumption of nested input sets, while Petersen
(1990) and Bogetoft (1996) suggest the use of convexity in output space.
As we will discuss, these minimal assumptions allow for analyzing cost
efficient behavior from the raw price and quantity data by exploiting
specific features of production processes characterized by economies of
scope.
The second feature of our approach pertains to this particular (scope
economies) interpretation of our empirical cost efficiency conditions.
More specifically, we take it that the very nature of scope economies
lies in joint input use and input externalities. The cost rationalizing ef-
fect of joint input use for multiple output firms is evident. For instance,
as for our own empirical application, senior researchers can serve as an
input in the production of both academic publications and doctorates
that are delivered by the research production unit. Within the same
setting, input externalities occur when the presence of a distinguished
scholar has beneficial effects on the productivity of other members of
the research unit, even if she or he is not directly involved in the pro-
duction of the associated research output. More generally, input exter-
nalities refer to cost saving (or productivity enhancing) effects to be
attributed to inputs (employed by the same production unit) that are
not used in a direct manner for the production of the output under
consideration.
While the illustrative application in the current chapter pertains to the
specific case of academic research production, it is worth stressing that
scope economies prevail in a wide variety of real-life situations, in the
public sector (e.g. public railway companies that simultaneously pro-
vide freight and passenger transport) as well as in the private sector
(e.g. banks that also provide insurance services). More generally, given
our starting position that scope economies (originating from jointly
used inputs and input externalities) form the very economic motiva-
Hanoch and Rothschild, 1972; and Varian, 1984) and the Data Envelopment Anal-
ysis (DEA) literature. [The term DEA, which was introduced by Charnes, Cooper
and Rhodes (1978), is often used for summarizing the literature on nonparametric
efficiency analysis.]
118 Chapter 5: Collective approach to multi-output production
tion for multi-output production, we believe that our methodology be-
comes a useful analytical tool as soon as the production behavior is
characterized by multiple outputs.
Finally, our method does not a priori impose economies of scope; it does
not assume any structure regarding the nature of the effects resulting
from joint input use and input externalities. In addition, it does not
presume that the empirical analyst knows which (parts of the) observed
input quantities represent joint use or are attributed to specific outputs.
Indeed, such non-observability of the input distribution is often the case
in real-life applications. That is, although we can observe aggregate
inputs (for example, the numbers of senior and junior researchers), it
may be quite difficult to determine which inputs are directly associated
with what output (academic publications or doctoral dissertations). In
the concluding section, we indicate how the presented model can be
refined in the case that such additional information regarding the input
quantity distribution is available.
Still, even though we impose minimal a priori structure regarding the
nature of the scope economies or the input distribution, we can de-
rive testable conditions for cost efficient behavior. Interestingly, these
conditions are expressed in terms of observable ‘aggregate’ price and
quantity information. In fact, we also extend our tools for nonparamet-
ric cost efficiency analysis to apply when only input-output quantity
and no price information is available. That is, there is no need to dis-
aggregate the observed firm demand and supply data to analyze the
firm’s cost efficiency, which make our conditions easy to implement in
practice.
To demonstrate its practical usefulness, we apply our methodology by
assessing the cost efficiency of research programs in Economics and
Business Management Faculties of Dutch universities. Our data cover
the period 1996-2000 and were delivered by the universities in the con-
text of the quinquennial assessment of university research conducted
under the auspices of the Association of Dutch Universities (VSNU).
As argued above, the multi-output research production is likely to be
characterized by economies of scope, which makes this data set well fit
to illustrate our methodology.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents
a nonparametric characterization of cost efficient production behavior
under economies of scope. As we will discuss, this provides nonpara-
metric necessary and sufficient conditions for efficient behavior that
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are expressed in terms of unobservable price and quantity informa-
tion. Section 5.3 subsequently presents the corresponding necessary
and sufficient cost efficiency conditions that solely use observable in-
formation, and which are easy to implement in practice. Section 5.4
presents our empirical application to research programs in Dutch Eco-
nomics and Business Management Faculties. Section 5.5 summarizes
and provides some concluding remarks regarding potential extensions
and refinements of the presented methodology. The Appendix contains
the proofs of our results.
5.2 Cost efficient production behavior under economies
of scope: a nonparametric characterization
We consider firms (broadly defined) that use a vector of m inputs x ∈
Rm+ to produce an s-valued output quantity y ∈ Rs+; in the following,
we let K = {1, . . . , s} denote the output index set. Next, we assume
a data set with T firm observations; we use S = {1, . . . , T} to denote
the corresponding index set. For each observation i ∈ S, we observe
the output vector yi, the corresponding input vector xi and the input
price vector pi ∈ Rm++. [In a following step, we relax the assumption
that input prices are observed.]
In what follows, we consider the most general production processes,
which correspond to our interpretation of scope economies discussed
in the introduction. Specifically, we take account of the fact that the
production process of each output may be characterized by production
externalities and joint input use. To do so, we consider decomposed
input vectors x̂ = (x′1 · · · x′s x′s+1 )′ for an aggregate input vector x
such that
x = x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xs+1 and 0 ≤ xl ≤ x for l = 1, . . . , s+ 1.
In this specification, each subvector xk, contains the input quantities
that are directly allocated to the production of the output k, while
the remaining subvector xs+1 captures the jointly used input. . Evi-
dently, each x̂ = (x′1 · · · x′s x′s+1 )′ defines a unique x =
s+1∑
l=1
xl; we will
repeatedly use this in our following discussion.
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Example 5.1. To illustrate the concept, we consider a situation where
three inputs (m = 3) are used for the production of two outputs (s = 2).
Suppose a firm with input vector x = (6 5 2)′. Given that we have two
outputs, we can define the corresponding decomposed input vector as
x̂ = (x′1 x′2 x′3 )′ ; the components x1 and x2 then capture the input
used for the respective outputs 1 and 2, and x3 contains the jointly
used input. A feasible specification is x1 = (2 1 1)′, x2 = (3 2 1)′ and
x = (1 2 0)′. [Note that this specification effectively satisfies x =
3∑
l=1
xl
but, of course, many other specifications are equally feasible.] In words,
this specification implies that respectively 2 and 3 units of the input 1
are used for the production of the outputs 1 and 2, while 1 unit of the
input 1 is jointly used; a directly similar interpretation holds for the
inputs 2 and 3.
At this point, it is worth stressing that we usually cannot observe the
allocation of the observed input vector x to its constituent components
x1, . . . ,xs+1; the mere restriction is that, for each observation i, the
vectors xik (k = 1, . . . , s + 1) should sum up to the observed input
vector xi. Note further that it may well be that some components
of the decomposed vector x̂ equal zero; e.g., there may be no joint
input use, which means that xs+1 is a zero vector. [Such cases, which
include additional information, may entail more stringent cost efficiency
conditions. We return to this in the concluding discussion.]
We describe the technology in terms of input requirement sets Vk(yk) ⊆
(Rm+ )s+1 associated with the k-th output quantity yk ∈ R+; the state-
ment x̂ ∈ Vk(yk) then indicates that the (decomposed) input vector x̂
produces at least the output quantity yk. This specification of the sets
Vk(yk) effectively implies that the production of each output k may
depend not only on the input xk specific to the production of the k-th
output but also, through production externalities, on the inputs xk∗
that are allocated to some other output k∗, and on the jointly used
input xs+1. By construction, the input requirement sets are nested in
the following sense:4
(x̂ ∈ Vk(yk) ∧ yk ≥ y˜k)⇒ x̂ ∈ Vk(y˜k);
this is a standard condition which reflects that less output never re-
quires more input or, in other words, that outputs are freely disposable.
4 As discussed by Varian (1984), including this condition avoids trivial rationaliza-
tions of the data in the sense of the following Definition 5.2.
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The presence of production externalities and jointly used inputs makes
it impossible to consider each output separately in the cost efficiency
analysis; e.g., the specification of the (unobserved) x̂ ∈ Vk(yk) most
clearly reveals that the input requirement sets associated with different
outputs are mutually interdependent. To obtain a setting that allows
for analyzing cost efficiency at the (multi-output) firm level, we define
the set V(y), which contains all input vectors x̂ that can produce the
multi-valued output vector y. The formal interrelationship between the
input requirement set V(y) and the sets Vk(yk), is as follows:
for y = (y1 · · · ys )′ : x̂ ∈ V(y)⇔ ∀k ∈ K : x̂ ∈ Vk(yk).
Using V(y), we can next define the further production assumption of
convexity in output space. We define this property in terms of some
given budget z that can be used for purchasing the inputs (under the
prices p):
(∃x̂a : p′xa ≤ z ∧ x̂a ∈ V(ya)) ∧ (∃x̂b : p′xb ≤ z ∧ x̂b ∈ V(yb))
⇒ ∀ λ ∈ [0, 1] : (∃x̂c : p′xc ≤ z ∧ x̂c ∈ V(λya + (1− λ)yb)).
In words, this definition states that, if the budget z can afford the pro-
duction of ya and yb (through the (decomposed) input vectors xa and
xb, respectively) then it can also produce any convex combination of
these output vectors (through some input vector xc). The economic in-
terpretation of the condition is that the marginal rates of output trans-
formation are everywhere decreasing (or, stricto sensu, non-increasing)
along the boundary of the output producible set associated with the
budget z.5
Using this convexity property, we can characterize efficient production
behavior. As a preliminary step, we note that each input requirement
set Vk(yk) corresponds to a production function fk(x̂), which gives the
maximum quantity of output k that can be produced with x̂. We have:
x̂ ∈ Vk(yk)⇔ fk(x̂) ≥ yk.
Similarly, we may relate the setV(y) to the production function f(x̂) =
(f1(x̂) · · · fs(x̂) )′.
5 It can be verified that this output convexity condition is actually somewhat
stronger than that forwarded by Petersen (1990) and Bogetoft (1996) in a similar
context. The more stringent property is essential for obtaining the cost efficiency
condition in (5.1), which will form the basis for our nonparametric characteriza-
tion of multi-output production under economies of scope.
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In our approach, cost efficient production behavior means that, for each
firm observation i, the selected (decomposed) input vector x̂i yields an
output combination yi that is situated on the efficient boundary of
the (convex) set of producible output combinations associated with
the given budget (which corresponds to the observed outlay (pi)′xi);
this effectively represents a ‘rational’ allocation of the available budget.
To formally define the condition, we (again) use the standard result in
welfare economics that under convex utility possibility sets, any Pareto-
efficient allocation can be characterized as a stationary point of a lin-
ear social welfare function (see, e.g., Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green,
1995). This result is readily translated towards the current setting,
which is characterized by convex output producible sets (instead of
utility possibility sets). More specifically, we obtain that efficient pro-
duction behavior requires that each observation i maximizes a multi-
output production function (linear in terms of yi) for the observed
outlay, i.e. ∀i ∈ S,∃µi ∈ Rs+ :
(µi)′yi = maxbx {(µi)′f(x̂) | x ∈ Rm+ with (pi)′x ≤ (pi)′xi}. (5.1)
In this cost efficiency condition, the entries of µi ∈ Rs+ can be inter-
preted as ‘priority weights’, which the firm under evaluation attributes
to the different outputs. These weights correspond to some implicit
(possibly nonlinear) production objective function that aggregates the
different individual outputs, and which underlies the observed output
choices. Importantly, these priority weights need not be constant across
the firm observations: they can change depending on the economic cir-
cumstances. For example, if the valuation of some output k increases,
then the firm may want to increase (in relative terms) the production of
output k, which is translated in a higher priority weight. The analogy
with the Pareto efficiency concept in welfare economics is immediate:
cost-efficient behavior, for a given outlay, implies that it is impossible
to increase output k without decreasing output k∗ (k∗ 6= k).
The question of data consistency with the cost efficiency condition is
then whether it is possible to conceive a collection of input requirement
sets that makes observed behavior consistent with the above efficiency
condition. The following definition states the formal conditions for such
a cost rationalization (or C-R) of the production data:
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Definition 5.2. For a production process characterized by production
externalities and joint input use, a family of input requirement sets
{Vk(yk), k ∈ K} provides a C-R of the set {(pi,xi,yi) | i ∈ S} if there
exists a production function f(x̂), such that for each i ∈ S there exists
a decomposed input vector x̂i = ((xi1)
′ · · · (xis)′ (xis+1)′ )′ and a priority
weight vector µi ∈ Rs+ that satisfy:
(i) f(x̂i) = yi;
(ii) (µi)′f(x̂i) ≥ (µi)′f(x̂) for all x̂ = ((x1)′ · · · (xs)′ (xs+1)′ )′ ∈
(Rm+ )s+1 with p′i(
s+1∑
k=1
xk) ≤ p′ixi.
In words, this definition requires that there must exist at least one
feasible decomposition of the observed input vectors xi into x̂i and,
accordingly, priority weight vectors µi and some production function
f(x̂) such that each firm observation i is consistent with the efficiency
condition (5.1). This definition is clearly analogous to the Definition
2.1.
This efficiency condition cannot be used as such, since the production
technology (and, hence, the function f(x̂)) is typically unknown. Es-
sentially, the nonparametric approach to analyzing production behavior
forwards efficiency conditions that do not necessitate a (non-verifiable)
functional specification of the production possibilities. To provide a
nonparametric characterization of cost efficient behavior in the sense
of Definition 5.2, we first define the additional concept of implicit price
vectors (p̂1, . . . , p̂s) for an (aggregate) input price vector p as
∀k ∈ K : p̂k = (p′k,1 · · · p′k,s p′k,s+1)′ such that
∀l = 1, . . . , s+ 1 : pk,l ∈ Rm+ and p1,l + · · ·+ ps,l = p.
This concept complements the earlier concept of decomposed input vec-
tor x̂: each p̂k = (p′k,1 · · · p′k,s p′k,s+1)′ captures the fraction of the price
for the decomposed input quantities x̂i = ((xi1)
′ · · · (xis)′ (xis+1)′ )′ that
is attributed to the output k. To see this, we first recall that the de-
composition of the (aggregate) input vector x into s + 1 components
effectively reveals the different channels through which the observed
inputs are allocated. Correspondingly, each l-th component pk,l of the
implicit price vectors p̂k gives the fraction of the price of each input
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component xl that is attributed to the output k.6 More specifically, the
components pk,k capture the fraction of the price of the input directly
allocated to output k that is effectively borne by that output k. Next,
the components pk,k∗ (k∗ ∈ K, k∗ 6= k) refer to the possibility of input
externalities: pk,k∗ 6= 0 means that the inputs allocated to the output
k∗ (i.e. x∗k) benefit the production of the output k (which is thus com-
pensated through pk,k∗ ). Finally, as for the jointly used input xs+1, the
cost must be distributed over the different outputs (see in particular
p1,s+1 + · · ·+ ps,s+1 = p).
Example 5.3. To further illustrate the concept, we recapture the situa-
tion with three inputs and two outputs in Example 5.1. Suppose an input
price vector p = (2 1 3))′. Given that we have two outputs, we can de-
fine implicit price vectors p̂1 = (p′1,1 p′1,2 p′1,3)′ and p̂2 = (p′2,1 p′2,2 p′2,3)′.
A feasible specification is the following:
p1,1 =
1.50.5
1.5
 , p1,2 =
 00.5
2
 , p1,3 =
 10
1.5
 and
p2,1 =
0.50.5
1.5
 , p2,2 =
 20.5
1
 , p2,3 =
 11
1.5
 .
In words, p1,1 6= p implies that the output 1 does not fully bear the
cost for the input used for its production (x1); this reflects that input
externalities benefit the production of the output 2 (for which the com-
pensation is captured by p2,1(= p− p1,1)). Similarly, the input used for
the production of the output 2 (x2) implies production externalities to-
wards the production of the output 1 (see the specification of p1,2 and
p2,2); in this case there are no externalities associated with the input 1
(as the first entry of p1,2 is zero). Finally, the remaining components
p1,3 and p2,3 distribute the cost of the jointly used input.
As a final note, we indicate that a specification of the decomposed input
vector x̂ and the implicit price vectors (p̂1, . . . , p̂s) effectively allows for
computing the cost share attributed to each output k (as p̂′kx̂ ). As for
our example, the given specification of x̂ (in Example 5.1), p̂1 and p̂2
implies a cost level of 9 (=p̂′1x̂ = p′1,1x1 + p′1,2x2 + p′1,3x3) for the out-
put 1 and a cost level of 14 (=p̂′2x̂ = p′2,1x1 + p′2,2x2 + p′2,3x3 ) for the
6 In fact, as in Chapter 2, the intuition of the implicit price vectors is analogous to
that of Lindahl prices in the context of public goods
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output 2. Note that the sum of these cost shares equals the total cost of
production p′x.
Once more we should stress that, for a given observation i, we usually
cannot observe the exact specification of the implicit price vector p̂ik =
((pik,1)
′ · · · pik,s)′ pik,s+1)′)′ associated with each output k. The only
restriction is that the components pik,l must add up (over the different
outputs k) to the observed (aggregate) price, i.e. pi1,l + · · · + pis,l. We
return to the use of additional information regarding the specification
of the implicit price vectors in the concluding discussion.
We are now in a position to state a nonparametric necessary and suf-
ficient condition for cost efficient production behavior in the sense of
Definition 5.27
Proposition 5.4. For a production process characterized by production
externalities and joint input use, there is a family of closed, convex,
positive monotonous input requirement sets that provide a C-R of the
data if and only if for each i ∈ S there exists
(i) a decomposed input vector x̂i = ((xi1)
′ · · · (xis)′ (xis+1)′)′ and
(ii) implicit price vectors (p̂i1, . . . , p̂
i
s),
such that ∀i, j ∈ S, k ∈ K : yjk ≥ yik ⇒ (p̂ik)′x̂j ≥ (p̂ik)′x̂i.
Hence, consistency with the cost efficiency condition requires that ob-
served behavior satisfies a number of cost minimization conditions
(i.e., one for each individual output k), which are expressed in terms
of decomposed input vectors x̂i and corresponding implicit prices
(p̂i1, . . . , p̂
i
s) for each observation i. If observation j produces more of
the output k than observation i (yjk ≥ yik), then cost efficiency requires
that the k-th output cost (under the prices p̂ik) for observation i does
not exceed that for observation j (i.e.,(p̂ik)
′x̂j ≥ (p̂ik)′x̂i). Interestingly,
these cost minimization conditions are formally analogous to the con-
dition derived by Varian (1984; Theorem 1) in the single output case.
Given our multi-output orientation, we identify a separate condition
for each entry k ∈ K of the evaluated output vector yi. Our above
explanation of the vectors x̂i and (p̂i1, . . . , p̂
i
s) makes clear that this
7 In Proposition 5.4, positive monotonicity of a set Vk(yk) means that (bx ∈ Vk(yk)∧bx∗ ≥ bx) ⇒ bx∗ ∈ Vk(yk). This is essentially the property of free input disposal,
i.e. more input can always produce the same output.
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nonparametric characterization has a natural intuition in terms of the
underlying model of joint input use and production externalities.
5.3 Empirical tests of cost efficient behavior under
economies of scope
The C-R condition in Proposition 5.4 is expressed in terms of decom-
posed quantity vectors x̂i and implicit price vectors (p̂i1, . . . , p̂
i
s). Em-
pirical testing of the condition would be easy if these vectors were ob-
served. However, as in the previous chapters, such price and quantity in-
formation is usually not available, which makes direct empirical imple-
mentation of the C-R conditions generally infeasible in computational
terms. Specifically, one cannot conclude whether a C-R is possible for a
given data set by using an algorithm that tries to find unobserved im-
plicit prices and decomposed input vectors that are consistent with the
conditions in Proposition 5.4: in general, no algorithm can exhaust all
possible values and combinations of these unobservables. Therefore, we
next institute necessity and sufficiency conditions that solely include
the ‘aggregate’ observed price and quantity information.
We first present the necessity condition. Before formulating that con-
dition, we define an output dominating reference set Ri for observation
i as
Ri = {jk ∈ S|∀k ∈ K,∃jk : yjkk ≥ yik}.
In words, each set Ri is constructed such that, for each output k, it
contains at least one observation jk ∈ Ri that dominates observation i
in that output k (yj
k
k ≥ yik). For each observation i,
Ri is the collection of output dominating reference sets Ri.
Example 5.5.We illustrate by means of three observations that are
taken from our own empirical application (see Section 5.4). It considers
a situation with three outputs (s = 3) and we have:
y1 = (
1
27
4
),y2 = (
1
27
2
) and y3 = (
0
13
5
).
Let us construct the output dominating reference sets for observation
1. Trivially, one such set is the singleton {1}. Evidently, this implies
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that the sets {1, 2}, {1, 3} and {1, 2, 3} equally satisfy the definition of
output dominating reference set for observation 1. [More generally, we
have that, if Ri1 ⊆ S is an output dominating reference set for observa-
tion i, then by construction any larger subset Ri2 (with R
i
1 ⊆ Ri2) is also
an output dominating reference set for the same observation.] In addi-
tion, given the output vectors of observations 2 and 3, a final output
dominating reference set is the pair {2, 3} (because y21 ≥ y11, y22 ≥ y12
and y33 ≥ y13). Hence, we obtain the collection of output dominating
reference sets
R1 = {{1}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}.
We can now define the nonparametric necessary condition for cost ef-
ficient production that solely includes aggregate price and quantity
information:
Proposition 5.6. For a production process characterized by production
externalities and joint input use, there is a family of closed, convex,
positive monotonous input requirement sets that provide a C-R of the
data only if for each i ∈ S : (pi)′xi ≤ min
Ri∈Ri
(pi)′(
∑
j∈Ri
xj).
This condition compares the cost level (pi)′xi for the evaluated firm
observation i to the cost level for each combination of observations
jk ∈ S with yjkk ≥ yik for each output k ∈ K. More specifically, the
condition states that the cost level of i should not exceed, under the
prices that apply to i, the cost level for the summed input vector
∑
j∈Ri
xj
associated with any set Ri ∈ Ri. Intuitively, if this condition were not
met, then observation i could have produced (at least) the same output
vector yi at a lower cost level by using the (sum) input
∑
j∈Ri
xj instead
of the chosen vector xi.
If an observation i does not meet the corresponding necessary condition
for cost efficient behavior, then it is useful to quantify the corresponding
deviation from the (necessary) efficiency condition. To do so, we use a
cost efficiency measure defined as the ratio of the minimum cost level
needed to obtain consistency with the necessity requirement over the
actual cost level:
ϕi =
min
Ri∈Ri
(pi)′(
∑
j∈Ri
xj)
(pi)′xi
.
128 Chapter 5: Collective approach to multi-output production
The corresponding necessary condition for a C-R of the data to be pos-
sible is that ϕi = 1 for each i ∈ S. The value captures the extent to
which costs should (minimally) be reduced in order to obtain consis-
tency of the observation i with the cost rationalization conditions. From
that perspective, the measure ϕi reveals for each individual firm obser-
vation the degree of consistency with the necessary C-R requirement in
Proposition 5.6, and may thus be interpreted as a goodness-of-fit mea-
sure for the cost efficiency condition under investigation. See Varian
(1990) and Fa¨re and Grosskopf (1995) for a detailed discussion of this
goodness-of-fit idea in a similar context of nonparametric production
analysis.
Example 5.7. To further illustrate, we recapture the situation in Ex-
ample 5.5. Specifically, we evaluate observation 1 and use the additional
information (again taken from our empirical application; see Section
5.4) that the three observations produce the three outputs by means of
two inputs (m = 2) with quantities and prices
x1 =
(
28.2
23
)
,x2 =
(
7.2
9.2
)
x3 =
(
10.2
8
)
and p1 =
(
1798.660
3129.605
)
.
On the one hand, we find that (p1)′x1 = 122933.115. On the other
hand, it can be verified that
min
R1∈R1
(p1)′(
∑
j∈R1
xj) = (p1)′(x2 + x3) = 85289.
Hence, (p1)′x1 > min
R1∈R1
p1)′(
∑
j∈R1
xj) and, thus, observation 1 does not
meet the necessary cost minimization condition in Proposition 5.6. The
corresponding cost efficiency measure ϕ1 = 85289122933.115 = 0.694 suggests
that, for the given output, observation 1 can reduce its cost level by (at
least) 30.6%. Obviously, ϕ1 < 1 a fortiori implies that a C-R of this
data set is impossible.
Proposition 5.6 institutes a condition on the observable price and quan-
tity information that should always be met by production processes
consistent with the C-R Definition 5.2. Still, meeting this condition
does not mean that there effectively exists a C-R of the production
data under consideration; i.e. the condition is necessary but not suffi-
cient for a C-R to be possible. A complementary sufficiency condition
is:
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Proposition 5.8. For a production process characterized by production
externalities and joint input use, there is a family of closed, convex, pos-
itive monotonous input requirement sets that provide a C-R of the data
if it is possible to construct a partitioning Sk (k ∈ K) with
⋃
k∈K
Sk = S
and Sk ∩ Sk∗ = ∅ (k, k∗ ∈ K, k 6= k∗) such that for i ∈ Sk :
(i) ∀j ∈ Sk : yjk ≥ yik ⇒ (pi)′xi ≤ (pi)′xj and
(ii) ∀j∗ ∈ Sk∗(k∗ 6= k) : yj
∗
k∗ > y
i
k∗ .
Intuitively, this condition considers the extreme scenario where each
firm observation i ∈ Sk allocates all inputs exclusively to the produc-
tion of a single output k. The first part of the closing cost minimization
condition then states that it should not be possible to produce (at least)
the associated output quantity yik at a lower cost when compared to
any (similarly specialized) production plan j with yjk ≥ yik. The second
part of the closing condition imposes that, under such exclusive allo-
cation (or specialization), the observation i should not dominate some
other observation j∗ in output k∗ if the latter observation effectively
specializes in producing k∗.8
Clearly, testing data consistency with the empirical requirements in
Propositions 5.6 and 5.8 is a finite process because, essentially, the car-
dinality of the set of observations j that dominate observation i in at
least one output k is finite in nature (i.e. {j ∈ S | ∃k ∈ K : yjk ≥ yik} is
finite in nature). Given this, the necessity and sufficiency tests may be
implemented by means of simple enumeration algorithms, which con-
secutively consider all possible specifications of the sets Ri for each
observation i (for the necessity requirement) and Sk for each output k
(for the sufficiency requirement). The next section provides an illustra-
tion for s = 3.
Note that these algorithms are, in comparison with the algorithms for
testing the collective consumption model in Chapter 3, are much less
computationally cumbersome. Indeed, in the production setting we ob-
serve the ordering information (i.e. the outputs yik), while in the con-
8 To avoid a conflict with the usual ‘no free lunch’ assumption, one may also in-
terpret the sufficiency condition in terms of quasi-exclusive input allocation (i.e.
the production of a single output consumes almost all inputs while a minimal
amount of input is allocated to each other output). [The proof in the Appendix
is easily accommodated.] More generally, it is worth stressing that, for data that
are consistent with the sufficiency condition, this may not be the only data ra-
tionalizing interpretation. The sole implication of the sufficiency result is that
(quasi-)exclusive input allocation always constitutes a possible interpretation.
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sumption setting we have to reconstruct this ordering information (i.e.
the revealed preferred relations Rm). As discussed in Chapter 3, it is
this reconstruction that could be time consuming.
Again as in Chapter 2 our empirical necessity and sufficiency require-
ments will in general not coincide; this discrepancy essentially reflects
the unobservability of the implicit prices and quantities in Proposition
5.4. The only instance in which both conditions are equivalent occurs
when there is a single output (i.e. s = 1). The intuition is straight-
forward: in that case, the implicit input prices and quantities are the
observed prices and quantities, and thus the necessity and sufficiency
conditions for a C-R of the data always coincide; or, from a different
perspective, the empirical implications of joint input use and produc-
tion externalities become irrelevant if there is only a single output.
In the general case (for s ≥ 2), violation of the necessary condition
in Proposition 5.6 means that a C-R of the data is impossible, while
consistency with the sufficient condition in Proposition 5.8 entails the
opposite conclusion. As for data that meet the necessity but not the
sufficiency condition, we cannot directly tell from the observable price
and quantity information whether a C-R of the data is effectively pos-
sible. In such cases, one may, for example, impose some additional prior
structure on the implicit input prices and quantities.
Still, even though the necessary condition should not generally coin-
cide with the sufficient condition, we (again) may expect the two con-
ditions to become equally powerful (or ‘converge’) when the sample
size increases. Specifically, for large T the probability increases that
for i ∈ S there exists k ∈ K such that ∀k∗ ∈ K, k∗ 6= k, we have
min
j∈S
{(pi)′xj | yjk∗ ≥ yik∗} gets closer to zero. In such a situation, the
difference diminishes between
min
Ri∈Ri
∑
j∈Ri
(pi)′xj and min
j∈S:yjk≥yik
(pi)′xj .
As a result, the requirement (pi)′xi ≤ min
Ri∈Ri
∑
j∈Ri(p
i)′xj in Proposi-
tion 5.6 will approach (pi)′xi ≤ (pi)′xj for j ∈ S such that yjk ≥ yik in
Proposition 5.8.9
9 As for this last formulation of the sufficiency condition in Proposition 5.8, we note
that the requirement (pi)′xi ≤ (pi)′xj for j ∈ Sk : yjk ≥ yik is equivalent with
(pi)′xi ≤ (pi)′xj for j ∈ S such that yjk ≥ yik under the stated condition that
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The associated ‘convergence rate’ depends (positively) upon the input
price-quantity variation in the data and, hence, we may expect it to
increase with the number of inputs. For a given number of inputs, the
speed of convergence will vary with the specific data generating process
that underlies the aggregate production data, which in turn depends on
the specific characteristics of the production process (see the function
f(x̂) and the weighting vector µi in (5.1)). But, in general, we can safely
argue that, for larger samples, the empirical implications of the fairly
rudimentary allocation process underlying the sufficient condition will
get closer to those of any more refined allocation process captured by
the necessary condition.
So far, we have assumed that prices pi for each firm observation i are
known. In many cases, such reliable price information is not available.10
Starting from Proposition 5.6, we may then formulate a necessary con-
dition for a C-R of the data, as follows:
Corollary 5.9. For a production process characterized by production
externalities and joint input use, there is a family of closed, convex,
positive monotonous input requirement sets that provide a C-R of the
data only if there exists a collection of price vectors {pi ∈ Rm+\{0} |
i ∈ S} such that
∀i ∈ S : (pi)′xi ≤ min
Ri∈Ri
(pi)′(
∑
j∈Ri
xj).
The interpretation of the condition is as follows: in the absence of fully
reliable price information, a necessary condition for data consistency
with the C-R conditions is that there exists, for each observation i, at
least one (non-zero) input price vector that implies consistency with
the condition in Proposition 5.6. From the perspective of the evalu-
ated production plan, such a price vector may be conceived as ‘most
favorable’ in that it effectively minimizes the cost inefficiency. In a
certain sense, such an implicit (most favorable) price vector may be in-
terpreted as a shadow price vector that supports cost efficient behavior
of the evaluated production vector.
min
j∈S
{(pi)′xj |yj∗k∗ > yik∗} = 0 for all k∗ ∈ K, k∗ 6= k. This follows from ∀i ∈ Sk :
(j∗ ∈ Sk∗ , k∗ 6= k ⇒ yj
∗
k∗ > y
i
k∗); see also our proof of Proposition 5.8.
10 See, e.g., Kuosmanen, Cherchye and Sipila¨inen (2005) for a discussion of instances
where reliable price information is not readily available. Our application in Section
5.4 contains a further example.
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Checking consistency with the necessary condition in Corollary 5.9 boils
down to solving the following linear programming problem for each
observation i:
Primal Dual
θi = max
u∈R,pi∈Rm+
u
s.t.
(pi)′xi = 1
u ≤ (pi)′( ∑
j∈Ri
xj) ∀Ri ∈ Ri
θi = min
φ∈R,λRi∈R+
φ
s.t.
φxi ≥ ∑
Ri∈Ri
λR
i
(
∑
j∈Ri
xj)∑
Ri∈Ri
λR
i
= 1
(5.2)
In the primal formulation of the problem, the price normalization
(pi)′xi = 1 effectively implements the condition pi ∈ Rm+\{0} in Corol-
lary 5.9. Recalling our above interpretation of the corollary, the model
checks whether, subject to the price normalization, there exists a set of
implicit shadow prices that make the firm observation i consistent with
the empirical cost minimization condition. Just like the measure ϕi that
we defined before, the measure θi captures the degree of (shadow) cost
efficiency of the observation i, and it can be interpreted as goodness-
of-fit measure. Clearly, we have θi ≥ ϕi and a necessary condition for
cost efficient production behavior is that θi = 1 for each observation i.
The dual problem in (5.2) computes (radial) Farrell (1957) efficiency
with respect to a monotone production technology with convexified
input sets; convexification is taken over the sets Ri. In fact, this primal-
dual formulation shows the close connection with the nonparametric
efficiency measurement literature known as Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA; after Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes, 1978). Specifically, the dual
problem in (5.2) is formally similar to Bogetoft’s (1996) DEA model
that computes Farrell efficiency with respect to a similar production
technology; the main difference is that we convexify over the summed
input vectors
∑
j∈Ri
xj , which results from our specific scope economies
perspective.11 Our above discussion institutes the model as a tool for
testing data consistency with (shadow) cost efficiency.
Example 5.10. To illustrate, we recapture Example 5.7, but now we
do not use the input price information. Again, we evaluate observa-
11 Hanoch and Rothschild (1972; Section 2) introduced a similar production tech-
nology representation as Bogetoft (1996) in a setting involving multiple inputs
and a single output.
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tion 1. For the given collection of output dominating reference sets Ri
(reported in Example 5.7), the problems in 5.2 take the form
Primal Dual
θ1 = max
u∈R,pi∈R2+
u
s.t.
(p1)′x1 = 1
u ≤ (p1)′(x1)
u ≤ (p1)′(x1 + x2)
u ≤ (p1)′(x1 + x3)
u ≤ (p1)′(x2 + x3)
u ≤ (p1)′(x1 + x2 + x3)
θ1 = min
φ∈R,λi,i=1,...,5
φ
s.t.
φx1 ≥ λ1(x1) + λ2(x1 + x2)
+λ3(x1 + x3) + λ4(x2 + x3)
+λ5(x1 + x2 + x3)
λ1 + λ2 + λ3 + λ4 + λ5 = 1
The outcome is θ1 = 0.748. This means that, even when using the
most favorable prices (in casu the computed shadow price vector (pi)′ =
(0.000 0.043) ), we can identify a potential cost reduction of (at least)
25.2% for the observation 1.12 The corresponding minimum cost level
is associated with the (sum) input vector (x2 + x3) or, for the dual
problem with λ4 = 1.
To conclude this illustration, we note that the specification of the set
Ri may be fine-tuned to enhance the efficiency of the empirical testing
of the condition. For example, we may exclude from consideration an
output dominating reference set Ri2 ∈ Ri if there exist another set Ri1 ∈
Ri such that Ri1 ⊆ Ri2 as, evidently, p′(
∑
j∈Ri2
xj) ≥ p′( ∑
j∈Ri1
xj) for any
input price vector p. For the specific data structure under investigation,
this means that we can effectively restrict attention to {{1}, {2, 3}} ⊂
R1 when evaluating observation 1. As a matter of fact, we have used
this insight for the computations of our own application presented in
the next section.
As a final note, we indicate that the computed shadow price vector pi
in 5.2 (and, correspondingly, the λR
i
in the dual problem) should in
12 The zero shadow price for the first input in this example is commonly referred
to as a ‘slack problem’ in the DEA literature (e.g., Cooper, Seiford and Tone,
2000). In this respect, we indicate that the problems in (5.2) may be enriched
by adding additional restrictions on the relative price that incorporate a priori
information regarding feasible/realistic ranges for the endogenously defined prices
(which can inter alia exclude zero shadow prices). In fact, such price restrictions
have received considerable attention in the DEA literature. For compactness, we
will not consider such restrictions in the following illustrative application.
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general not be unique: there may be multiple input price vectors that
support the same cost efficiency level. Therefore, we choose not to focus
on these shadow price estimates in our following empirical application.
5.4 Illustrative application
We apply the presented methodology for examining the behavior of
research programs in Economics and Business Management faculties of
Dutch universities. Specifically, we evaluate the efficiency of 77 research
programs organized at 8 universities. The same data set was studied
by Cherchye and Vanden Abeele (2005), who motivate efficiency as-
sessment within this setting by the argument that efficient research
production is not guaranteed by the usual market correction mecha-
nisms. These authors further claim that a cost efficiency evaluation
model is particularly appropriate within this application context. But
they focus on a different cost efficiency criterion, which does not ex-
plicitly incorporate the empirical implications of joint input use and
production externalities. Still, as we argued in the introduction, the
production process of university research seems well-suited to illustrate
our method for assessing cost efficiency under scope economies. [In fact,
this method implies a strengthened efficiency test as compared to that
used by Cherchye and Vanden Abeele; we return to this below.]
Generally, a research program can be defined as “a group of researchers
who join forces to investigate a particular theme, and in the process to
educate researchers and to publish research results”. Cherchye and Van-
den Abeele argue that this definition institutes research programs as
the natural production units for studying academic research efficiency.
Building on that definition, they suggest the following input-output
selection for characterizing the production of each program:
Inputs: (1) junior research staff (=PhD candidates), (2) senior re-
search staff (= other research personnel). Following Cherchye and Van-
den Abeele, we relate the output of each year to the sum of the inputs
used in that same year and the inputs used in the two preceding years;
this corrects for the fact that output in a particular year may actually
result (at least partly) from inputs that have been used in preceding
years.
Outputs: (1) total number of doctoral dissertations, (2) total number
of refereed articles in top international journals, and (3) total number
of refereed articles in international journals.
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The input and output data are taken from the ‘Quality Assessment
Reports on Research 1996-2000’, delivered by each Dutch university
in the context of the quinquennial assessment by the VSNU (i.e., the
Dutch association of universities). For each research program we have
complete data for the years 1998, 1999 and 2000. Pooling the three
cross-sections in the same sample, we have 229 observations in total.13
Cherchye and Vanden Abeele (2005) provide a detailed discussion about
the data and the input-output selection. At this point, two special fea-
tures of the input-output data deserve some additional explanation.
First, the input data account for differences in the allocation of faculty
time across different research programs. Specifically, they correct for
differences in time spent on teaching in different universities and/or
professional ranks (see in particular the discussion on p. 501 in Cher-
chye and Vanden Abeele). Second, outputs 2 and 3 count publications
at the level of the research programs, which effectively avoids dou-
ble counting publications that are co-authored by researchers of one
and the same research program. The particular specification of these
outputs (which includes top-journal publications in the output 2 as
well as the output 3), entails an implicit extra premium for the top-
journal publications. In other terms, it imposes the natural assumption
that these publications get a higher weight than other refereed publi-
cations in international journals. More specifically, it implies that one
input-output combination is a possible comparison partner for another
input-output combination only if it produces at least the same amount
of articles in international top journals (see the output 2) and, in addi-
tion, at least the same amount of articles in refereed journals in general
(including top journals; see the output 3). This effectively imposes that
a top publication can substitute for another (non-top) publication, but
not vice versa.14
13 Recall that the output in a given year is related to the sum of the inputs of
that year and those of the two preceding years. Given this, Cherchye and Vanden
Abeele use information on 79 research programs. Because of our specific focus on
efficiency differences between research programs within specific specialization ar-
eas, we restrict attention to the 77 research programs for which the specialization
type is known; this leaves 231 observations (= 77 programs x 3 years). From that
sample, we further exclude two cases with important missing information, which
eventually obtains 229 observations.
14 Cherchye and Vanden Abeele (2005, p. 501-502) illustrate by means of a simple
numerical example. In fact, while our data set implies a two-tiered classification
of international journal publications, the same procedure can be used for intro-
ducing a three-tiered classification (e.g. ‘top journals’, ‘very good journals’ and
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As a final note, we remark that the testing tools employed below re-
quire stricto sensu that the efficiency estimates are independently dis-
tributed. This assumption may be criticized as the input values for
the years 1998, 1999 and 2000, which are used for computing the ef-
ficiency values, are interdependent by construction for each research
program. In addition, and probably more importantly, efficiency values
are obtained from comparison with a production possibility set that
is constructed by means of a common set of reference units; i.e. the
observed set of research programs. From that perspective, our (illus-
trative) test results below should be considered as ‘indicative’ rather
than ‘conclusive’. Still, as for our test results based on the full sample
of 229 observations (see Table 5.1), we may refer to the consistency
results that have been established for nonparametric efficiency analysis
models similar to the one applied here, which suggest that this inter-
dependency problem diminishes for sufficiently large samples (see, e.g.,
Banker, 1993, and Simar and Wilson, 1998). In this context, it is also
worth referring to our discussion in the concluding section, on possible
solutions for the sampling problem of DEA analyses.
5.4.1 Overall differences between universities and
specialization types: observed prices
We focus on the necessity condition for cost efficient behavior under
economies of scope (see Proposition 5.6). This necessity condition seems
a natural starting point, since inconsistency with this condition implies
a fortiori that the sufficiency condition cannot be met. In this respect,
it is worth noting that the following results in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 imply
that, for each of our exercises, the necessity condition in Proposition 5.6
is nowhere met at the sample level, which implies redundancy of testing
the sufficiency condition in Proposition 5.8. Still, it is worth stressing
that, while we will not illustrate this, testing the sufficiency condition
is just as simple as testing the necessity condition; recall our discussion
in Section 5.3 on the possibility of using enumeration algorithms.
For an observation that does not meet the necessary condition for cost
efficient behavior, we quantify the degree of cost inefficiency by means
‘other journals’) or any other multi-tiered classification if that would seem rec-
ommendable. For the sake of compactness, we abstract from exploring this in
our (illustrative) application. Still, we believe that our main qualitative results
are fairly robust with respect to such additional journal classifications, which
basically imply a more refined output structure.
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of the measure ϕ that was introduced before. Apart from the observed
research output and input quantities, this cost efficiency measure also
needs input prices. For the different years that we consider, we take
the price/wage information from the salary tables that were applicable
to the Dutch universities at that time.15 One problem in this respect
is that salaries depend on the different types of staff (e.g., assistant
professor, associate professor, etc.) and seniority. The VSNU-data do
not allow us to determine the shares of the different types of research
staff that are engaged in a certain university or a research program.
Therefore, we assume that all junior researchers have the salary of
a third year teaching assistant, while senior researchers are assumed
to be of the associate professor level. Note that all price information
included in the analysis is in real terms; we constructed real wages
on the basis of the Eurostat harmonized consumer price index for the
Netherlands. Consistent with our construction of the input quantities
(i.e., the output of each year is related to the sum of the input in that
same year and the input in the two preceding years) we evaluate the
inputs by averaging real wages over the three input years associated
with each output year. This yields the following relative input prices
(i.e., the ratio of senior staff wage over junior staff wage): 1.745516 for
the year 1998, 1.745468 for the year 1999, and 1.745524 for the year
2000. At this point, we note that our above ‘simplifications of a complex
reality’ may lead critics to question the reliability of the prices that we
use. Therefore, referring to our earlier discussion of Corollary 5.9 (and
the corresponding linear programming problems in 5.2), we will also
use shadow prices in a further exercise, which effectively corrects for
potential ‘unreliability’ of the actual price information.
To begin, we focus on test results for (1) universities (i.e., the corre-
sponding faculties of Economics and Business Management) as a whole
and (2) specialization areas as a whole. Both exercises start from effi-
ciency results based upon comparison of each individual research pro-
gram (in the years 1998, 1999 and 2000) to the full set of 229 research
program observations.16 The first exercise then checks (significant) dif-
15 Dutch universities are subject to a collective agreement that settles working con-
ditions of university personnel. Since 2005, the same collective agreement applies
to both public universities and the so-called special universities. Before 2005,
there were differences in the agreement for both types of universities. However,
the salary settlements were always the same.
16 An alternative exercise could have considered a production setting with 30 out-
puts per university observations, i.e. 3 outputs for each of the 10 specialization
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ferences in mean efficiency between research programs associated with
different universities (while not correcting for different compositions in
terms of specialization areas across universities). The second exercise
similarly considers (significant) differences in mean efficiency between
research programs that are active in different specialization domains
(while not correcting for the identity of the organizing university).
Table 5.1 reports the efficiency results for the newly proposed method-
ology (in the column ‘scope economies’ cost efficiency). The table shows
mean efficiency values for the different universities and specialization
areas in the VSNU-data, respectively; for each (row) category of re-
search programs, the table additionally reports (in the column ‘p-
value’) the probability that the mean efficiency of research programs in
that category equals the mean efficiency over all other categories. Fo-
cusing on the upper panel of the table, it is clear that there are rather
important efficiency differences between the 8 universities. For example,
there is a difference of more than 30 percentage points between the two
extremes in the sample: Tilburg University obtains a mean efficiency
value of about 67.2%, while the University of Nijmegen obtains a mean
efficiency of only 35.6% in the period 1998-2000. [Remark, though, that
the efficiency value of the latter university is based upon a rather small
sample size.] Overall, the average efficiency level equals 52.1%. The top
three universities in terms of mean efficiency values are respectively
Tilburg University (67.2%), Wageningen University (63.3%) and the
Free University of Amsterdam (54.5%). Note, however, that only three
universities perform significantly differently from the average at the
10% significance level (see Column 5 of Table 5.1): Tilburg University
and Wageningen University perform significantly better than (the av-
erage of) the other universities, while the opposite conclusion applies
for the University of Maastricht.
The bottom panel of Table 5.1 gives the mean efficiency values for the
different specialization areas in the sample. Like before, there is con-
siderable efficiency variation over the different specialization areas. In
the period 1998-2000, the highest mean efficiency value (of 68.6%) is
areas. However, such a large number of outputs would make the efficiency assess-
ment exercise particularly vulnerable to the so-called ‘curse of dimensionality’ of
nonparametric models, which in this instance would mean a severe upward bias
of the efficiency estimates (because we would retain a setting with only 8 univer-
sity observations for as much as 30 outputs). Therefore, in this study we choose
to focus on research programs as production units, and to compute university
efficiencies by averaging over the corresponding research programs.
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obtained in the field of Spatial and Environmental Economics, which is
closely followed by Econometrics (mean efficiency of 66.1%) and The-
oretical and Applied Microeconomics (64.8%). The least efficient areas
are Applied Labor Economics and Economics of Public Policy (both
areas have a mean efficiency value of 35.3%). Five specialization areas
performed significantly differently from the mean at the 10% signif-
icance level: Econometrics, Theoretical and Applied Microeconomics,
and Spatial and Environmental Economics do significantly better than
the rest, while research programs in Applied Labor Economics and
Economics of Public Policy do significantly worse.
Based on these results, we may conclude that the average performance
of universities may largely be driven by different configurations in terms
of specialization domains. Indeed, one interpretation of systematic effi-
ciency differences between research programs that are active in differ-
ent specialization fields is that alternative specializations entail other
research production technologies. To correct for this potential bias in
our inter-university comparisons, our following exercises focus on sys-
tematic differences between universities per specialization type.17 In
addition, accounting for possible flaws in our construction of the input
prices/wages, we will analyze these differences by using shadow prices.
Before doing so, we briefly compare our results to those obtained on the
basis of a standard cost efficiency measure such as that used by Cher-
chye and Vanden Abeele (2005; see in particular p. 497-499), which
does not incorporate the implications of joint input use and input ex-
ternalities. For each observation i, this measure is defined as
ωi =
min
j∈Di
(pi)′xj
(pi)′xi
with Di = {j ∈ S | yj ≥ yi}.
Referring to our discussion in Section 5.3, we have that Di ⊆ Ri and
ωi ≥ ϕi. Thus, our newly proposed method entails a strengthened
efficiency analysis.18 To interpret this last result in terms of our un-
derlying model of multi-output production, recall from the definition
17 Cook et al. (1998) provide a general discussion of issues related to DEA efficiency
evaluation when the sample can be subdivided into groups. We note that the
procedures they present for dealing with grouped samples in the DEA evaluation
could also be used in combination with the methodological tools presented in this
chapter.
18 For completeness, we add that Cherchye and Vanden Abeele use shadow prices
in their empirical cost efficiency assessment, while the results in Table 5.1 are
based on actual price information. We choose to include the cost efficiency results
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in Section 5.3 that every output dominating reference set Ri in Ri
contains a combination of observations jk that each dominate the eval-
uated observation i in at least one output k. The use of the sets reflects
that combinations of the input vectors jk (in Ri), each producing more
of the (individual) outputs k than the evaluated input vector i, can
also produce the (multi-output) combination yi. As such, our necessity
condition for cost efficient behavior under economies of scope naturally
complies with the common intuition that such scope economies imply
that the cost of the multi-output production should not exceed the sum
of the costs associated with the separate production of the individual
outputs. It is essentially this feature, which clearly exploits the mul-
tiple output production following from scope economies, that entails
the strengthened analysis. For example, the standard cost efficiency
measure does not consider combined input vectors: the set Di (only)
contains observations j that dominate observation i in all outputs si-
multaneously.
Table 5.1 reports the results for the measure ωi in the column ‘stan-
dard’ cost efficiency. Generally, we find that the pattern of the efficiency
distribution in that column is similar to that in the column ‘scope
economies’ cost efficiency. For example, we again find that Tilburg Uni-
versity and Wageningen University performed better than the average
of the other universities in the period 1998-2000; and we equally ob-
tain that Dutch universities have a comparative advantage in the areas
of Spatial and Environmental Economics, Econometrics and Theoret-
ical and Applied Microeconomics. Still, an important observation is
that the mean efficiency values obtained by using the newly proposed
(scope economies) method are generally lower than those obtained by
the standard method. This confirms that an explicit consideration of
the features that are specific to multi-output production effectively ob-
tains a more stringent efficiency analysis. In fact, putting an additional
a priori structure on the decomposed input vectors or implicit price
vectors, which includes specific information regarding the nature of the
scope economies (in terms of production externalities and/or jointly
used inputs), may entail an even stronger analysis.
based on actual price information, as this enhances the comparison with the
results in the column ‘scope economies’ cost efficiency. Still, the main qualitative
conclusions of the shadow price assessment are similar to those obtained on the
basis of actual prices.
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Table 5.1. Differences between universities and specialization types
‘scope economies’ ‘standard’
cost efficiency cost efficiency
numb. m.e. st. d. p-value m.e st. d.
University
Erasmus University 59 0.528 0.303 0.831 0.562 0.320
of Rotterdam
Tilburg University 27 0.672 0.273 0.004 0.741 0.282
University of Nijmegen 6 0.356 0.173 0.156 0.423 0.252
University of Groningen 18 0.437 0.213 0.197 0.537 0.275
University of Maastricht 27 0.417 0.214 0.046 0.469 0.283
University of Amsterdam 35 0.454 0.284 0.136 0.466 0.294
Free University 36 0.545 0.324 0.597 0.566 0.331
of Amsterdam
Wageningen University 21 0.633 0.282 0.063 0.622 0.300
Overall 229 0.521 0.289 0.562 0.311
Specialization area
Accounting and Finance 36 0.467 0.280 0.224 0.513 0.309
Applied Mathematics 18 0.514 0.284 0.917 0.529 0.299
Development, Growth and 15 0.485 0.279 0.611 0.548 0.317
Transition Econometrics 15 0.661 0.214 0.053 0.733 0.229
Applied Labor Economics 13 0.353 0.155 0.030 0.384 0.205
Marketing and 66 0.493 0.291 0.345 0.539 0.315
Business Economics
Macroeconomics, Money 18 0.547 0.279 0.693 0.591 0.299
and International Issues
Theoretical and 21 0.648 0.286 0.034 0.692 0.310
Applied Microeconomics
Economics of Public Policy 9 0.353 0.219 0.075 0.354 0.218
Spatial and 18 0.686 0.352 0.011 0.696 0.358
Environmental Economics
Overall 229 0.521 0.289 0.562 0.311
Notes: The column p-value reports the (two-sided) probability value for the hypoth-
esis that the mean efficiency of the row categories equals the mean efficiency over all
other categories; m.e. stands for mean efficiency and st.d. for standard deviation.
5.4.2 Differences between universities per specialization
type: shadow prices
We next decompose the aggregate performance of each specialization
area. More specifically, we evaluate each research program by com-
paring it to all other research programs that are active in the same
specialization domain (while -to recall- the results in Table 5.1 follow
from comparison to the set of all research programs independent of their
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specialization type). Per specialization area, we subsequently calculate
the mean efficiency value of each university. This allows us to identify
the research domains in which a given university has a comparative
advantage as compared to the other universities. This section reports
the results of such an exercise when using shadow prices for evaluating
the different inputs.19 That is, for each observation i we concentrate
on the cost efficiency measure θi introduced in Section 5.3.
We allow different shadow prices for different research programs. In do-
ing so, we effectively account for possible salary differences over univer-
sities and specialization areas.20 Of course, this use of program-specific
shadow prices does not account for possible differences in salaries
among researchers within one and the same research program; such
differences may e.g. follow from different levels of experience, quali-
fications or productivity. For the current application, it is impossible
to account for such differences because we lack the necessary informa-
tion regarding the composition of the input (= research staff) cate-
gories. From that perspective, differences in program-specific shadow
prices capture differences in ‘average’ salaries between research pro-
grams (thus reflecting e.g. differences in average experience, qualifica-
tions and productivity). At this point, it is also worth recalling the
non-uniqueness of the shadow prices computed by means of the linear
program in (5.2), whence our following discussion does not focus on
the computed shadow prices.
Table 5.2 tabulates the mean efficiency values of Dutch universities per
specialization area. The best performing universities per type of spe-
cialization are the following: University of Groningen (Accounting and
Finance), Tilburg University (Applied Mathematics; Marketing and
Business Economics; Theoretical and Applied Microeconomics), Wa-
geningen University (Development, Growth and Transition), Erasmus
University (Econometrics and Applied Labor Economics), University
of Maastricht (Econometrics, Applied Labor Economics), Free Univer-
sity of Amsterdam (Applied Labor Economics; Spatial and Environ-
mental Economics), University of Amsterdam (Econometrics; Macroe-
19 We have also conducted similar exercises on the basis of the same (potentially un-
reliable) price information as before. Generally, this yielded the same qualitative
conclusions as for the results in Table 5.2.
20 Uniform shadow prices across (subgroups of) research programs may be imposed
by using the methodological tools that Kuosmanen, Cherchye and Sipila¨inen
(2006) proposed in a DEA context; these tools are readily adapted to the current
set-up.
5.4. Illustrative application 143
conomics, Money and International Issues; Economics of Public Pol-
icy). In fact, despite the relatively small samples for each specializa-
tion domain (ranging from 9 observations to 66 observations), we do
find significant efficiency differences for almost all specialization areas
(when using the 10% significance level; see the p-values in column 5
of Table 5.2). More specifically, we can identify (at the 10% signifi-
cance level) universities that do significantly better than the rest (in
the fields Marketing and Business Economics; Spatial and Environmen-
tal Economics) and, even more importantly, universities that perform
systematically worse than other institutes (in the fields Accounting and
Finance; Applied Mathematics; Development, Growth and Transition;
Marketing and Business Economics; Theoretical and Applied Microe-
conomics; Spatial and Environmental Economics). This indicates that
the presented method may obtain robust conclusions even in the case
of small samples, when putting minimalistic a priori structure on the
multi-output production process and using ‘most favorable’ shadow
prices for evaluating the different research programs. In this specific
application setting, such information may be particularly instrumen-
tal for robustly benchmarking the bad performing universities: these
institutes may learn from other universities which, within the given
specialization area, significantly outperform them.
Next, the above list seems to indicate that most universities have a
comparative advantage in at least one specialization area. To some ex-
tent, these results are in ‘contrast’ with the information provided by
Table 5.1. Universities that perform well overall (see Table 5.1) may
perform relatively badly in some specialization domains, and univer-
sities that perform relatively badly overall may perform well in some
specialization areas. For example, Tilburg University, which had the
highest mean efficiency value in Table 5.1, only performs best in the
areas of Applied Mathematics, Marketing and Business Economics and
Theoretical and Applied Microeconomics. And Wageningen University,
which obtained the second highest overall performance value, only ex-
cels in the area of Development, Growth and Transition. This indicates
that top universities have some ‘core’ businesses, in which they reach
a generally high performance level. Finally, and not surprisingly, uni-
versities that generally perform well do not do (significantly) badly in
any of the specialization areas that we consider.
In addition, these results seem to confirm our earlier conjecture that
one should take into account technology differences between special-
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ization areas in efficiency analyses, which is in contrast with the more
naive (but, apparently, rather widespread) view that one may directly
compare the performance of research programs that are active in very
different specialization areas within the general Economics profession.
In fact, disaggregating over specialization domains seems a necessity
when assessing the research efficiency of universities: examining aggre-
gate faculty figures, which is conventional practice, does not always
provide useful insights in terms of the aim of increasing a university’s
performance. Quite the contrary: disaggregated figures allow us to sit-
uate the comparative advantage of different institutes, which, in turn,
can lead to further performance improvements through specialization-
specific research policies. As such, this conclusion provides further sup-
port for Cherchye and Vanden Abeele’s (2005) motivation to focus on
micro-units of research production, such as research programs, rather
than on macro-units, such as university faculties. From that perspec-
tive, the results in Table 5.2 provide useful complementary informa-
tion to the results of Cherchye and Vanden Abeele (discussed in the
previous section), by specifically considering efficiency differences be-
tween universities within one and the same specialization domain. As
we indicated above, such results may be useful, for example, from a
benchmarking perspective.
5.4. Illustrative application 145
Table 5.2. Differences between universities per specialization type; efficiency dif-
ferences based on shadow prices
numb. mean eff. st. dev. p-value
Accounting and Finance
Erasmus University of Rotterdam 6 0.826 0.357 0.481
Tilburg University 6 0.831 0.171 0.457
University of Groningen 3 1.000 0.000 0.146
University of Maastricht 6 0.722 0.309 0.886
University of Amsterdam 9 0.576 0.365 0.078
Free University of Amsterdam 6 0.696 0.385 0.720
Overall 36 0.740 0.322
Applied Mathematics
Erasmus University of Rotterdam 9 0.787 0.300 0.080
Tilburg University 3 1.000 0.000 0.344
University of Amsterdam 3 0.970 0.052 0.482
Free University of Amsterdam 3 0.959 0.071 0.541
Overall 18 0.881 0.230
Development, Growth
and Transition
University of Groningen 3 0.999 0.001 0.293
University of Maastricht 3 0.348 0.070 0.000
Free University of Amsterdam 6 0.950 0.088 0.249
Wageningen University 3 1.000 0.000 0.291
Overall 15 0.849 0.267
Econometrics
Erasmus University of Rotterdam 3 1.000 0.000 0.460
Tilburg University 3 0.958 0.073 0.117
University of Maastricht 3 1.000 0.000 0.460
University of Amsterdam 3 1.000 0.000 0.460
Free University of Amsterdam 3 0.973 0.028 0.481
Overall 15 0.986 0.035
Applied Labor Economics
Erasmus University of Rotterdam 2 1.000 0.000 0.689
University of Maastricht 3 1.000 0.000 0.606
University of Amsterdam 5 0.982 0.040 0.220
Free University of Amsterdam 3 1.000 0.000 0.606
Overall 13 0.993 0.025
Macroeconomics, Money
and International Issues
Erasmus University of Rotterdam 6 0.942 0.102 0.188
Tilburg University 3 0.998 0.004 0.442
University of Nijmegen 3 0.995 0.009 0.498
University of Maastricht 3 0.948 0.051 0.521
University of Amsterdam 3 1.000 0.000 0.405
Overall 18 0.971 0.064
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numb. mean eff. st. dev. p-value
Marketing and
Business Economics
Erasmus University of Rotterdam 18 0.766 0.238 0.483
Tilburg University 9 0.905 0.158 0.033
University of Nijmegen 3 0.544 0.228 0.228
University of Groningen 12 0.589 0.271 0.047
University of Maastricht 9 0.713 0.268 0.857
University of Amsterdam 3 0.474 0.124 0.095
Free University of Amsterdam 6 0.715 0.390 0.904
Wageningen University 6 0.881 0.243 0.145
Overall 66 0.728 0.269
Theoretical and
Applied Microeconomics
Erasmus University of Rotterdam 6 0.808 0.298 0.612
Tilburg University 3 1.000 0.000 0.199
University of Amsterdam 3 0.607 0.198 0.036
Free University of Amsterdam 3 0.966 0.059 0.324
Wageningen University 6 0.872 0.159 0.755
Overall 21 0.848 0.219
Economics of Public Policy
Erasmus University of Rotterdam 6 0.948 0.124 0.506
University of Amsterdam 3 1.000 0.000 0.506
Overall 9 0.965 0.102
Spatial and
Environmental Economics
Erasmus University of Rotterdam 3 0.401 0.213 0.000
University of Amsterdam 3 0.928 0.125 0.609
Free University of Amsterdam 6 1.000 0.000 0.087
Wageningen University 6 0.907 0.185 0.566
Overall 18 0.857 0.251
Notes: The column p-value reports, for each specialization type, the (two-sided)
probability value for the hypothesis that the mean efficiency of the row categories
equals the mean efficiency over all other categories.
5.5 Summary and concluding remarks
We have presented a nonparametric methodology for analyzing the cost
efficiency of firms that produce multiple outputs. Our starting point
is that such multi-output production basically refers to economies of
scope in the production process, which in turn refers to joint input use
and input externalities. Given this, we have instituted a nonparamet-
ric characterization of efficient behavior under these general conditions,
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and subsequently derived necessary and sufficient empirical conditions
for data consistency with the cost efficiency requirement. Importantly,
these conditions only include observed firm demand and supply data;
this means that inputs are not to be disaggregated in terms of the
specific channels through which they can be allocated (i.e., to a spe-
cific output or to joint use for the production of different outputs).
Essentially, we have designed cost efficiency conditions that exploit the
implications of scope economies (through joint input use and input
externalities) at the level of the observable aggregate prices and quan-
tities. In addition, we have relaxed the assumption that input prices
are observed, to come up with (linear programming) efficiency tests
that utilize (implicit) shadow prices. Inter alia, this provides a direct
link with the nonparametric efficiency assessment literature known as
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).
We have illustrated our methodology by examining the cost efficient
behavior of research programs in Economics and Business Manage-
ment faculties of Dutch universities. This application shows that the
proposed methodology is easy to implement in practice, even for fairly
large data sets (e.g., our application involved 229 observations). In
fact, we recall from our discussion in Section 5.4 that exploiting scope
economies entails a strengthened cost efficiency analysis as compared
to more conventionally used alternatives, such as in Cherchye and Van-
den Abeele (2005). As we explain below, the efficiency evaluation can
be strengthened even further by putting additional structure on the
decomposed input vectors and implicit price vectors.
In addition, our application demonstrates the practical usefulness of
the method for obtaining robust conclusions regarding cost efficiency
differences between universities within specific specialization areas, also
when using shadow prices to evaluate the different inputs. As we have
indicated, in our specific application set-up such insights may be par-
ticularly useful for benchmarking purposes.
A general qualitative conclusion of our results is that they seem to sup-
port the necessity of accounting for technological differences between
specialization domains (within the general Economics profession) when
analyzing research performance. Given this, we have analyzed perfor-
mance differences between universities at the level of individual special-
ization areas. We found that universities indeed seem to specialize in
only a few research domains: while universities that perform best over-
all generally perform well in all the domains in which they are active,
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universities that are generally less efficient can also perform very well
in certain areas of specialization. The fact that many of these findings
turned out to be statistically significant illustrates that our method
can obtain robust conclusions while imposing a minimalistic a priori
structure on the actual (but unknown) production process (even in the
cases where we could only use small (specialization-specific) data sets).
At this point, it is worth stressing the limitations of our empirical anal-
ysis, which mainly served to illustrate the proposed methodology. Most
importantly, we did not explicitly account for errors-in-variables and
small sample bias. Still, we want to indicate that (i) we have used an
input-output configuration that largely coincides with that considered
by the VSNU in their quinquennial assessment based on the same data,
and (ii) the data, which were reported by the universities themselves
in extensive self-assessments, are relatively well standardized and have
been subjected to some scrutiny for correctness and consistency, which
gives us reasonable confidence in their quality. But in order to draw ab-
solute conclusions from our exercises, it seems recommendable to utilize
methodological tools that satisfactorily deal with errors-in-variables.
See, for example, Grosskopf (1996) for a survey of tools that are cur-
rently available in the nonparametric literature, and Cazals, Florens
and Simar (2002) for a more recent proposal; these tools (that were
originally proposed in a DEA context) may easily be accommodated
to the newly proposed cost efficiency assessment methodology. Next,
the sampling problem may apply in particular to our specialization-
specific exercises, which are often based on a fairly limited number of
observations. To obtain more robust results in such cases, one may for
example use the bootstrap procedure proposed (again, in a DEA con-
text) by Simar and Wilson (1998), which is also readily adapted to the
presented efficiency evaluation tools.
Three concluding remarks are in order. First, to keep the discussion
focussed, we have concentrated on consistency testing and the asso-
ciated efficiency measurement. Still, Varian (1984) emphasized alter-
native uses of the nonparametric approach in addition to testing for
optimizing firm behavior, namely recovering the production set and
forecasting firm behavior under new price conditions. It is worth em-
phasizing that such recoverability and forecasting questions may also
be addressed when starting from the specific (scope economies-based)
condition for cost efficiency that has been forwarded in this study; the
methodological extensions develop along directly analogous lines as in
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Varian (1984). The goodness-of-fit and subset rationalization concepts
of, respectively, Varian (1990) and Banker and Maindiratta (1988) al-
low for addressing such questions while accounting for observed ineffi-
ciencies.
Another remark pertains to the shadow price efficiency measurement
problem in (5.2), which is applicable when reliable price information
is not available. Such a shadow price analysis can be strengthened by
imposing price information in the form of additional constraints that
define a feasible range for the relative prices, which may rule out the
extreme cases where the relative price of a commodity approaches zero
or infinity. The technical questions related to incorporating such price
restrictions have been discussed extensively in a DEA context, most
commonly under the label ‘weight restrictions’ or ‘assurance regions’
(see, e.g., Allen et al., 1997; Pedraja-Chaparro et al., 1997, for surveys;
and Kuosmanen et Cherchye and Sipila¨inen, 2006, for more recent de-
velopments). These tools may be adapted to the current set-up.
Finally, from a related perspective, putting an additional a priori
structure on the implicit input prices and quantities will obviously
strengthen the cost efficiency analysis of the multi-output production
process at hand. Extra structure on the decomposed quantities may,
for example, reflect additional information (or assumptions) regarding
the presence of jointly used inputs, or regarding (shares of) inputs that
are specifically used for the production of particular outputs; similarly,
additional structure on the implicit prices may reflect some a priori
position regarding the presence of externalities in the production of
certain outputs. Generally, such extra price-quantity conditions will en-
tail refinements of the general model presented in Section 5.2 which in
turn will lead to more stringent necessary and sufficient cost efficiency
conditions in terms of observables (see Section 5.3). These conditions
may be obtained along similar lines as in the proofs of Propositions 5.6
and 5.8.
In this respect, it is also interesting to compare our approach with
Activity Based Costing (ABC) (e.g., Cooper and Kaplan, 1988; Chris-
tensen and Demski, 1995, elaborate on the relationship between ABC
and the classical theory of cost). Essentially, ABC uses information
regarding the input costs (= prices * quantities) that are (through so-
called ‘cost drivers’) allocated to individual outputs. By contrast, our
approach does not require such information, but starts from a separate
allocation of input quantities (resulting in decomposed input vectors)
150 Chapter 5: Collective approach to multi-output production
and input prices (resulting in implicit price vectors) to different out-
puts. From this perspective, ABC can be considered complementary to
our approach: the input cost information used in ABC can be useful for
putting a priori restrictions on the feasible combinations of decomposed
input vectors and implicit price vectors.
In summary, the approach to modeling multi-output production pre-
sented here provides a general framework for a wide spectrum of pro-
duction models that incorporate input externalities and joint input use.
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Proof of Proposition 5.4
(i; necessity) Each bundle (x̂i)′ = ((xi1)′ · · · (xis)′ (xis+1)′ )′ solves the
following problem for given priority weight vector µi :21
max
xi1,...,x
i
s+1
∑
k∈K
µikfk(x
i
1, . . . ,x
i
s+1) s.t.(p
i)′(xi1 + · · ·+ xis+1) ≤ (pi)′xi.
Given concavity, the output-specific production functions are subdif-
ferentiable, which carries over to their weighted sum
∑
k∈K
µik fk. An
optimal solution to the above maximization problem should therefore
satisfy (for l = 1, . . . , s+ 1)∑
k∈K
µikf
xl
k ≤ ηipi,
for ηi the Lagrange multiplier associated with the cost constraint, and
fx
l
k a subgradient of the production function fk defined for the vector
xl and evaluated at ( (xi1)
′ · · · (xis)′ (xis+1)′ )′. Letting pik,l =
µikf
xl
k
ηi
and
λik =
ηi
µik
thus gives (for l = 1, . . . , s+ 1)
fx
l
k ≤ λikpik,l. (5.3)
Next, concavity of the functions fk implies for all k ∈ K
fk(x
j
1, . . . ,x
j
s+1)− fk(xi1, . . . ,xis+1) ≤
s+1∑
l=1
(fx
l
k )
′(xlj − xli). (5.4)
Substituting (5.3) in (5.4) and setting yik = fk(x
i
1, . . .,x
i
s+1) obtains
yjk − yik ≤ λik
s+1∑
l=1
(pik,l)
′(xjl − xil), (5.5)
21 To be exact, we have that fk is quasi-concave rather than concave. For com-
pactness, however, we consider fk concave in the following proof. Indeed, under
mild regularity conditions and strict convexity of the upper-level sets (which fol-
lows from pi ∈ Rm++ in our case), for any quasi-concave function there exists a
positive monotone transformation that obtains a concave representative. Such a
monotone transformation is harmless in view of the equivalence between (5.6)
and (5.5), which applies for any monotonous transformation of fk.
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which is equivalent to
yjk ≥ yik ⇒
s+1∑
l=1
(pik,l)
′xjl ≥
s+1∑
l=1
(pik,l)
′xil. (5.6)
(ii; sufficiency) Recalling the equivalence between (5.6) and (5.5), we
first define for (k = 1, . . . s)
fk(x1, . . . ,xs+1) = min
i∈S
[yik + λ
i
k
s+1∑
l=1
(pik,l)
′(xl − xil)] (5.7)
Varian (1984, Theorem 2) proves that fk(x1, . . . ,xs+1) = yik. Next,
given µi ∈ Rs+, we have for all x̂i such that (pi)′(x1 + · · · + xs+1) ≤
(pi)′xi
∑
k∈K
µik fk(x1, . . . ,xs+1) ≤
∑
k∈K
µik [y
i
k + λ
i
k
s+1∑
l=1
(pik,l)
′(xl − xil)].
Without losing generality, we concentrate on µik = (λ
i
1/λ
i
k), which ob-
tains
∑
k∈K
µik fk(x1, . . . ,xs+1) ≤
∑
k∈K
µiky
i
k + λ
i
1[(p
i)′(
s+1∑
l=1
(xl − xil))].
Since (pi)′(x1 + · · ·+ xs+1) ≤ (pi)′xi, we thus have∑
k∈K
µik fk(x1, . . . ,xs+1) ≤
∑
k∈K
µik y
i
k =
∑
k∈K
µik fk(x
i
1, . . . ,x
i
s+1),
which proves that x̂i maximizes
∑
k∈K
µik fk(x1, . . . ,xs+1) subject to
(pi)′(x1 + · · · + xs+1) ≤ (pi)′xi. We conclude that the functions
fk(x1, . . . ,xs+1)(k ∈ K) in (5.7) provide a C-R of the data. These
functions are concave, monotonously increasing and continuous (see
Varian, 1984, Theorem 2). The corresponding input requirement sets
are closed, convex and positive monotonous. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 5.6
For any set Ri with ∀k ∈ K,∃jk ∈ Ri : yjkk ≥ yik consistency with the
C-R conditions in Proposition 5.4 requires for all k
yj
k
k ≥ yik ⇒
s+1∑
l=1
(pik,l)
′xj
k
l ≥
s+1∑
l=1
(pik,l)
′xil
and thus ∑
k∈K
(
s+1∑
l=1
(pik,l)
′xj
k
l ) ≥
∑
k∈K
(
s+1∑
l=1
(pik,l)
′xil).
The result then follows from the fact that∑
jk∈Ri
(pi)′xj
k ≥
∑
k∈K
(
s+1∑
l=1
(pik,l)
′xj
k
l )
and
∑
k∈K
(
s+1∑
l=1
(pik,l)
′xil) = (p
i)′xi. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5.8
Suppose that a construction Sk, k ∈ K, consistent with the sufficiency
condition in Proposition 5.8 exists. Given this, we can construct a con-
figuration of unobservable, decomposed input vectors and implicit price
vectors that meet the C-R conditions in Proposition 5.4. Specifically,
we use
for i ∈ S : pik,k∗ = pi for k = k∗, pik,k∗ = 0 for k 6= k∗; and
for i ∈ Sk : xik = xi.
We obtain the sufficiency result in two steps. First, for i ∈ Sk we have
for any j ∈ S : if yjk ≥ yik then j ∈ Sk. (Indeed, j ∈ Sk∗ , k∗ 6= k would
require yjk < y
i
k, which is not the case.) Given this, we can distinguish
two cases for each i, j ∈ S with yjk ≥ yik. If i ∈ Sk then j ∈ Sk (see
before) and consequently (pi)′xi =
s+1∑
l=1
(pik,l)
′xil ≤
s+1∑
l=1
pik,lx
j
l = (p
i)′xj
by construction. Alternatively, if i /∈ Sk we have
s+1∑
l=1
(pik,l)
′xil = 0 and
the condition 0 =
s+1∑
l=1
pik,lx
i
l ≤
s+1∑
l=1
pik,lx
i
l is always satisfied. Q.E.D.

General conclusion
The main objective of this dissertation was to develop and apply non-
parametric tests of general collective choice behavior for both consump-
tion and production settings.
In Chapter 2, we generalized the work of Chiappori (1988, 1992) by
providing a nonparametric characterization of the general consumption
model of Browning and Chiappori (1998), which includes public con-
sumption and (positive) externalities. Starting from (only) aggregate
household data, this characterization led to testable collective rational-
ity conditions which have a structure similar to the GARP conditions,
which, to recall, form the basis for nonparametric tests of individual
rationality.
Our general model encompasses a large variety of alternative behavioral
models as special cases; these cases mostly boil down to restrictions on
the feasible personalized quantities and prices. Besides considering tests
of the general collective model, we also investigated such special models
in our empirical applications in Chapters 3 and 4.
In our real-life application in Chapter 3 we started by describing an ef-
ficient algorithm for our necessity condition (Proposition 2.7). We used
this algorithm for analyzing the (necessity constraints for) collective
rationality of couples that were drawn from the Russia Longitudinal
Monitoring Survey. In this way we obtained a first empirical applica-
tion of nonparametric tests of the general collective model.
Since all couples passed our necessity test, we then developed a non-
parametric framework for restricting the collective model by constraints
on the sharing rule. To recall, the sharing rule defines the within house-
hold distribution of the household means. In our application we ob-
tained that a multitude of collective consumption models were able to
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describe the collective behavior. On the other hand, the unitary model,
which can be seen as limiting case of our restricted collective models,
was not able to rationalize the observed behavior.
We ended the chapter by introducing two power measurements from
which we concluded that the (general) collective rationality tests are
(rather) powerful at the sample level but have less bite on the household
level. While the first power is useful in tests that compare the adequacy
of several behavioral models (e.g. unitary versus collective model), the
second power reflects how good we will be able to tackle recovery and
forecasting issues. Indeed, a low power at the household level, will gen-
erally imply imprecise recovery and forecasting results. However, as we
will discuss below, there are several avenues to significantly increase
the power at the household level.
A first example is given in Chapter 4 where we considered another
class of restricted collective models by focusing on the ‘egoistic model’
(i.e. dyads consisting of egoistic individuals and excluding public con-
sumption). As we showed in our empirical application, the parsimo-
nious nature of this model allows for a more powerful analysis. The
test results concerning the choice behavior of dyads in our simple con-
sumption setting, provided strong support for this restricted model.
For those dyads that did not pass the test, we showed consistency with
our general model; as such we provided an interpretation in terms of
externalities and/or public consumption.
An important feature of this second application is that it uses labora-
tory data which allows us to avoid usual data problems. Moreover this
setting enables us to obtain information on the individual consumption
quantities. Again this resulted in an increased power of our tests.
Our empirical application in Chapter 4 is a first example of a nonpara-
metric test of collective rationality on experimental data. As such our
study complements the existing nonparametric-experimental literature
that focuses on individual rationality (see, e.g., Sippel, 1997, Harbaugh,
Krause and Berry, 2001, Andreoni and Miller 2002). We believe that
nonparametric consumption analysis of experimental data can be very
useful for gaining insight in the mechanics of the intrahousehold de-
cision process (or more generally, in the mechanics of group decision
making).
In the Chapters 2 to 4 we focused on consumption behavior, while in
the final Chapter 5 we analyzed choice behavior in a production setting.
More precisely, we presented a nonparametric methodology for analyz-
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ing the cost efficiency of firms that benefit from economies of scope.
Our starting point is that such multi-output production refers to joint
input use and input externalities. Given this, we exploited the concep-
tual analogy with the collective consumption model in Chapter 2 to
develop a nonparametric characterization of cost minimizing behavior
of multi-output firms. This resulted in operational necessity and suffi-
ciency tests that are solely based on observed aggregate demand and
supply data. In addition, we also relaxed the assumption of observed
input prices and introduced shadow prices in our efficiency tests. As
such we directly linked our tests to the nonparametric efficiency as-
sessment literature known as Data Envelopment Analysis. Finally, we
also used our tests to analyze the cost efficient behavior of research
programs in Economics and Business Management faculties of Dutch
universities. In our empirical application we obtained robust results
and showed that our approach entailed a strengthened cost efficiency
analysis.
The above summary of our dissertation makes clear that we focused
on developing and applying nonparametric tests of collective choice
behavior. These results will allow us to address welfare related questions
concerning the intrahousehold (or more general intragroup) allocation
process (see Chapter 1 for motivating example questions). However, as
argued before, the characterization of the observed household behavior
is only a first step in answering these questions. In our future work,
we can now focus on the second complementary step: recovery of the
decision structure underlying the observed household behavior (e.g.
the individual preferences and the sharing rule) and forecasting the
household behavior in new situations (see, e.g., Cherchye, De Rock
and Vermeulen, 2007d). To obtain these results, we can exploit the
similarity of our tests with the GARP conditions, in order to adapt
existing result for individual rationality towards the collective model
(see, e.g., Varian, 1982, 1983 and 2006, and Blundell, Browning and
Crawford, 2003 and 2007, for inspiring results). In Chapter 3 we already
did this for power measurements of Bronars (1987) and in Chapter 4
for Varian’s goodness-of-fit measure (see Varian, 1990).
From the empirical applications in Chapters 3 and 4, we may conclude
that the power of our tests of the general collective model is rather low.
However, there are several possibilities to increase the power of our re-
sults. Firstly, as we already did in our empirical applications, we can
further consider restricted collective models in order to obtain more
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stringent tests. Such restrictions could for example be: observability
of the distribution of goods (or household means over) the household
members (e.g exclusive goods/assignable information and sharing rule
restrictions); or imposing structure on the nature of the externalities
(e.g. exclude externalities for some (all) goods). Our results, and the
current literature, suggest that this is a fruitful strategy.
Secondly, our empirical applications were illustrative and considered
rather small data sets. Obviously, if we want to increase the power of
our results, we have to increase the sample size. In Cherchye, De Rock,
Sabbe and Vermeulen (2007), we therefore develop an alternative al-
gorithm, based on integer programming, which allows us to deal with
larger data sets.
Finally, we may try to adapt the ‘sequential maximum power path’
idea from Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2003, 2007), which is for-
mulated in an unitary setting, towards our collective model. Using this
concept, these authors obtain powerful recovery results for their unitary
setting.
The above remarks pertain to consumption settings, but of course,
analogous remarks hold for production settings. Firstly, we can further
apply our insights of the consumption context to the production setting,
in order to extend the existing nonparametric toolkit for analyzing cost
efficient behavior (see, e.g., Varian, 1984, and Banker and Maindiratta,
1988 for inspiring examples). We could for instance consider incorpo-
rating information on the decomposed input vectors and/or implicit
price vectors to obtain more powerful results. Secondly, as argued be-
fore, our tests extend the current Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
literature. We may therefore try to incorporate known results for DEA,
on for instance including restrictions on the implicit prices, in our tests.
See, e.g., Allen et al. (1997) and Pedraja-Chaparro et al. (1997) for sur-
veys; and Kuosmanen, Cherchye and Sipila¨inen (2006) for more recent
developments.
Finally, to increase power we can also apply the nonparametric boot-
strap methodology suggested by Simar and Wilson (1998) in a non-
parametric production context.
Once we have such a more powerful nonparametric machinery, we may
try to gain insight in the mechanics of collective choice behavior un-
der alternative restrictions. For the analysis of the household (or more
general group) behavior, we can do this, like in Chapter 4, by using
laboratory data to test different assumptions concerning for instance
General conclusion 159
the preferences and/or the decision process. Given that such a setting
optimally controls for heterogeneity and data problems, we may expect
to obtain more robust results. Moreover, the experimental set-up allows
us to obtain extra information concerning for instance the sharing rule
or the nature of the externalities.
Besides investigating alternative restrictions for the current (static)
setting, this machinery also allows us to tackle other intriguing issues
suggested in this work. In this respect, we will firstly focus on inte-
grating measurement error into our nonparametric tests. Cherchye, De
Rock, Sabbe and Vermeulen (2007) discuss the possibility to use their
IP formulation to include the idea of Varian (1985) for dealing with
measurement error. For applications of this idea in an unitary set-
ting, see, e.g., Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2007) and Crawford
(2007). Secondly, we may also try to integrate intertemporal aspects in
our nonparametric tests such as changing preferences (e.g. habit forma-
tion) and intertemporal decision making. See, e.g., Browning (1989),
Crawford (2007) for existing nonparametric results in an unitary set-
ting and Mazzocco (2007) for parametric results in a collective setting.
Finally, let us return once more to the policy relevant questions. As
already emphasized before, many of these questions are related to the
bargaining weights (e.g. measuring the effect of targeting a benefit to
specific members in the household). So within the collective model, re-
covery concerns not only the underlying preferences of individual house-
hold members, but mostly it aims to retrieve the underlying ‘weights’,
which are accorded within the decision process. Similarly, forecasting
pertains not only to the consumption quantities but also to the individ-
uals’ weights that apply in newly defined situations. So, a final line of
future research aims to further develop the methodology for retrieving
these weights and to tackle as such policy relevant questions as the ones
introduced in Chapter 1 (see again Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen,
2007d).
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